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Abstract 
 
Destalinisation was the process of enormous change that began in the 
wake of Stalin’s death. Whilst it has been heavily studied from the Soviet 
perspective, it has not been examined from the American standpoint. This thesis 
fills that gap. It took until 1956 for Eisenhower and Dulles to alter their 
perceptions of the USSR and its ideology despite the years of change that 
followed Stalin’s death. This thesis explains how the majority of policymakers 
rejected signals of change in the USSR until 1956. There were numerous reasons 
for this: domestic politics, relations with allies, and public opinion all played a 
role. But the key factor in preventing a change in mindset was an engrained 
perception of the Soviet leaders as Stalinists. While the Soviet leadership after 
1953 rejected the hallmarks of Stalinism, the Eisenhower administration 
understood such signals of change within a mindset that saw the Soviets as 
unreconstructed communists, expansionist in aims, conspiratorial in methods, 
and, above all, out to destroy the West. This perception was in effect a mental 
‘dam’, which held back any substantial perception change in Washington.  
 
By 1956, however, a new perception of destalinisation, and by extension 
Soviet Communism, came into being. The Eisenhower administration no longer 
rejected out of hand the changes the Soviet leadership enacted both domestically 
and in foreign relations. Eisenhower and Dulles found sufficient evidence to 
question whether the rigid view of Soviet Communism and its aims was accurate 
or useful. The 20th Party Congress caused serious cracks in the ‘dam'. Two of these 
‘cracks’ were in the minds if Eisenhower and Dulles, who by the end of 1956 had 
changed their view of the Soviet leaders, and no longer regarded them as Stalinist. 
This change in perception would ultimately allow détente to take hold. 
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Introduction 
Josef Stalin’s death had serious implications for U.S. foreign policy. Would 
the United States maintain its rigid Cold War policies toward the Soviet Union? If 
not, how would such a decision be formulated? Above all, would the new Soviet 
leadership differ from Stalin’s? To complicate matters, such questions needed to 
be considered within a complex melange of domestic politics, relations with allies, 
and divisions of opinion within the Eisenhower administration.  
Although the rapid deterioration of Soviet-American relations during the 
post-war years has been thoroughly documented, and American perceptions of 
the death of Stalin have been analysed, perceptions of the subsequent 
destalinisation in the USSR have not. In contrast to the dramatic changes in Soviet 
outlook, the central objectives and perceptions of U.S. foreign policy changed little 
in first years after Stalin’s death. Why was the United States, which had 
developed a thorough evaluation of the threat posed by communism, not more 
perceptive of the changes taking place within the centre of the enemy it found so 
threatening?  
This is the question at the heart of this thesis. The answer shows how the 
Eisenhower administration initially failed to understand the importance of 
destalinisation due to engrained perceptions of the Soviets as doctrinaire and 
expansionist. In the minds of those in the administration, leaders in Moscow 
remained Stalinists. Although key figures in the Eisenhower administration also 
considered other factors, such as domestic politics and relations with allies, 
overall it was these rigid perceptions in the face of events inside the USSR that 
were crucial. 
Some Definitions 
A few terms must be clarified. Firstly, ‘destalinisation’ means a number of 
different things, especially to scholars of Soviet history. In one sense it can be 
applied only to the period following the 20th Party Congress in which it was an 
active policy of the Kremlin to disavow much of Stalin’s legacy.1 This thesis uses a 
                                                       
1 In the USSR “destalinisation” was never in public usage in this period. It was instead referred to as 
“overcoming the cult of personality”. Polly Jones is perhaps the most renowned current scholar of 
the issue. She says the West defined it as “…the process of historical revisionism that dissected the 
Chapter 1: Stalin’s Death and the change in leadership, 1953 
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more expansive definition, however. It sees destalinisation as the process by 
which Stalin’s successors moved away from the methods and style of rule that the 
West viewed as typical of Stalin, especially in the post-war years, for example: 
dictatorial control, the widespread use of terror, an antagonistic and obstructive 
foreign policy, and severe hostility towards the West.   
In another sense the most important, and verifiable element of 
destalinisation from the very beginning was the vastly reduced role that Stalin’s 
legacy played in the justification of Soviet policies. Ironically, Stalin’s death 
marked the beginning of the end of the Stalin myth. His successors dismantled 
this cult almost immediately, and U.S. policymakers took note. Without Stalin to 
justify Soviet policies, the question of who was in control in the Kremlin became 
even more important as it was one of the few ways the U.S. could ascertain the 
future direction of the Kremlin. Inside the administration, officials expressed a 
great deal of concern over whether a ‘power struggle’ would ensue. For them, the 
question of who ruled in the Kremlin was integral to destalinisation itself. That is 
why this dimension is so predominant in the pages that follow.  
Another term that needs clarification is the notion of ‘American 
perceptions’.2 For the most part, the thesis equates ‘American’ and ‘U.S.’ with the 
opinions of key voices in the administration, particularly President Eisenhower 
and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles figures more prominently than 
Eisenhower, partly because he left a more extensive paper trail and so is more 
observable. By contrast, Eisenhower, as president, held far wider ranging 
                                                       
Stalin cult”, whereas the Soviets objectified the issue as a struggle against the “cult of personality”. 
She emphasises, however, that destalinisation had many more meanings and cut across all divisions. 
There are studies on areas as diverse as farming, architecture and criminal justice. Polly Jones, ed., 
The Dilemmas of de-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 2–3; Polly Jones, ed., “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal 
Responses to de-Stalinisation,” in The Dilemmas of de-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social 
Change in the Khrushchev Era (London: Routledge, 2006), 41–42; See also: Polly Jones, “From Stalinism 
to Post-Stalinism: De-Mythologising Stalin, 1953-56,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 4, 
no. 1 (June 1, 2003): .  A meta-search of databases of peer-reviewed journals and books for 
“destalinisation” reveals hundreds of publications on topics as diverse as the satellites, North Korea, 
Gorbachev, literature, architecture, and even physiology. These are only the publications in English. 
However, all of these publications are from the perspective of the Soviets or former communist 
satellites. None examine the phenomenon from the Western perspective. Search performed in the 
BLPES search engine. It is a meta-search of all publications and journals available at the BLPES. The 
same search performed in WorldCat revealed 609 publications. 
2 Perception has received extensive treatment in both international relations and political 
psychology literature. The most famous, and perhaps thorough analysis is perhaps Robert Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
Chapter 1: Stalin’s Death and the change in leadership, 1953 
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responsibilities. In NSC meetings, he typically intervened only at the end of 
discussions, and so did not reveal his thinking in any details.3 He also delegated a 
great amount of work to NSC assistants and groups. When he did discuss foreign 
policy issues with his advisers, these meetings were often off the record.  
At the same time, the views of those in the cabinet and NSC were also 
important, especially Allen Dulles, and CIA material figures prominently.4 
Charles Bohlen was perhaps the savviest member of the administration towards 
destalinisation and features conspicuously. But a number of administration 
outsiders, both in academia, the press, or otherwise are included, especially when 
they influenced changing perceptions. Furthermore, the media offered a source of 
intelligence that was critical when dealing with a closed society. In this regard 
journalists could offer key insights into the Kremlin.  
The Argument 
Stalin’s death marked the beginning of destalinisation. But this was a 
process of change within the USSR that the administration largely discounted 
until 1956. The reasons why the administration ignored it for so long can be traced 
to a number of factors. The most important of these was the engrained perception 
of the Soviet leaders, and of communism more generally. The relationship 
between the U.S. and the USSR since the end of the Second World War was rocky, 
to say the least. Much of the U.S. perception of the Soviets as inherently 
expansionist, repressive and violent came from longer term views of Russian 
tsarist imperialism. But communism gave it a new, more virulent potency, one 
that was antithetical to what those in government thought the U.S. stood for. The 
distrust and distain for Soviet Communism stretched back to the Bolshevik 
revolution.5 
                                                       
3 Anna Kasten Nelson, “The ‘Top of Policy Hill’: President Eisenhower and the National Security 
Council,” Diplomatic History 7, no. 4 (October 1, 1983): 307–26; John Burke, Honest Broker?: The 
National Security Advisor and Presidential Decision Making, 1st ed. (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2009); John P. Burke, “The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign-Policy Decision 
Making: A Reassessment,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2005): 229–58. 
4 For the sake of clarity, when Allen Dulles is mentioned I refer to him with his full name in the first 
instance of the paragraph. When both he and John Foster Dulles are mentioned in the same 
paragraph, I refer to them with ‘Allen Dulles’ and ‘Foster Dulles’.  
5 An excellent overview of the origins of U.S. anti-Bolshevism is: David S. Foglesong, America’s Secret 
War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1995), chap. 2. 
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Soviet actions in the interwar period were understood within a context of 
distrust and hatred for communism as an ideology that sought to destroy the 
basis of Western society. Thus after the aberration of the Grand Alliance was over, 
this mistrust remerged and manifested itself in deteriorating relations. Therefore, 
the men in the administration, all of whom had various experiences with Soviet 
Communism, some from its earliest years, came to form hostile perceptions of the 
USSR. Communism was committed to violent expansion and the elimination of 
capitalism. It was the antithesis of American democracy. It sought the destruction 
of individual rights and subjugation to the state.6 
It was with such a mindset that the Eisenhower administration not only 
immediately dismissed Stalin’s death as of consequence for U.S. policy, but also 
rejected the Soviet leadership’s ‘new course’ as tactical. Indeed, the administration 
thought the Soviet emphasis on peace validated a suspicious mindset: these 
changes were only made for the benefit of spreading revolution. The idea that 
there could have been changes of substance was wholly rejected. Soviet 
Communism in the minds of U.S. policymakers retained its expansionist goals, 
and thus they considered any change that appeared outwardly beneficial for 
improved relations as a ploy to undermine the West. This is in part due to the 
human tendency to fit new information into existing beliefs, thus causing bias. 
This is a normal response that allows quicker comprehension and reaction to 
events. However, it also makes existing beliefs resistant to change, which in turn 
can cause unrealistic expectations.7 
Compounding this engrained hostility toward the USSR were other 
concerns. Domestic politics in the 1953-56 period meant that even giving pause to 
the changes in the USSR could be politically disastrous. This illuminates, in part, 
the response of the administration to Stalin’s death and the transfer of power in 
the USSR. Given the politically cautious nature of both Eisenhower and Dulles, 
consideration of the beginning of destalinisation had to be done very carefully.  
                                                       
6 The terms ‘Soviet ideology’ and ‘Soviet Communism’ are used interchangeably. They are taken to 
mean the official doctrine that the CPSU sought to spread throughout the world, i.e., the ‘party line’ 
of Marxism-Leninism as defined by the Presidium and rubber stamped at Party Congresses. ‘The 
Kremlin’, ‘Soviet leadership’, ‘the Soviets’, ‘the USSR’ and the like all refer to the ruling elite of the 
CPSU.  
7 The literature on belief systems is extensive. See for example: Robert Jervis, “Understanding 
Beliefs,” Political Psychology 27, no. 5 (October 2006): 641–63; Richard Little and Steve Smith, Belief 
Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). 
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The relationship between the U.S. and its allies in this period was another 
consideration. Western European leaders wanted to keep the U.S. involved in 
European defence for their own sake, and were aware of the isolationist 
tendencies of many in Washington. But European leaders also had to take into 
account the desires of their own electorates. The desire for peace often clashed 
with the interests of European defence. The rapid turnover of French 
governments in this period was a source of instability in allied policymaking. 
With Stalin’s death, Europeans questioned how much of a threat the USSR 
remained. This was a situation the Soviets sought to exploit. For the most part 
European leaders were aware of this. But the British, French and West Germans 
all interpreted the changes in the USSR slightly differently in light of their own 
domestic imperatives and ideological predilections. Therefore, the French were 
most inclined to give change in the USSR the benefit of the doubt, whilst the West 
Germans under Konrad Adenauer rejected them outright. The British remained 
close to the U.S. initially in their interpretation, but their perceptions changed 
more quickly than did the Americans.   
Hostility towards the changes in Moscow remained the prevalent 
perception (with the exception of a few voices in the U.S. administration) of the 
Soviet leaders and their objectives until late 1955, when doubt began to creep into 
the minds of Dulles and Eisenhower. More and more Soviet actions were given 
the benefit of the doubt, though Soviet intentions remained the object of 
suspicion. 
When Khrushchev consolidated his position at the top of the Kremlin 
hierarchy, he instituted a renewed emphasis on neutralism. It was part of a larger 
campaign of peaceful coexistence, or even competitive coexistence. The 
Eisenhower administration felt extremely threatened by this. The shift away from 
militarism as a means of controlling communism abroad was unwelcome as far as 
the U.S. was concerned. It was more difficult to counter. Indeed, one of the 
perverse results of this was that destalinisation was in many ways discounted as a 
ploy meant to undermine the West.  
The 20th Party Congress initially furthered this hostile American 
interpretation. The Congress enshrined changes to Soviet Communist doctrine 
that had been made since 1953. The U.S. found this dangerous. The 20th Party 
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Congress allowed the Soviets to publicly revise their ideology in a manner that 
made it much more accessible and attractive to neutralist sentiment and newly 
independent nations. These changes made the Soviets at once less and more 
menacing: less due to the emphasis on peace and reduced emphasis on 
revolution; but more dangerous since the U.S. thought these changes were a fig 
leaf meant to draw neutral nations closer to the Soviet orbit.  As a result the U.S. 
fit these changes into existing perceptions of the Soviets. This led policymakers to 
reject that there had been any change at all in the Kremlin. 
However, the 20th Party Congress was also a watershed moment. At first, 
various groups in the U.S. administration believed that nothing of substance 
would change in the USSR. Though they mostly considered the ideological 
changes announced in the opening days as an unwelcome development, they also 
saw that the denouncement of Stalin as a profound change. They felt that the 
Soviet leaders would not undertake such an action lightly. Thus, the 
administration closely scrutinised CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s 
speech. As a result, many key U.S. policymakers, most notably Dulles, who in 
turn influenced Eisenhower, came to regard destalinisation as genuine. Whilst it 
could have detrimental impacts for the U.S., it also allowed for numerous 
opportunities. Regardless, the U.S. could no longer persist in the belief that 
nothing of substance had changed in the Kremlin.  
After years of prodding for the U.S. to undertake a serious evaluation of 
the changes in the Kremlin there was finally a serious shift of perspective at the 
top. Dulles himself accepted that the Soviet leaders were not the Stalinists he 
thought they were. Crucially though, he expressed these thoughts only in private. 
This is not to say that a good measure of doubt about the changes of 
destalinisation remained. To be sure, in public the administration expressed such 
doubts frequently, where the refrain remained that the changes in the Kremlin did 
little to alter the situation. But as 1956 progressed more and more documents 
show key members of the administration accepting the fundamentals of 
destalinisation as changing the nature of the USSR’s interaction with the world- to 
both the advantage and disadvantage of the West. 
The new conception of destalinisation as held by Dulles and others was 
challenged by the unrest in the satellites. This led many in the administration to 
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reassert that nothing had truly changed in the Kremlin. Yet in the wake of the 
uprising in Hungary there was no mention by Eisenhower or Dulles of the Soviets 
‘reverting’ to Stalinism. Instead, the uprisings seemed to convince them that 
Stalinism was definitively gone, even if the Soviets would continue to rely on 
force when necessary.  
 
Thesis Scope and Structure 
As mentioned, the term destalinisation can conjure up various meanings. 
This was also a period of transition and flux in the Cold War, and therefore the 
scope of the thesis must be made clear. It covers the period from Stalin’s death in 
1953 until the weeks following the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. However, the 
focus is mostly on the years 1955-56. This is for a few reasons. Firstly, the 1953 
period has been covered well by a number of scholars. Secondly, 1954 was a 
particularly poor period for documentation. Lastly, the sense in the 
administration that something was indeed changing in the USSR became more 
prevalent through 1955, and then truly came into its own in 1956. Therefore, the 
bulk of the thesis focuses on 1956.  
The thesis is an examination how of U.S. perceptions towards the Soviets 
changed in this period. This means two things for its scope. Due to the nature of 
examining perception, there is necessarily some discussion of Soviet foreign and 
domestic policy. However, it must be borne in mind that this is only in order to 
illuminate the positions and mindsets of those in the Eisenhower administration. 
This is not a study in Soviet history. Furthermore, whilst domestic U.S. politics 
certainly played a role in the speed of changing perceptions and their expression, 
this thesis examines how those in the Eisenhower administration looked 
‘outward’. Again, domestic issues often influenced this, but they will be examined 
only insofar as they effected foreign perceptions, and not in and of themselves.8 
                                                       
8 An excellent explanation of the interface between international and national history, as well as the 
role of individuals (which features heavily in this thesis) is: Frank Costigliola and Thomas G. 
Paterson, “Defining and Doing the History of United States Foreign Relations: A Primer,” in 
Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd Edition (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) This thesis cuts across such definitions. Although it looks primarily at U.S. foreign 
relations history, it does so in a way that necessarily takes into account international trends and 
events, as well as individual, yet international, experiences of those involved in the thesis. 
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The third world was of increasing relevance to the Cold War in this 
period. However, limits must be set on the scope of a PhD thesis, and this falls 
outside of what was possible. The role of the third world for U.S. perceptions of 
the new Soviet leadership and destalinisation is indeed interesting, but it does not 
change the conclusions of this thesis.9 
Stalin’s Death and the Initial Leadership Transition, 1953-54 
The first two chapters examine 1953 and 1954. This is necessary to provide 
context for the later chapters and highlight how far thinking progressed by 1956. 
In these years the overwhelming position towards the USSR remained one of 
hostility and mistrust. The administration rejected Soviet peaceful gestures after 
Stalin’s death out of hand. This much has been researched before. However, in 
addition to providing context, these chapters provide a new narrative by 
examining the nascent trend of destalinisation, something other studies 
conspicuously fail to do. This period was the true genesis of destalinisation, and 
there were key actions taken by the new Soviet leadership in this regard. Some 
members of the U.S. administration were cognisant of this, and made initial 
attempts to bring these developments to the attention of Eisenhower and Dulles. 
However, the engrained perceptions of both these men, as well as the 
overwhelming rejection of any serious or lasting change in the Kremlin meant 
they were disregarded.  
By the end of 1954 the consensus in the administration was that despite 
increasing evidence to the contrary, the Soviet leaders remained Stalinists 
committed to worldwide communist domination. The fundamental reason for this 
was that, as far as anyone could tell, Soviet objectives remained the same as they 
had been at the time of Stalin’s death. That is to say, the Soviets remained 
                                                       
9 A good deal of research went into investigating the role of the Third World in U.S. perceptions of 
destalinisation. The Eisenhower administration was acutely aware of the danger posed by the Soviet 
advances into the Third World at this time. It interpreted destalinisation as (in part) a way of 
sweetening economic and military aid packages by concurrently altering Soviet ideology in order to 
make it more attractive. This would at once entice neutrals and developing nations by offering them 
assistance, and, crucially, making the Soviet model and ideology more attractive. The administration 
well recognised the danger this posed. See: Weston Ullrich, “The Eisenhower Administration, 
Destalinisation and the Soviet Third World Offensive, 1954-56” paper presented at Society for the 
History of American Foreign Relations Conference, Arlington, VA, June 21, 2013, and: Robert J. 
Mcmahon, “The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of the Soviet Threat, 1955–1956,” 
The International History Review 18, no. 3 (September 1996): 591–619, 
doi:10.1080/07075332.1996.9640755. 
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communists. Therefore, any changes made by the Kremlin were regarded by the 
administration as mere window dressing.  
Destalinisation as a Source of Increased Danger 
This portion of the thesis focuses on the period between 1954 and 1956. 
During this period the administration increasingly accepted that destalinisation 
was not a ‘red herring’, but was indeed something the Soviet leaders were 
advocating as a policy in itself. However, the administration as a whole continued 
to assert that the purpose of any change in the USSR was to undermine the West. 
So whilst there was increased acceptance of the USSR moving away from 
Stalinism, the conclusion was that this only made the USSR and its ideology more 
dangerous to the U.S. 
Chapter three addresses the ouster of Malenkov from the Premiership and 
Khrushchev’s consolidation of power in the Kremlin. The overall emphasis is on 
debates in the administration surrounding whether Khrushchev’s ascent meant 
there would be a return to Stalinist style dictatorship, or whether collective 
leadership in fact remained in force. But I argue that these debates mattered in 
changing perceptions. If Khrushchev was solidifying a dictatorship then those 
who felt there was never any serious change away from Stalinism would be 
confirmed in their belief that despite the changes in the USSR, the objectives of the 
Kremlin remained unaltered. In contrast, those who felt that collective leadership 
was still in force thought that the changes in the Kremlin since 1953 were not 
reversed by Khrushchev’s ascendance. They urged the administration to take a 
hard look at the Soviet new tactics in an effort to better understand how to 
counter the revised Soviet foreign policy line.  
1955 presaged a number of important changes in Soviet foreign policy that 
would come into full blossom at the 20th Party Congress and these are addressed 
in chapter four. One of these was the re-emergence of Lenin as the key figure to 
cite for doctrinal questions. This was a key form of destalinisation which the 
administration took note of. Indeed, 1955 presented the administration with a 
number of Soviet foreign policy moves that challenged the existing perception of 
the leaders as unchanged Stalinists. The rapprochement with Tito, overtures to 
neutrals, and the Soviet offensive into the developing world were among these. 
But rather than rethink their perceptions of Khrushchev and others, the 
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administration instead found it easier to fit these new patterns into the existing 
mindset towards the Soviet leaders. Ironically, Soviet ideology, as far as the U.S. 
understood it, was key in this.  
The newfound emphasis on peaceful coexistence was another 
development that unnerved the administration. It was understood to be part of a 
larger scheme to gain favour among neutrals across the globe. Though 
qualitatively different from the Stalin era, the fact that Stalin had frequently used 
images of peace his propaganda caused the administration to doubt the veracity 
of the Soviet commitment to peace. Furthermore, since this shift was naturally 
meant to benefit the USSR, many in the administration dismissed it. Here I show 
that changes in the USSR would only be taken seriously if detrimental to it. 
The most important development, however, came at the end of 1955 after 
the Geneva Conference. I show that it was at this point that Dulles and 
Eisenhower first expressed faint optimism that the Soviets had indeed changed 
away from Stalinism and were in fact a new breed of Soviet leaders, one that the 
U.S. could productively cooperate with. This trend would develop further over 
1956.  
The 20th Party Congress and the Genesis of a Changed Perception of the USSR 
Chapter five deals directly with the 20th Party Congress. First the views of 
various groups within the administration prior to the Congress are assessed in 
order to present the reader with the perceptions of the administration prior to the 
Congress. Then, initial reports and assessments of the Congress are examined. 
Key to these are the issues of whether the Congress would present the 
administration with any significant changes from the Soviets. Initial reports of the 
Secret Speech are scrutinised in this regard in order to provide context for the 
later revelations of the Secret Speech.  
The opinions of key allies and non-aligned nations are taken into 
consideration as they act as a foil to the U.S. understanding of the 20th Party 
Congress. The influence of domestic politics is evaluated. Finally, the initial U.S. 
propaganda line is discussed as it was the beginning of an important element of 
continuity through the remainder of 1956.  
The 20th Party Congress ushered in a new level of urgency to 
destalinisation. Chapter six illustrates how the administration quickly became 
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aware that anything representative of Stalin’s legacy was to be destroyed. But 
conclusions varied. Some thought the U.S. should wait to see what the Secret 
Speech and destalinisation represented; while others were more bullish and ready 
to dismiss it as yet another ploy to undermine the West. Here I show that this was 
the point at which a new conception of the Soviet leaders began to gain ground. 
Dulles began to express privately to a small group that the Soviet leaders were in 
fact changed from the Stalinists he had previously thought they were. A number 
of other actors in the administration also voiced their concern that the 
administration was not properly evaluating the longer-term changes in the USSR 
that the Congress was highlighting.  
When the U.S. finally obtained a copy of the speech it presented a 
potential propaganda coup, but debate ensued about how forcefully to use the 
speech to attack the Soviet leaders. This in turn provides a good indication of how 
various policymakers were approaching the effects of destalinisation on the U.S. 
This was because using the speech to attack Soviet intentions was in many ways 
contrary to the policy of encouraging evolutionary change in the USSR. As a 
result of the disagreement of how forceful propaganda should be towards the 
Soviets, the U.S. only distributed the speech, rather than relying on more 
innovative ways to exploit it concocted by a number of agencies. Chapter seven 
argues that part of the lack of action was down to the caution of Eisenhower and 
Dulles. But the real driving force was that this was the same time that Dulles was 
becoming more and more assertive about his views that the Soviet leaders had 
indeed become a new breed. He was thus reticent to appear too hostile towards 
the USSR lest it backfire and strengthen hardliners in the Kremlin.  
The most explosive result of destalinisation was the resistance to Soviet 
domination in Poland and Hungary in October-November 1956. Although the 
role of the U.S. in the uprisings has been examined, how the uprising affected U.S. 
perceptions of destalinisation has not. Chapter eight highlights the effects of these 
events on how the administration perceived of the changes in the Soviet bloc since 
Stalin’s death, and specifically since the 20th Party Congress. The effect of the 
Poznan riots is analysed as it is useful in addressing how the recent knowledge of 
the contents of the Secret Speech changed U.S. perceptions of Soviet satellite 
control. Polish October and the Hungarian uprising are addressed insofar as they 
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were events heavily influenced by destalinisation. How the U.S. responded is 
considered in order to understand how perceptions of destalinisation influenced 
the U.S. response. Conversely, how open resistance to Soviet control affected U.S. 
perceptions of destalinisation is evaluated. Counter intuitively, the Hungarian 
Uprising did not reverse the change in perceptions of the Soviets that had begun 
to be accepted by Eisenhower and Dulles earlier in 1956. 
Sources 
Archives 
The thesis draws on a number of sources. First and foremost are materials 
found in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and the National 
Archives and Records Administration. These, along with a number of published 
documents in various FRUS volumes form the bedrock of the thesis. Some of this 
material has been utilised before in other studies of the period. None of it, 
however, has been examined with destalinisation in mind. In addition to these 
sources are documents found in the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST). Many of 
these have not been used before. They offer an unvarnished look at how 
intelligence was gathered and analysed relating to the changes in the Soviet 
Union, and how it was compiled to form the briefs used by Allen Dulles at NSC 
meetings. Also of interest are contributions from CIA ‘consultants’ such as George 
Kennan, who remained on the CIA payroll through the period in question, and in 
this anonymous guise contributed to CIA opinions. 
However, since the onset of the Cold War the Kremlin was a ‘black box’ 
for U.S. intelligence. As far as we know the CIA had no operatives in the Kremlin. 
In order to fill this gap the State Department relied heavily on the despatches of 
the few American and British correspondents in Moscow. The papers of Harrison 
Salisbury, long-time Moscow correspondent for the New York Times were 
consulted to investigate this. His papers highlight the collaboration between some 
in the press in Moscow and the embassy there, and his role as a frequent source of 
intelligence for Ambassador Charles Bohlen. In addition, the State Department’s 
Bureau of Public Affairs kept a close eye on domestic and international media and 
its impression of U.S. policies. It is a great source for understanding how the State 
Department thought the press, both at home and abroad, perceived of it.  
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Salisbury is just one of administration outsiders that shed light on the 
initially static, and later changing perceptions of the administration. Other 
correspondents and public figures are woven into the thesis for this reason. 
Former government official Louis Halle maintained correspondence with Policy 
Planning Staff head Robert Bowie. We know from this, as well as from Allen 
Dulles’ use of consultants outside the CIA, that the administration was listening 
to outsiders. They were a key source of intelligence, analysis, and indications of 
public opinion.  
The relationship between correspondents of Time magazine and the State 
Department is indicative of this. The Time correspondent dispatches at the 
Houghton Library at Harvard University, part of long-time Time editor Roy 
Larson’s papers, show the extent to which the press and State Department relied 
on each other are. Many, if not all, of the despatches cited are based on leaks from 
the Russian and Eastern European affairs sections of the State Department. the 
dispatches provide a look into the mindset of those working under Dulles, and 
the political attitudes of these men. The despatches offer a great number of direct 
quotations from the ‘leakers’, and thus are not simply the interpretation of Time 
correspondents- though they do shed a light on those opinions as well. The men 
who acted as sources for these despatches did so under the condition that they 
remain anonymous. Most times, however, they are specifically named in the 
despatches, but with the instruction that they are ‘not for attribution’. Thus there 
is likely a higher level of candour from the sources themselves. This does not 
mean, though, that they did not have a political axe to grind by leaking to Time, 
and this is illuminating. The Time dispatches are novel in that they have not been 
used in this area before. They offer an alternative view of how perceptions of 
destalinisation and the Soviet leadership were resistant to change, and when they 
did start to change in the minds of men like Dulles, the resistance he would have 
encountered. 
In order to gain perspective on U.S. policies and allies the British National 
Archives (Kew) were researched. These yielded important materials that shed 
light on how U.S. and British perspectives of destalinisation differed. FO series 
materials also contain numerous files from the UK delegation to NATO, which in 
turn highlight how the alliance, and its constituent countries, conceived of the 
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Soviet threat and the changes that it was seemingly undergoing. In all of the 
above the differing, or similar, opinions offer a useful foil to the materials found 
in U.S. archives. Though the differences in perceptions of the U.S. and those of its 
Western European allies were often minor, these differences help to point out that 
even in varying circumstances the same conclusions were often reached, and if 
they were not, what led to this divergence of opinion. Evidence from Western 
allies also illuminates that in the absence of firm intelligence much was left to 
interpretation, which in turn rested upon perceptions.  
 
Memoirs and Contemporaneous Literature  
Memoirs and literature published by those who were involved in 
policymaking were extensively consulted. It must be noted of course, that such 
sources contain numerous drawbacks. They are subject to the vagaries of ego and 
desires to burnish the image of those involved for posterity. Yet when compared 
to the archival records, they can often illustrate whether such historical actors 
were trustworthy or consistent in their reporting, and whether their memoirs are 
reliable. Eisenhower’s autobiography is an example of such embellishment. He 
presents himself as a keen peacemaker. While I do not doubt he genuinely wanted 
peace, he was also keenly anti-communist. These convictions prevented his 
acceptance of change in the Kremlin until 1956. Furthermore, the documentary 
record, as has been examined by numerous historians (and is noted in the thesis) 
is often contrary to his reminisces. Dulles, in contrast, died before he could write 
memoirs. Curiously there has been no comprehensive biography of him since 
Townsend Hoopes’ The Devil and John Foster Dulles was published in 1974. 
Hoopes’ work, while especially informative about the politics within the State 
Department, is also compromised by Hoopes’ barely concealed distain for Dulles. 
The most useful memoir in this regard is Charles Bohlen’s. The historical record 
confirms his accounts, and he often provides copies of documents to substantiate 
his narrative. Numerous other memoirs are used, as noted in the bibliography.  
A number of newspaper and magazine accounts are consulted as well. 
These are often found within archival material, which is an indication that it was 
at the very least considered by policymakers at the time, and may have influenced 
their thinking. In addition, works by actors in and close to the administration who 
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published their thinking on matters relating to destalinisation are also included. 
These include works by Robert Tucker, Walt Rostow, and numerous other 
‘Kremlinologists’. These encompass both items published in popular magazines, 
as well as academic journals, as well as books often published long after the 
period in question. In the case of the latter I consider them somewhere between 
secondary literature and memoirs.  
Historiography and Literature Review 
Examining Stalin’s Death 
The death of Stalin has given rise to a considerable amount of scholarly 
literature from the Soviet perspective. Less has been done from a Western 
standpoint, but there are a number of studies that specifically address the larger 
question of whether Stalin’s death was an opportunity for a ‘chance for peace’ or a 
‘first détente’. This thesis seeks to build on an area that is unexamined in such 
works: the beginnings of destalinisation and how the U.S. perceived and 
responded to it; and critically, how such perceptions changed when the period 
examined is extended to 1956. 
The definitive volume on the period is The Cold War after Stalin's Death: A 
Missed Opportunity for Peace? It brings together a number of scholars in the field to 
address this question from varying angles while highlighting several important 
themes.10 Among these was the fundamental nature of Stalin to the Cold War thus 
                                                       
10 Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, eds., The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for 
Peace? (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) Other works which address the issue, but in a less 
specific manner, are discussed in the following section. There is a significant amount of articles on 
the topic that date from 1953-57, and therefore lack access to archives. They do provide an 
illustration of the mindset of academics and Sovietologists at the time. Consequently, they lie 
somewhere between primary and secondary sources. The most prolific authors were Philip Mosely, 
director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, and Bertram Wolfe. See the comprehensive 
bibliography attached for a selection of their articles. Naturally there is a greater quantity of 
literature dealing with Stalin’s death and destalinisation from the Soviet perspective. Notable works 
include: Geoffrey Roberts, “A Chance for Peace? The Soviet Campaign to End the Cold War, 1953-
1955,” CWIHP Working Paper Series, no. No. 57 (n.d.), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/WP57_WebFinal.pdf; Vladislav Zubok, A Failed 
Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (University of North Carolina Press, 
2009); Zolina Yelisaveta, “De-Stalinisation in the Mirror of Western Politics,” International Affairs 
(Moscow) 3, no. March (1993): 115–25; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the 
Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); 
William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (London: Free Press, 2005); Aleksandr Fursenko 
and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 2007); Harry Hanak, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin, World Studies Series 
(London: Routledge, 1972); Robert C. Tucker, “The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization,” World Politics 
9, no. 4 (July 1957): 550–78; Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and 
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far. Mark Kramer rightly points out that he was integral to every East-West 
conflict between 1930-53. On a superficial level, this is obvious. Yet Kramer’s 
remark that the absence of Stalin introduced fluidity into the international 
situation highlights the towering figure that he cut in East-West relations.11 Stalin 
had built a system where both the party and state were completely subordinate to 
him.12 Therefore, the substance of the Cold War in his lifetime was dependent on 
him. Kramer and most of the other contributors agree that ‘peace’ was not 
possible in 1953, and any chance there may have been was gone by the time of the 
East German Uprising in June 1953.13 However, they do not address the longer-
term implications for U.S.-USSR relations that the origin of destalinisation 
unleashed.  
Rather, many of the contributors to The Cold War after Stalin's Death focus 
on how the Eisenhower administration sought to capitalize on Stalin’s death in 
order to gain an advantage in the Cold War. Among these is Ira Chernus, who 
makes many of the same arguments that he develops in Apocalypse Management.14 
According to Chernus both Eisenhower and Soviet Prime Minister Georgi 
Malenkov constructed a Cold War discourse that divided the two, but also acted 
as a brake on tensions. This necessitated that both Eisenhower and Malenkov 
present themselves as the opposite of the other while being careful not to 
perpetuate the image that they were being obstinate in reaching an 
accommodation. Key to this rhetorical difference was the definition of ‘peace’ that 
each side operated from. 15  
                                                       
Poland: Reassessments and New Findings,” Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 2 (April 1998): 
163–214; Charles Gati, “The Stalinist Legacy in Soviet Foreign Policy,” Proceedings of the Academy of 
Political Science 35, no. 3 (1984): 214–26. 
11 Mark Kramer, “Introduction: International Politics in the Early Post-Stalin Era: A Lost 
Opportunity, a Turning Point, or More of the Same?,” in The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed 
Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), xiii. 
12 See chapter 9 in: Isaac Deustcher, Stalin: A Political Biography, 2nd Ed. (New York: OUP, 1966); Merle 
Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, Russian Research Center Studies  ; (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1963), 265–71, 354–89.  
13 Kramer, “Introduction,” xiii–xiv. 
14 Ira Chernus, Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
15 Kramer, “Introduction,” xxi. In contrast, Kramer points to the short duration of time between 
Stalin’s death and the East German uprising as preventing an accommodation between the U.S. and 
USSR. 
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Eisenhower envisioned peace as a mode of separation.16 He presented the 
U.S. as a bastion of justice, hope and peace; while the USSR represented evil, war 
and slavery. The ‘Chance for Peace’ speech given in the weeks after Stalin’s death 
showed such a worldview, and set the tone for Eisenhower’s Cold War rhetoric 
towards the USSR.17 In contrast, Malenkov put forth a concept of peace as a mode 
of cooperation. This sort of ‘peace’ was intended to avoid war by Soviet 
participation in political and economic relationships.18 However, the U.S. viewed 
Soviet actions to create such relationships as deceptive. To those in the U.S. 
administration such actions towards ‘peace’ were the same as those needed to 
accumulate Soviet power. In this vein, Chernus mentions Stalin’s assurances to 
the West that the peace movements were intended to prevent war, and not to 
undermine the West.19 With the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust between the 
U.S. and USSR, such a statement had the opposite effect, and the U.S. was not out 
of line with its allies in thinking the peace movements were bogus and intended 
only to undermine Western security.20 
Many in the administration had seen the peace movements ‘movie’ before. 
Such feelings of doubt combined with the perceptions of the Soviets as 
ideologically implacable and bent on the spread of communism made 
accommodation unlikely. Taken in tandem with the administration’s policy 
commitments such as NATO, the EDC, and Mutual Security, any idea of quick 
policy changes after Stalin’s death were stillborn.  
In this regard, Lloyd Gardner argues that the U.S. was so committed to the 
reconstruction of West Germany, Japan, and the liberal-capitalist system, that the 
idea of meaningful change in the Soviet system was not taken seriously. There 
was no motivation to probe the Soviets and the peaceful gestures they had made 
since Stalin’s death. Rather, the inclination, personified by Dulles, was to brush 
aside such gestures as ‘tactical retreats’, the roots of which laid in communist 
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doctrine.21 I argue that this inclination to dismiss changes in the Soviet system was 
not limited to Stalin’s death, but proved to be the norm until 1956.  
 The Soviet attempts to mend fences, if indeed genuine, were flawed from 
the beginning since they were expressed in Stalinist rhetoric. Jeffery Brooks notes 
that in their effort to gain legitimacy, the new leaders had moved immediately to 
curb the excesses of Stalin’s rule while simultaneously lessening domestic 
repression. However, the new leadership was so immersed in the Stalinist rhetoric 
that although they could ‘walk the walk’, they could not ‘talk the talk’.22 The 
supreme irony is that in his ‘Chance for Peace’ speech Eisenhower specifically 
stated, “We care nothing for mere rhetoric. We care only for sincerity of peaceful 
purpose—attested by deeds.”23 However, the U.S. was so conditioned to words 
rather than action that it could not realise when the Soviets actually provided the 
deeds, many of which were undertaken in the 1953-56 period. The administration 
was itself so immersed in Stalinist discourse that they assumed the Soviet state 
was still an embodiment of Stalin, and must operate as such.24 Any opportunity 
for improved relations was killed by the combination of the Soviet inability to 
express itself in anything other than Stalinist terms, and the inability of the U.S. 
leaders to interpret it through anything other than the ‘lens’ they had developed 
in the Cold War thus far.  
The most recent scholarship reconsiders the period after Stalin’s death not 
only as one of détente, but also as a chance to end the Cold War. Jaclyn Stanke 
argues that three positions towards the USSR existed: to destroy it; to reform it; or 
to come to an understanding (détente). Whilst she is broadly correct in identifying 
these three groups of thought, in reality they were never as solid as she implies. 
The ‘membership’ in any group varied depending on the exact period in question. 
Furthermore, those who desired the destruction of the USSR, CD Jackson and 
Walt Rostow she mentions specifically, had varying influence in the 
administration. At any rate, the idea of totally destroying the Soviet system was 
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not a popular one for any number of reasons, and was not held by Eisenhower 
and Dulles. This is made clear in NSC-5505/1 when the decision is taken to 
actively seek evolutionary change in the USSR. Indeed, it even specifically states 
that the U.S. should not seek the destruction of the Soviet regime. But there is no 
mention of it in Stanke’s work.25 She only addresses the desire of some to reform 
the USSR. But the period in which this reformist tendency was greatest was after 
the Geneva Conference, and critically, after the 20th Party Congress. These are 
both absent in her work, and this thesis fills that gap.  
Major Works Addressing the 1953-56 Period 
There are a number of broader works that address questions or themes 
relevant to this study.26 Richard Immerman’s and Robert Bowie’s Waging Peace is 
the most directly useful to scholars of the Eisenhower administration. They argue 
that the administration approached the Cold War through a ‘bureaucratic-
national security’ framework. Largely positive, it is perhaps the apex Eisenhower 
revisionism. It does address Stalin’s death and other issues that are of relevance, 
but only by discussing the immediate reactions of the administration to Stalin’s 
death. It does not consider destalinisation or the role of perception. Waging Peace 
examines the balance between national security and the federal budget, asserting 
it was one of Eisenhower’s primary concerns. Eisenhower considered reducing 
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military spending necessary to maintain a sound economy- something he felt was 
as important as a strong military in the struggle with communism. Immerman 
and Bowie note that Eisenhower roughly dubbed the economy, in combination 
with military and spiritual strength, the ‘Great Equation’.27 It was important 
enough that he began discussions with advisors on the issue prior to his 
inauguration.28 But they do not investigate whether Eisenhower considered 
destalinisation to be an opportunity to reduce tensions, and therefore defence 
expenditures. Indeed, budget cuts were almost impossible to consider with Stalin 
in power, since he represented the embodiment of communist expansion to 
Americans. But they do not address why Stalin’s removal from power was not 
treated as a chance for domestic U.S. reforms that relied on changes in the 
international situation. Indeed, the question of federal spending is an important 
one. Defence spending was also greatly affected by perceptions. The cynical 
narrative would assert that defence spending continued to increase since 
armament production was spread across various Congressional districts. This has 
some merit. But the defence industry was not yet widespread enough in 
Eisenhower’s first term for it to hold the weight it would in later presidential 
administrations. Regardless, before anyone could countenance cutting defence 
spending a change in perceptions would need to take place. It would have been 
political suicide to cut defence spending when widespread perceptions of the 
Soviets remained so hostile. The documents show that neither Eisenhower nor 
Dulles considered destalinisation to be serious until late 1955 at the earliest. Thus 
it was not considered as an opportunity to reduce expenditures before the 1956 
election. Indeed, even had perceptions substantially enough before the election 
was underway, it would have been a very dangerous line to toe during the 
campaign. To be sure, this is one of the reasons that Dulles kept his new opinion 
of the Soviets quiet after April 1956. 
In contrast Kenneth Osgood’s Total Cold War rejects that Eisenhower ever 
‘waged peace’. The change in Soviet policy away from the belief in inevitable war 
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towards peaceful coexistence transformed the conflict into a psychological 
struggle.29 Osgood argues that rather than seeking to resolve the struggle, the 
administration turned to propaganda. Stalin’s death represented the first major 
opportunity to wage such ‘Total Cold War’.30  
Osgood’s argument that the end of the doctrine of the inevitability of war 
on the part of the Soviet’s made the Eisenhower administration turn to 
propaganda is questionable in part. That the administration emphasised political 
warfare is indisputable. Chapter four shows how the turn away from the 
inevitability of war was something that the administration only grasped in 1954 as 
the Soviet leaders persistently stressed peace in their own rhetoric, and followed 
it up with various gestures towards improving relations. Even then it was subject 
to heavy doubt. 
Osgood omits the fact that Stalin himself had spoken of peaceful 
coexistence, but was understandably not taken seriously by the Truman 
administration. The difference during the Eisenhower administration was that the 
new Soviet leadership backed up their rhetoric of peaceful coexistence with 
action. Osgood asserts that the ‘peace offensive’ was viewed in light of past 
hostile actions, and was thus interpreted to be disingenuous efforts to weaken the 
Western alliance.31 Nonetheless, Osgood is firmly focussed on the propaganda 
efforts of the administration, and does not address how the changing perceptions 
of the Soviet system altered the waging of ‘Total Cold War.’ This thesis fills such a 
gap by examining how perceptions influenced U.S. information campaigns. The 
output of U.S. diplomatic and information posts abroad remained hostile 
throughout 1956, but this does not mean there was no change in perception of the 
Soviets. As chapters six and seven illustrate, there was some debate over the 
direction of U.S. propaganda, but it fundamentally sent the same message of 
distrust of the Soviets. Ultimately the changed perceptions of Eisenhower and 
Dulles were too new to be expressed publicly, let alone in propaganda, where it 
would have run into resistance from many who had a vested interest in 
maintaining a hostile line. 
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David Engerman’s Know Your Enemy discusses the development of the 
role of Soviet ‘experts’. While he does not deal directly with the perceptions of the 
U.S. leaders, his work illuminates the developing links in policymaking between 
academia and government during the Cold War. Engerman traces the creation of 
such institutions as the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Russia Research Center at 
Harvard. CENIS was to play a role in the development of policy after Stalin’s 
death, primarily via CD Jackson and Walt Rostow.32 While it is hard to determine 
the exact effect of these organisations on the perceptions of the administration, it 
seems unlikely that they would have been funded and consulted as frequently as 
they were if they were of no importance. However, the social science based 
reports generated by the ‘Sovietologists’ were often subject to criticism from 
Foreign Service professionals such as Charles Bohlen.33 
The worldview held by policymakers in the Eisenhower administration 
was greatly influenced by the actions of the Truman administration. Melvyn 
Leffler’s For the Soul of Mankind offers useful lessons in this regard. Adhering to 
his national security thesis, Leffler discusses the public diplomacy of the Truman 
administration and the ‘good versus evil’ rhetoric that predominated. While this 
rhetorical device was good for gaining Congressional and public support for large 
budgets and the struggle against communism, Leffler argues that it also trapped 
subsequent administrations into a Manichean discourse with the USSR.34 
Addressing the question of why the ‘chance for peace’ after Stalin’s death 
did not materialise, Leffler states that while the Cold War was expensive and 
fraught with danger, “…the clash of ideologies and the dynamics of the 
international system militated against the chance for peace.” Since Eisenhower 
would not take the risks necessary to reach an accommodation after Stalin’s 
                                                       
32 David Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (Oxford: OUP, 
2009), 47–49. CENIS was often consulted by the CIA, but the exact nature of the interactions remain 
classified. 
33 Ibid., 54; Yet Bohlen did not disagree with all of the findings of the Soviet experts. One crucial area 
of agreement was in the goals of the Soviet leaders. Both Bohlen and Merle Fainsod agreed that the 
modus operandi of the Soviet leaders was the maintenance of power, rather than expansion of 
communism. Bohlen consistently stressed this in his memoirs. Charles Bohlen, Witness to History, 
1929-1969, [1st ed.] (New York: Norton, 1973), 40, 82–84, 178.  While the accuracy of memoirs often 
suffers due to self-promotion, Bohlen’s assertions related to this study can be verified in the archival 
record; Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, 87. 
34 Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1st ed. 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 63–71. 
Chapter 1: Stalin’s Death and the change in leadership, 1953 
 32 
death, Leffler contends that Eisenhower set out to ‘win’ the Cold War.35 In 
contrast, Waging Peace asserts that Eisenhower‘s actions set the groundwork for 
détente. This thesis argues that it was not simply the actions of Eisenhower and 
Dulles that laid the groundwork for détente. Rather, it was their change in 
perceptions that was critical.  
 
Foundations of American Perceptions of the USSR 
In The Cold War After Stalin’s Death Jeffery Brooks suggests that the 
gestures of the Soviets were dismissed in part due to the U.S. leaders perceptions 
of Stalin’s legacy in the Soviet system. The interpretation of the ‘new course’ set 
by the Soviet leaders was predetermined in part by the concept of totalitarianism. 
Policymakers interpreted Soviet actions in light of their understanding of the 
Soviet system as totalitarian. Their understanding of totalitarianism was such that 
it could not distinguish between Stalin and the Stalinist system; though Stalin was 
gone, the system would remain. Therefore, the leadership succession would have 
little impact on the style of the regime.36 Brooks is correct that perceptions played 
a role. I argue though, that they mattered more than he asserts, and the thesis 
shows the lasting effect was far longer than 1953. The hostile existing perception 
of the Soviet leaders mattered throughout the first Eisenhower administration and 
especially with regards to destalinisation. Brooks does not address this key issue. 
This needs to be examined not only since it has not been, but also since the 
question is of importance since we now know that Stalin’s death was the genesis 
of destalinisation. Addressing the immediate period after his death without also 
considering the effects it would have on how destalinisation proceeded, and then 
how this effected U.S. perceptions is only telling half the story. 
By the 1950’s, a number of competing definitions of totalitarianism had 
emerged. Hannah Arendt postulated that totalitarianism was the product of the 
erosion of 19th century institutions such as hereditary classes, political parties, and 
nation-states, combined with the rise of modern technologies of power and a 
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contemporary society unable to rule itself. This definition did not fit the USSR, but 
it did not prevent her ideas from having an impact in Washington.37  
Carl Friedrich attempted to reconcile Arendt’s definition with the USSR, 
defining totalitarianism as an ‘official ideology’ with a ‘single mass of true 
believers’ controlled by a state apparatus with a monopoly on both violence and 
mass communication, and a systematic terror-based police force. A doctoral 
student of Friedrich’s, Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued that the USSR was the model 
totalitarian state; unchanging in its principles. Brzezinski’s idea found traction 
among those in the administration who did not see Stalin’s death as a harbinger 
of change.38 More recently, Marc Selverstone has examined the issue of 
totalitarianism in the creation of the idea of a communist monolith. He determines 
that U.S. (and British) leaders thought themselves as ordained as a force for good 
in the world.39 This would only make it even more difficult to ponder a 
relationship with the Soviets.  
Figures such as George Kennan questioned the utility of lumping together 
the Nazi and Soviet systems. But the trend to do so continued, reinforced by 
Stalin’s actions between 1945-1953. To U.S. policymakers, the Sovietisation of 
Eastern Europe and the Korean War underlined the expansionist and totalitarian 
nature of the Stalinist (and therefore, Soviet) system.40 This was aided by the 
background of those in the administration, who shared the Second World War as 
the defining event in their lives. H.W. Brands advanced the idea that this shared 
experience gave those in the administration a tendency to view all totalitarian 
regimes in the same light; thereby placing the lessons of the Second World War 
onto the struggle with the USSR. An outcome of this was a tendency to equate 
negotiation and appeasement.41 This proclivity towards drawing a direct link 
between Nazis and Soviets was rejected by Kennan. He deemed it the ‘German-
Nazi syndrome’ and warned against fitting Soviet actions into a Nazi 
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framework.42 Kennan and others in the State Department who came of age in the 
1920s and 1930s developed a perception of the USSR as hostile and expansionist 
far earlier than many of their later contemporaries in the 1950s would. Daniel 
Yergin notably labelled these the ‘Riga axioms’ due to Kennan’s time spent there 
in the 1930s.43 
The reactions of the policymakers in the Eisenhower administration to the 
departures of the new Soviet leaders from Stalinist policy was shaped by their 
perceptions of Stalin and the system he had created. Believing, as many did, that 
Stalinism was the Soviet system, it was assumed his death would change little. 
Even the optimistic among Eisenhower’s staff did not think there would be 
reliable change. On a practical level, the policymakers often thought there would 
be no change because the gestures of peace from the Kremlin had occurred before, 
with no lasting effects. The reticence to allow for change on a theoretical level is 
also quite compelling taken within historical context. Robert Jervis has written 
extensively on perception, most notably in Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics.44 In addition, Jervis laid out three hypotheses that help 
explain the inability for the U.S. policymakers to adjust their positions to the 
radically new information coming to them about the USSR in 1953. According to 
Jervis, decision-makers:  
I. Fit new incoming information into existing frameworks and theories.45 
II. …err on the side of established views, and are closed to new information.46 
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III. Actors can more readily assimilate new information if it is introduced little by 
little, rather than all at once. When it comes all at once, it can be too much for 
the framework, and will be rejected.47 
Jervis’ hypotheses are a useful framework for understanding the actions of 
the U.S. leaders in response to the Soviet change in policy towards the West. 
Stalin’s death was so sudden, and the changes in policy so abrupt that even the 
U.S. decision makers who were receptive to the idea of change in the USSR found 
it hard to believe change was likely. In time though, perceptions of the Soviets did 
change. By 1956, even Dulles agreed that things were changing for the better, 
even if he only voiced this behind closed doors. Though the changes after Stalin’s 
death were often dramatic, destalinisation was akin to water accumulating behind 
a dam. It took until 1956 and the earthquake of the Secret Speech to breach its 
walls. 
Deborah Welch Larson draws attention to the role of trust through a series 
of ‘missed opportunities’ in U.S.-Soviet relations. According to Larson, both U.S. 
and Soviet leaders failed to seize opportunities to cooperate due to “…mutual 
mistrust, based on ideological differences, historical baggage, and intuitive mental 
biases.”48 Larson addresses a number “trust issues” that are relevant to the U.S. 
position after Stalin’s death. For example, she points out that the value of 
deception can be much higher than the value of truth. As a consequence, 
aggressive states have an incentive to appear to be conciliatory in order to lull 
others into a false sense of security.49 This is precisely what Dulles, and indeed 
many Western leaders, thought the Soviets were attempting through the peace 
offensive after Stalin’s death. Dulles interpreted Soviet actions in a more 
doctrinaire Marxist sense than did the Soviet leaders themselves due to his literal 
reading of Stalin’s Problems of Leninism.50 Since states form long-term perceptions 
of other states based on their history, the U.S. reaction to the peace offensive was 
negative due to the perception of the USSR as aggressive and untrustworthy.51  
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In light of the above, it is not difficult to understand why the U.S. was 
sometimes suspicious, but more often dismissive, of the changes in the Soviet 
system. By 1956, the administration was more receptive to the notion that the 
Soviets had changed. Yet the idea that the Soviets were using overt destalinisation 
as a way to undermine the West was still present.  
Most of the work on perception has been theoretical in nature, and 
therefore has not been applied specifically to the period in question. Larson’s 
work addresses this period, but not the issue of destalinisation. I contribute a new 
perspective by applying it from a historical standpoint to illustrate one of the 
ways the administration initially failed to appreciate the scope of the changes in 
the USSR and the ramifications for U.S. foreign policy, and how these perceptions 
changed in 1956. 
Personalities 
While the role of perception has been studied in a broad manner, or in a 
more focussed way using specific international events, the study of the people 
who held these perceptions is more limited. In the Eisenhower administration, the 
overwhelming amount of literature focuses on Eisenhower and Dulles.  
The archives of the Eisenhower administration have been open for 
decades so Eisenhower’s memoirs are no longer the important source they once 
were. They suffer from the typical drawbacks, for example, hindsight and a desire 
to improve the author’s image. Taken in combination with the documentary 
record though, they are at times illuminating. For instance, Eisenhower claims 
that in the wake of Stalin’s death:  
The new leadership in Russia, no matter how strong its links with the 
Stalin era, was not completely bound to blind obedience to the ways of a 
dead man…Consequently, a major preoccupation of my mind through 
most of 1953 was the development of approaches to the Soviet leaders 
that might be at least a start toward the birth of mutual trust founded to 
cooperative effort…52 
Eisenhower followed this by stating that within a month the Malenkov regime 
was making ‘startling departures’ from Stalinist policy.53 This account conflicts 
with the documentary evidence that indicates Eisenhower was wary of Soviet 
moves, and the consensus in the administration that the new leadership would 
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maintain Stalinist policies. By the time Eisenhower’s memoirs were published in 
1963, the significance of the changes that occurred in the USSR during 
Eisenhower’s presidency would have been apparent. Thus, it is understandable 
that Eisenhower would seek to appear more perceptive of the changes wrought 
by destalinisation.  
The best known of the Eisenhower biographies are the volumes written by 
Stephen Ambrose.54 Ambrose’s work makes short shrift of certain events, such as 
Stalin’s death and the ‘Chance for Peace’ speech, which receive little more than a 
page each.55 Ambrose does consider certain aspects of Eisenhower’s background 
that shed light on the period following Stalin’s death. His discussion of 
Eisenhower’s years as a general staff officer is indicative of his reorganisation of 
the NSC and his demands for an orderly and process driven administration.56 
However, the useful sections are easily overshadowed by his rose-tinted view of 
certain issues. Ambrose takes at face value initiatives such as Atoms for Peace and 
Open Skies, describing the latter as the most serious and far-reaching 
disarmament proposal ever made by a president.57 He never considers if either 
Eisenhower or others in the administration had ulterior motives with these 
proposals. Amplifying these omissions are careless errors, such as referring to 
Stalin’s successor as ‘Nikolai’ Malenkov.58 
There is no shortage of general studies of Eisenhower, but many distinctly 
lack scholarship in reference to U.S.-Soviet relations, or, where they do address it, 
are often in error. For instance, Elmo Richardson’s earlier book on the Eisenhower 
Presidency addresses the importance of the death of Stalin to the administration, 
but lists the date of the event as 11 April, rather than 5 March 1953. For a political 
study of the Eisenhower Presidency it is startling that Stalin is mentioned only 
twice, considering the effect his legacy had both on foreign and domestic U.S. 
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politics.59 The pro-U.S. stance and Eisenhower flattery in other studies is such that 
the influence of certain events is vastly overstated. Dwight David Eisenhower and 
American Power cites the ‘Chance for Peace’ speech as forcing the Soviets to 
negotiate over both Austria and Korea, while the East German uprising is reduced 
to being the result of Germans rejoicing in the streets after Stalin’s death.60 
If brevity of historical analysis and historiographical clarity were most 
valued among Eisenhower histories, then Peter G. Boyle’s Eisenhower would be 
near the top of the list. Boyle lucidly summarizes the debate between historians 
who think that Eisenhower lacked vision for failing to meet with Malenkov after 
Stalin’s death, and those who felt that a meeting would have made little 
difference. Detractors point out that since Stalin’s successors were thought to be 
little different than Stalin himself, the meeting would be at best a waste of time, 
and perhaps worse, expose the administration to both foreign and domestic 
dangers. It could have also caused increased expectations of peace, thereby 
reducing commitment to rearmament and the European Defence Community, or 
opened the administration to charges of appeasement and being soft on 
communism.61 
In a manner contrasting the orthodox and revisionist schools, Fred 
Greenstein addresses Eisenhower’s leadership and administrative abilities by 
arguing that Eisenhower used five methods to exercise his presidential power 
without “flexing his muscles”.62 Among these, Eisenhower’s refusal to attack or 
criticise ‘personalities’ in order to help promote a non-political image stands out 
in relevance to this study. This allowed him to garner support in Congress while 
maintaining his image as above politics, thus enhancing his popularity. It also 
allowed him to avoid getting into disagreements that were disadvantageous to his 
administration.63 However, this manner of political manipulation limited his 
ability to counter potentially harmful trends in domestic politics that had serious 
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implications on foreign relations, especially vis-à-vis the USSR. Refusing to use 
‘personalities’ left him looking weak in the face of demagogues such as Senator 
Joseph McCarthy, while preventing actions that could have limited the damage 
McCarthy did to foreign relations. The atmosphere that anti-communist hysteria 
promoted made any suggestion of rapprochement with the Soviets a political 
third rail. 
Also among Greenstein’s ‘methods’ is Eisenhower’s habit of delegation of 
authority.64 Stemming from his years as a general staff officer, such delegation has 
often been misconstrued by detractors of Eisenhower, especially in the years prior 
to the opening of his presidential archives. The orthodox view was that 
Eisenhower handed over control of foreign policy to Dulles. Revisionists point out 
that Dulles was in daily contact with the president regarding important events 
and rarely, if ever, made an important decision without conferring with him first. 
Robert Divine, for one, disagrees with not only the notion that Dulles made 
foreign policy, but with the notion that Eisenhower was a passive president in 
general.65 Divine argues that the Eisenhower administration had a 
“schizophrenic” foreign policy reflected in Eisenhower’s peaceful, measured 
statements and Dulles’ often bombastic anti-Communist rhetoric. Divine claims 
this helped appease two domestic political blocs: the internationalist wing of the 
Republicans and some Democrats, versus the anti-communist GOP ‘old guard’ 
and McCarthyites.66 Yet at the very least, such a strategy (if indeed it was) sent 
mixed signals to the Soviets, who would have interpreted such belligerence on the 
part of Dulles as coming from ‘imperialist’ or ‘Wall Street’ elements controlling 
the administration. This was often done publicly, and such rhetoric was typical of 
the Stalin years. Therefore, any caution exercised on the part of the new Soviet 
leadership due to Dulles’ statements would have been seen as foot-dragging by 
the U.S. administration, thus reinforcing the perception that the Soviets had not 
changed since Stalin’s death.67  
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Dulles’ manner of conducting U.S. foreign policy has been thoroughly 
studied, especially regarding the formulation of his beliefs and perceptions. Ole 
Holsti has approached the ‘Dullesian enigma’ from a combination of international 
relations and psychology. Holsti’s approach is similar to Jervis’ in this respect, 
except whereas Jervis is interested in the ‘macro’, Holsti focuses on the ‘micro’ 
level of a specific personality.  
“Will the real Dulles Please Stand Up” suggests that Dulles’ lawyerly 
background caused him to treat each crisis as a case he was determined to win. 
But in so doing, he lost sight of the overall struggle each ‘case’ existed within, and 
the long-term considerations of U.S. foreign policy.68 While the debates about 
Dulles’ legal training are as well trod as those regarding his religion, Holsti makes 
an important point that complements Jervis’ argument regarding frameworks, 
which in turn adds to my argument: If Dulles was concerned only with the short 
term, he was unlikely to question the mindset that the Eisenhower administration 
was using to approach the Cold War. Thus there was little questioning of the 
effects that Stalin’s death and destalinisation had on such a framework until 
destalinisation became irrefutable in 1956.  
Holsti’s ‘Operational Code’ is a detailed examination of Dulles’ belief 
system.69 Written in 1970, it represents much of the orthodox view of Dulles. 
Holsti lists forty-one beliefs that were instrumental in Dulles’ formulation of 
foreign policy. A number of themes emerge that are useful for understanding the 
period in question. For instance, he addresses Dulles’ conviction that “Social 
cohesion is dependent on external enemies”, and by extension, that “[i]t is easier 
to build unity upon fear rather than upon hope.”70 Such ‘beliefs’ offer two ways of 
understanding Dulles’ role in the formulation of U.S. policy during the period of 
destalinisation. Firstly, numerous scholars have shown that Dulles felt enemies 
were necessary for the cohesion of the Western alliance as well as for preparing 
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the American people for lasting conflict with the USSR.71 Therefore, he would 
have sought to downplay the effect that Stalin’s death and destalinisation would 
have had on U.S.-Soviet relations. Secondly, it would have influenced his 
perception of the effect of Stalin’s death. Dulles’ perceptions of the USSR as an 
enemy were so integral to his belief that he likely would have minimised 
contradictory information while emphasising information that confirmed the 
Soviets as enemies.72 Therefore, his conviction regarding the integral nature of 
enemies to the Cold War framework illuminates why established Cold War 
perceptions prevented any change in U.S. policy in this period, or even open-
minded investigations into the nature of the changes in the USSR.  
Dulles is an ideal case study in the persistence of perceptions due to his 
reliance on communist doctrine to explain and predict the intentions and actions 
of the USSR. For example, Dulles:  
…repeatedly asserted that peace and security were threatened by an 
international movement responsive to the needs of an elite steeped in the 
doctrines of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, rather than by a coalition of 
states promoting…national interests…In particular, he equated Stalin's 
Problems of Leninism with Hitler's Mein Kampf as a masterplan of goals, 
strategy, and tactics.73 
By sheer quantity alone Problems of Leninism was more important to Dulles 
than even the Bible. Numerous scholars have underlined its significance.74 
Communist doctrine served as the touchstone for Soviet actions. Indeed, it was 
more important to Dulles than to the Soviet leaders themselves and helps account 
for his rejection of the advice of Soviet specialists.75  
The consistency that communist writings offered Dulles in interpreting 
Soviet intentions rendered him incapable of interpreting real change when it 
came. The Soviets had an established policy of ‘zigzag’ during negotiations that 
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was well known to both Dulles and Eisenhower. Dulles however, attributed this 
solely to doctrine.76 When he later attributed it to tactics, it was only as a result of 
communist doctrine teaching such tactics. Paradoxically, it was Dulles’ devotion 
to communist mantra that made him unable to distinguish between bargaining 
tactics and the doctrine of tactical retreat outlined in communist literature. 
Furthermore, Dulles was attracted to universalism as a foundation for his 
worldview. To Dulles the Cold War was a struggle between two universalist 
ideologies. There was no room to compromise. Dulles’ universalist 
fundamentalism created an overly rigid worldview that prevented the accurate 
interpretation of changes in the Soviet system. Dulles’ universalism is also 
addressed by Townsend Hoopes. Hoopes supports the idea that Dulles viewed 
the Cold War in black and white ideological terms, quoting Dulles as stating 
“[w]e have enemies who are plotting our destruction...Any American who isn't 
awake to that fact is like a soldier who's asleep at his post.”77  
Hoopes relies heavily on Dulles’ pious nature in his portrait of the 
Secretary of State. He renders Dulles as defining foreign policy explicitly through 
morality. Dulles viewed the struggle with communism as akin to a Christian 
struggle with the heathen. This in turn contributed to his tendency to see issues in 
absolutes.78 Hoopes notes that Dulles’ absolutism did not restrict him in terms of 
his actions. Rather, he claims that Dulles was a pragmatist who defined broad 
goals in terms of morality, but whose individual actions were politically 
determined.79 Both of these statements contribute to understanding the 
administration’s response to Stalin’s death and destalinisation. Since Dulles 
tended to view issues in absolutes, and ultimate goals in terms of morality, he 
would have understood the struggle with communism as one that was based 
upon right and wrong. Consequently, Dulles disregarded any change in the 
Soviet system that did not alter the fundamentally evil nature of the system. 
Therefore, Dulles saw Soviet goals were as unchanged. Additionally, Dulles’ 
tactical nature would have led him to believe that giving the changes in the USSR 
a chance to ‘pan out’ would have been a mistake since it would have jeopardized 
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the coherence of the coalition and the viability of the European Defence 
Community. These conclusions explain Dulles’ conviction that Stalin’s death and 
destalinisation would not change the USSR, or the nature of the U.S. struggle 
against communism. According to Hoopes, Dulles viewed Stalinism as an 
aberration; the U.S. must be prepared to subdue the whole communist system 
regardless of who led it. Dulles construed Soviet gestures after Stalin’s death as 
due to U.S. pressure. This supports Hoopes’ conclusion that Dulles was both 
morally and tactically dedicated to the Cold War.80 
As archives have opened, views of Dulles have become more nuanced. 
John Lewis Gaddis exemplifies this change. He repudiates Hoopes’ view of Dulles 
as a rigid ideologue with a narrow and monolithic view of communism.81 Gaddis 
disagrees that Dulles dismissed any chance of change in the USSR after Stalin’s 
death. Gaddis points to the short lived peace proposal discussed between 
Eisenhower and Dulles in autumn 1953, and Dulles’ suggestion of a quid pro quo 
with the Russians over Korea and Germany as proof of a more open-minded 
Dulles.82 Gaddis’ views are hard to substantiate though, as the discussion of the 
peace overture towards the Russians never gained any momentum. The idea of 
negotiating over Germany and Korea could also support the understanding of 
Dulles’ as tactically pragmatic. However, Gaddis is broadly correct when he 
insists that a close reading of Dulles’ private writing and statements shows that he 
did not consider the USSR permanently Stalinist and thought change was 
possible. This is especially true from 1956 onwards.83 Gaddis’ mistake, though, is 
insinuating that he felt this was possible all along. It is the changes in the period 
1953-56 that are integral to the change in perceptions of the Soviet system that 
allowed improved relations. Gaddis fails to mention this. Indeed, none of the 
personality-based studies of either Eisenhower or Dulles take into account the 
effects of destalinisation on U.S. foreign policy. I remedy such shortcomings by 
including the ramifications of personality.  
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 This thesis supports the idea that Dulles was often doctrinaire himself, and 
given to universalism and rigidity in his views. It took years of change in the 
USSR and numerous overtures from the Soviets for Dulles to augmenting his 
perception of them. As mentioned, the domestic political situation and relations 
with allies were key reasons for him not to question his viewpoint. However, 
contrary to the claims of orthodox historians, Dulles did change his views by 
1956, but kept them private. A canny political operator, he knew he needed to 
keep his changed view of destalinisation and the Soviets in general between 
himself and Eisenhower until it was safe to express such opinions in public. I 
contend he never expressed them fully before his death for this reason.  
 Therefore, Dulles could have developed a new perception of the Soviets 
even earlier whilst the domestic political situation was unfavourable and Western 
European security was being worked out, but kept his views private. Yet there is 
no evidence of this. Rather, it is not until April 1956 that the first indisputable 
evidence of a new perception is found. This thesis concludes that it was not such 
aforementioned reasons, but rather the massive implications the 20th Party 
Congress, that tipped the balance and changed his perceptions. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no shortage of literature dealing with the Cold War and the 
Eisenhower administration. But only a small amount of writings address 
destalinisation. Even when destalinisation is considered there is no systematic 
analysis into its significance for U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-USSR relations. This 
thesis remedies that gap. It addresses the effects on U.S. perceptions of the USSR, 
how Stalin’s death and destalinisation were understood and how this affected 
perceptions of Soviet Communism.  
The administration initially failed to understand the importance of Stalin’s 
death and the subsequent effect on Soviet policy and decision-making that can be 
defined as ‘destalinisation.’ This was due primarily to a Cold War mindset of the 
Soviets constructed under Stalin. The role of the administration’s perceptions of 
the Soviet system, and the new leadership, is key to understanding the period. 
Perception has been addressed in general international relations theory. This 
thesis innovatively demonstrates how perception played a critical role in both 
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delaying change, the role it played when they eventually did change. The 
cumulative effects of these changed perceptions are important to greater Cold 
War history since they allowed détente in the mid-1960s and are illuminative of 
the way the U.S. reacted to the Soviet transition of leadership in the early 1980s.  
The resilience of U.S. perceptions of the USSR caused policy towards the 
USSR to be resistant to change. Yet other issues were of relevance in policymaking 
with regard to destalinisation. The domestic political situation in the U.S. changed 
significantly between 1953-56. The thesis seeks to take this into consideration as it 
can help explain why the administration was reticent to accept the reality of 
change in the USSR in 1953-54, but by 1956, was more receptive to the effects of 
the change in the Soviet system. The decline of the anti-communist fervour that 
characterised the early administration, and the awareness of Dulles to it had some 
bearing on the increased receptivity of the second Eisenhower administration to 
the changes in the USSR. Many books have been written addressing the effects of 
politics on the foreign policy of the administration. But none have taken into 
consideration the effect destalinisation had on domestic politics, nor the role 
domestic politics played in preventing U.S. foreign policy changes as a result of 
destalinisation.  
The role of allies is assessed, especially in regard to the formulation of 
further alliances such as the EDC and NATO, since the motivation for these was a 
perception of fear towards the USSR. Since these perceptions were subject to 
change as a result of destalinisation, they must be re-examined. This study will 
complement existing works by considering the changes in the Soviet system that 
had enormous effects on the Cold War and American foreign policy.  
The role of intelligence was important in the formation of, and 
maintenance of perceptions. However, as a closed society, reliable information 
about the USSR was difficult to obtain. As a result, correspondents and diplomats 
were especially important in this regard. Their contribution is examined. This 
allows the perceptions and insights of those ‘on the ground’ to be compared to 
those in Washington. This in turn can indicate why perceptions changed, and 
what was the root cause.  
Furthermore, the administration continuously assessed the opinions 
expressed in the media. The thesis takes this into account in determining if it 
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altered perceptions, or retarded change even in light of a changed international 
atmosphere.  
However, the driving force the change of heart towards destalinisation 
and the Soviets in general was a change in perception. I combine the above factors 
with this conclusion to offer a new synthesis of how U.S. perceptions of 
destalinisation changed over the course of the first Eisenhower administration. 
Rather than take existing scholarship at face value I have combined the existing 
narratives, many of which are decades old, with new resources to illustrate that 
perceptions of the Soviets began to change earlier than thought, even from an 
extremely hostile beginning.  
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Chapter 1: Stalin’s Death and the Change in Soviet Leadership 
As Stalin died Western leaders debated how the Soviet leadership transfer 
would proceed and what this would mean for the West. How would the Soviet 
Union continue without Stalin, the icon of world communism? Once it became 
apparent that one of Stalin’s lieutenants would not simply continue in his 
footsteps, a flurry of speculation, analysis and argument ensued, not just about 
the transfer of power, but also about the significance of the changes following 
Stalin’s death. The U.S., and the West in general, had to rapidly develop an 
understanding of what the new Soviet leaders represented, who the most 
important members of the leadership were, and what Soviet objectives would be 
in the post-Stalin era. The rapidity of the change from Stalinism to what became 
known as a ‘soft’ line, or ‘new course’ in Soviet foreign (and domestic) policy 
highlighted by the peace moves of the nascent Soviet regime was crucial in the 
formation of the perceptions of the U.S. leadership. 
This change in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy was part and parcel of 
the process of destalinisation. The Eisenhower administration initially rejected the 
changes in the USSR as mere fig leaves designed to divide and confuse the West 
into letting down its guard. In this regard, many of the Western assessments of 
the new Soviet policies were correct. They were meant to make Western unity 
more difficult to maintain. But to dwell on the ‘success’ of the Western 
assessments would be to miss the larger consequence of the new Soviet course: 
the attitude of the Soviet leaders towards the West and their vision of the Cold 
War had changed significantly. Yet the Western position in general, and that of 
the U.S. in particular, could not keep pace with such changes due to the engrained 
perception of the USSR as irredeemably hostile. As a result, the majority of the 
Western governments did not yet appreciate these changes.  
 In time, elements within the U.S. administration began to question the 
validity of such assumptions. As spring led to summer in 1953, certain key figures 
began to assert, with more and more conviction, the gravity of the changes 
underway in the USSR. This dissent from the conventional wisdom of what can 
be termed the ‘no basic change’-view of the USSR did not have an initial impact 
upon either Dulles or Eisenhower.  
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This chapter charts the evolution of U.S. and Western perceptions of the 
origins of destalinisation by examining two intertwined issues. Firstly, the 
understanding of the leadership change and the possibility of an overt power 
struggle is analysed. The response to the initial perceived ‘ascent’ of Malenkov, 
his subsequent ‘demotion’, and the fall of Beria are examined. Secondly, the 
chapter discusses the departures of the new Soviet leaders from Stalinist doctrine 
in foreign policy with particular emphasis on the ‘peace offensive’ and new ‘soft 
line’ in Soviet foreign policy.  
In all of these sections the emphasis is on U.S. reactions and perceptions. 
The inclusion of evidence of the position of U.S. allies offers another angle with 
which to scrutinise the evolving U.S. mindset towards the changes in the USSR. 
This illustrates that while there were interesting subtle differences in 
interpretation of the Soviet changes, much more united the West in its reactions to 
the origins of destalinisation in 1953 than divided them.  
Perceptions of the Transfer of Power through 1953 
The Initial Reshuffle  
Eisenhower valued intelligence. Reflecting his long career as a staff officer, 
he sought to surround himself with all information available before he came to a 
decision. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Stalin was not yet dead when the 
Eisenhower administration began gathering intelligence and formulating 
assessments of the situation. By 4 March the State Department had issued an 
intelligence estimate describing reports that some of the Soviet leaders held 
‘divergent’ opinions about relations with the West. The State Department 
presumed that these divisions would not become apparent until one of the Soviet 
leaders achieved supremacy.1 This, in effect, created an ironic corollary to the 
consequences of McCarthyism in the U.S. at the time; the new leaderships of both 
nations felt their range of actions constrained by the possibility of charges of 
political heresy. 
The task for analysts was to determine what structure would emerge. In 
the weeks following Stalin’s death, two lines of thought were apparent. One 
theory assumed that a singular leader would emerge from the ruling group. The 
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State Department Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) asserted that Malenkov 
was the logical choice to lead the USSR after Stalin.2 The idea of Malenkov 
emerging as a ‘new Stalin’ was supported by the fact that he held both the 
positions of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and led the Party Secretariat of 
the CPSU. Most tellingly to U.S. observers was the treatment of Malenkov in the 
Soviet press: Malenkov was consistently praised in Pravda in the same manner 
Stalin had been.3 
Alternatively, Allen Dulles told the NSC that while a Malenkov 
dictatorship was a possibility, committee rule was more likely in the 
circumstances with Malenkov as titular head. Soviet foreign policy, Dulles 
concluded, would remain as it was. CIA Special Estimate 39 (SE-39) determined 
that despite the change in leadership, there would be no change in Soviet hostility 
or the Kremlin’s ultimate objectives.4 Eisenhower recalled the debate between 
those who felt the new regime was a “one-man Malenkov dictatorship” or a 
committee and that the “intelligence experts” were inclined to support the 
committee hypothesis.5 
Despite the evidence that Malenkov was in a position of prominence, 
neither of the theories about the Kremlin power transfer held the absolute 
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confidence of anyone in the administration. Due to the secretive nature of the 
Kremlin, the State Department and CIA could only base their assessments on the 
limited intelligence available, resulting in the necessarily vague conclusion that 
the power struggle was ongoing. This did not mean that the current Kremlin 
hierarchy was actually engaged in a power struggle; merely that something could 
develop in the future.6 In the absence of good intelligence, perceptions filled the 
void.  
Some in the State Department attempted to gain further insights into the 
developments. The chargé in Moscow, Jacob Beam, risked contacting George 
Kennan (who was at the time deep in the political wilderness) to get his 
soundings on the situation. Kennan advised, “[t] here is simply no orderly way of 
transferring power in Russia. That doesn’t mean the transfer can’t be solved, but it 
will be solved the dangerous way…”7 Kennan’s reply underlined the existing 
belief in the State Department that the USSR was a totalitarian state, and therefore 
rigid and incapable of moderate change. It also heightened hopes of an overt 
power struggle.  
Kennan’s reply, however, had a mixed effect on Beam. The following week 
he cabled to Washington that the emphasis in the Kremlin seemed to be on 
collective leadership, albeit with Malenkov and Beria as the real sources of power. 
Significantly, Beam stressed to the State Department that “…freed from Stalin’s 
oppressive presence…” the new leaders were operating along much different 
lines.8 This was the first indication of U.S. awareness of the possible significance of 
the change underway in the Kremlin. At this point, however, the intelligence 
about the situation in the Kremlin was scarce.9 In the absence of reliable 
information about the inclinations of the Kremlin leaders, the mindset of U.S. 
policymakers led them to reject any indications of change. 
Malenkov’s ‘Demotion’ 
When the news reached Washington that Malenkov had stood down from 
the chairmanship of the CPSU on 14 March, the White House immediately 
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recognised the significance, noting that never before had the position of General 
Secretary been held by someone other than the head of state. Khrushchev’s 
replacement of Malenkov was seen as a remarkable change in the Kremlin power 
structure, and Khrushchev was noted as someone who could now take the ‘top 
spot’.10 The State Department also thought that the Kremlin was unstable due to 
the Malenkov demotion. It felt that such an action was indicative of a power 
struggle.11 The greatest effect of Malenkov’s demotion on the perceptions of the 
power structure in the Kremlin was to underline the belief of many in the 
administration that there was a latent power struggle. At the very least it led the 
administration to question the prudence of basing any policies on the emergence 
of any one leader until the situation in the Kremlin had stabilised. 
After Malenkov’s removal from the Party Secretariat, the State Department 
quickly detected the changed tone of the Soviet press towards ‘collective 
leadership’.12 With hindsight, it is easy to link Malenkov’s removal from the 
Secretariat to his ultimate downfall in 1955. But such a clear connection was 
hardly the case. The removal of Malenkov did not cause the U.S., or other 
Western powers, to conclude that he was a political has-been. In fact, the analysis 
of Malenkov’s significance continued through 1954. As a result of the changes in 
the Kremlin, the State Department and White House, and many Western allies 
were completely in the dark about the power structure in the Kremlin.13 The U.S., 
unable to comprehend the murky way in which power was exercised in the USSR, 
did not come to the conclusion that hindsight now grants; that the Party was the 
locus of power.14  
Despite his removal from the Party Secretariat, the assumption in the U.S. 
was that Malenkov remained in charge. The NSC met on 8 April to discuss the 
demotion of Malenkov and the numerous reversals in Soviet policies since Stalin’s 
death. It reached few conclusions in light the recent fantastic Soviet policy 
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turnarounds. It was clear to the NSC that the initial estimate that Stalin’s policies 
would be continued was far from the mark. Beyond that the NSC could only 
conclude that the changes in the offing were the most monumental since 1939. 15 
The British simultaneously pondered the developments in the Kremlin. 
The Foreign Office told Churchill that the new soft line characterising Soviet 
foreign policy would make intra-Western relations more difficult than the 
“bludgeoning xenophobia” of Stalin. But it advised that the new attitude should 
not be dismissed.16 British Ambassador in Moscow Alvary Gascoigne advised 
Churchill that the situation could yet become more complicated; while 
Malenkov’s removal from the party “…suggest[ed] a deliberate departure from 
Stalin’s example” it did not imply that he had conceded control over the Party.17 
The British opinion was essentially the same as the U.S., but with a greater 
willingness to accept the new Soviet attitude. This reflected the desire for 
lessening Cold War tensions among the British public, and Churchill’s desire to 
play peacemaker.18 
The U.S. was working under the assumption that power was either in the 
hands of Malenkov or a Malenkov-led committee, with much of the intelligence 
focused on Malenkov personally. The information reported to the State 
Department (some outright absurd) provides an indication of how little the West 
knew of the Soviet leaders.19 As such, the Office of Soviet Affairs and the OIR had 
to rely largely on Malenkov’s public statements. One such compilation of his 
pronouncements spanned 33 pages for the 1929-1953 period. Using Malenkov’s 
own words, the OIR painted him as irreconcilably hostile towards the West and 
an avowed Stalinist, thus confirming the existing belief held by U.S. 
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policymakers.20 The selection was potent enough that anyone reading it who even 
considered the possibility that the Soviet changes in policy were sincere would 
have given serious pause. In light of the Soviet ‘soft line’ launched since Stalin’s 
death, such intelligence would have undercut the position of anyone advocating 
dialogue with the Soviets on such a basis. Malenkov’s conciliatory statements 
since Stalin’s death, such as those highlighting the peaceful resolution of conflicts, 
would have been understood by the West as a mere change in tactics, due to the 
sheer volume of statements contradictory to these.21 Yet the point was never 
voiced that these statements, made as they were during Stalin’s reign, may not 
have been the true feelings of the new leaders. 
Hopes of a Power Struggle 
By the end of April the consensus in the administration was that a 
committee ruled the USSR with Malenkov at its head. However, the long-term 
stability of this arrangement was open to interpretation. By July, some 
perceptions changed fundamentally.  
Underlying much of the U.S. analysis of the situation was a hope that a 
power struggle would become openly manifested. The Psychological Strategy 
Board (PSB) asserted that committee rule was impossible in the Soviet system. 
The underlying assumption was that no matter how well planned and executed 
the power transfer was, it lacked longevity. The rapidity with which the new 
regime had established itself, the amnesty of prisoners in the USSR, goodwill 
measures abroad, the general new ‘soft line’ of Soviet foreign policy, and even 
Stalin’s funeral were interpreted as a signs of nervousness on the part of the new 
regime. According to the PSB, these actions could only be due to a desire for 
international tranquillity caused by internal concerns. This was interpreted as 
proof of a latent power struggle.22  
 Others were less sanguine. Tracy Barnes, a high-ranking CIA operative, 
contacted CD Jackson, the president’s Special Assistant for Psychological Warfare, 
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to express his misgivings. Barnes criticized the optimism over a power struggle. 
He thought it wishful thinking that resulted from the western desire for an end to 
the Cold War. Such optimism found support in the conclusions of Kennan 
(himself a CIA consultant) who predicted a power struggle, as well as in the more 
general conclusion that totalitarian systems bore the seeds of their own 
destruction. But for Barnes, there were simply too many assumptions involved in 
such a scenario for it to be the basis of national security policy. In light of the 
‘peace moves’ from the Kremlin, such optimistic assumptions were dangerous. 
Barnes concluded it best for the administration to assume that the new soft line of 
the Kremlin was a tactical change to gain breathing space.23 Indeed, CIA SE-46 
concluded that while a power struggle could cause a retraction in Soviet power, it 
was difficult to predict with any accuracy. Furthermore, the CIA highlighted that 
the failure of Stalin’s death to erode any bases of economic or military power 
made this unlikely.24 U.S. Ambassador in Moscow Charles Bohlen echoed these 
conclusions. He reported that a change from collective leadership back to a 
Stalinist system was unlikely, as it would place tremendous strains on Soviet 
society.25 So far, those optimistic for an overt power struggle had been 
disappointed. The western tradition of scrutinizing the May Day parade 
confirmed (as far as such speculation could) that the Kremlin power structure 
remained the same as it had been since March.26 By early July however, the CIA 
had noticed signs of change in Moscow. Beria had not been seen in public with 
the other leaders in some weeks.27  
 
The Confusion over Beria 
The public announcement on 10 July of Beria’s arrest attracted intense 
scrutiny. Eisenhower met with his Cabinet that morning to consider the situation. 
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Allen Dulles emphasized that while the purge of Beria was likely Malenkov’s 
doing, it did not necessarily mean he had fully consolidated power.28 CD Jackson 
agreed. But Foster Dulles rejected the views of the CIA and CD Jackson. He 
predicted that the removal of Beria would mean an end to the softer Soviet line 
and a return to Stalinist policies. In a phone call to his brother he quoted at length 
from Problems of Leninism to support his point.29  
Bohlen was recalled to Washington to advise on the matter at the tripartite 
meeting of the British and French Foreign Ministers the following day.30 Over 
cocktails at Dulles’ home, the Secretary once again relied on Problems of Leninism 
and quoted from passages regarding the seizure of power. Bohlen responded that 
communist doctrine had little relevance to Soviet actions. Foster Dulles remained 
convinced of their validity.31  
At the Foreign Ministers meeting, Dulles raised the Beria issue with British 
representative Lord Salisbury and French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. He 
insisted that the West could be witnessing the end of the Soviet ‘soft line’ and a 
return to Stalinism. He quickly qualified his argument though, by stating that 
there “…does not appear to be any personality comparable to Stalin…” who 
could carry out such a reversal.32 Given the vehemence with which Dulles made 
his argument against a reversal in Soviet policy, such a qualification was in stark 
contrast. Yet he concluded that the situation in the Kremlin proved that the 
Western policies of NATO and the EDC were working, and should be “…pursued 
with increased vigor.”33 Dulles was attuned to the idea that “dictatorships inspire 
doubts about motives, democracies inspire doubts about resolve.”34 Consequently, 
he was determined to maintain the western course of rearmament and integration 
in order to underline western resolve while concurrently protecting the west from 
what he thought were the devious intentions of the Soviet new course. While 
                                                       
28 Editorial Note 603, FRUS: 1952-1954 Vol. 8, 1206. 
29 TeleCon: SecState and DCI, July 10, 1953, ibid., 1208–1209.  
30 Nixon suggested to Foster Dulles that the White House plant a number of stories that Bohlen had 
actually predicted Beria’s demise in order to head off any criticism of his appointment. Dulles 
indicated that the State Department was already in the process of doing so, but for the White House 
to go ahead as well. Ibid., 1209. 
31 Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969, 355–356. 
32 McBride Minutes (of Bermuda Conference), July 11, 1953, FRUS: 1952-1954, Vol. 5 (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1983), 1609–10. 
33 Ibid., 1610; “Gascoigne to FO,” July 11, 1953, PREM 11/540, TNA.  
34 Larson, Mistrust, 17. 
Chapter 1: Stalin’s Death and the change in leadership, 1953 
 56 
Salisbury and Bidault largely agreed with Dulles’ stance, Salisbury expressed that 
the West nevertheless should remain flexible in its dealings with the Soviets.35  
While Salisbury was meeting with Dulles in Washington, many in 
Downing Street and the Foreign Office saw Malenkov’s star rising, but did not 
interpret the fall of Beria as indicating a reversal in Soviet foreign policy. There 
was little evidence that Beria was behind the new ‘soft line’ or any of the 
particular policies introduced since Stalin’s death. Indeed, the Foreign Office 
advised Churchill that since Beria had been the head of the Soviet secret police, 
his purge might actually signal a liberalisation of the regime. 36 
The differing predictions about the effects of Beria’s downfall illustrated 
how a lack of intelligence could lead to various conclusions. In this instance since 
Beria’s opinions, and the structure of the Kremlin hierarchy now that he was gone 
were unknown, the West could only guess at how Soviet policy would evolve.  
Malenkov in Control? 
What the ouster of Beria meant for the power structure was also unclear. 
Malenkov’s prominence suffered as a result of his relinquishing his position in the 
Party Secretariat, but he still benefitted from more public adulation than any other 
member of the collective leadership. Therefore, the OIR deemed Malenkov in the 
best position to establish “absolutist control.”37 The British felt that Malenkov was 
the most powerful, but that a collective leadership was ultimately in charge; there 
was little appetite for the idea that a dictator, or Stalinism, would return.38 
Though there was little current intelligence the OIR nevertheless noted a 
number of historical points that supported a ‘Stalinist’ interpretation of Malenkov. 
His involvement with the Cominform, and organisation perceived by the west as 
shadowy and conspiratorial was one example. Another was that Malenkov was 
the only leader, other than Stalin, that had worked in all government and Party 
institutions simultaneously. His close association with Stalin would have given 
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him the knowledge of how to set up his own dictatorship. Thus the OIR 
concluded that Malenkov was:  
 …a product of Stalinist Russia, he has displayed complete devotion to the 
teachings of the dead dictator. Malenkov shares the basic antipathy of 
Stalin toward the West, and his thinking is apparently just as doctrinaire.39 
Thus he was potentially a ‘new’ Stalin. By the end of August, Western views were 
coalescing around the belief that Malenkov was the true leader of the USSR, or at 
the very least, primus inter pares.40 
No sooner was Malenkov’s position at the top of the Kremlin hierarchy 
confirmed than concerns were raised in Whitehall about the rise of Khrushchev. 
The Beria purge reverberated at the highest levels and the British enquired what 
affect it had on the placement of Khrushchev in the leadership. The new emphasis 
on the general welfare of the Soviet people was understood as part of the reason 
for Khrushchev’s rise due to his recognition as an agricultural expert. The British 
found it easier to explain Khrushchev’s increased visibility through the fact that 
since March he had been First Secretary of the Party.41 But U.S. and British 
intelligence still suffered from a lack of information. When the NSC met on 17 
September, Allen Dulles could only report that Khrushchev was “…Number 
Three in the government, and Number Two in the Party…” but that Khrushchev 
“…did not appear likely to aspire to the top position, as did Beria.”42 By 
November, State Department sources were informing Time correspondents that 
Khrushchev was second in the Kremlin hierarchy.43  
The evolution of Western perceptions of the Soviet leadership structure 
through 1953 illustrated that while the U.S., and the West in general, were 
reasonably attuned to the changes in the Kremlin hierarchy, their understanding 
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of the policy changes that were concurrent to these were less perceptive. It is of 
note that although the changes in the hierarchy were interwoven with the changes 
in policy, as Beria’s purge illustrated, the reactions and perceptions of the West 
were more ‘objective’ towards the leadership changes than they were to changes 
in policy. As the transition to a more ‘peaceful’ foreign policy on the part of the 
Soviets was the driving force behind the modification of Western understanding 
of the Soviets, appreciation of the significance of the changes varied considerably, 
and was underpinned by deeply held convictions. But the seemingly objective 
view of the leadership struggle would become more and more polarised as it 
became clear that it held important implications for the U.S. 
“a series of cheap gifts”, “talk of conversations”, or “something that 
cannot be dismissed”44 : Reactions to the Soviet New Course 
The Soviet ‘Peace Initiative’ 45 
The changes in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin’s death were ground-
breaking in their rapidity and frequency. But the most prominent of these actions, 
the ‘peace offensive’, was based on Stalin’s actions, and this led to a great deal of 
scepticism. Due to the experiences of the West in the Cold War thus far, as well as 
domestic imperatives in the case of the U.S., the safest option was to be wary of 
Soviet proclamations of peaceful intentions. Indeed, the West was acutely aware 
that a few easily reversible actions did not prove the sincerity of the Soviet 
leaders.46 The U.S. proclaimed its willingness to entertain the Soviet peace moves 
while their sincerity was ascertained. Yet this was simply public cover for the 
deeply held conviction that the nature of the Soviet peace moves launched since 
Stalin’s death represented a change in Soviet tactics at best, and a cunning trap at 
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worst. In time, a minority within the U.S. administration began to feel that real 
change was afoot in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. This, in combination 
with the changes in the leadership and origins of what became known as 
destalinisation, could not be dismissed outright.  
At a special meeting of the NSC on 31 March Foster Dulles emphasised 
that the U.S. must win the Cold War through inducing the disintegration of the 
USSR. He thought the peace initiative was an acute danger to the U.S. that was 
designed to relieve pressure on the nascent Soviet regime. Dulles insisted the U.S. 
not be deceived and must maintain its policies towards the USSR. Eisenhower 
voiced his unequivocal agreement with the assessment.47 This highlighted the 
change in outlook that Eisenhower undertook between 1945-53. In 1946, he had 
dismissed the idea that the Soviets were bent on conquest. By 1947 he expressed 
the opinion that the Soviets were “definitely out to communize the world.”48 
Combined with a hostile domestic situation, he could hardly be seen to be ‘falling’ 
for what the Republican right deemed a ‘communist trap.’ 
Yet Eisenhower expressed some optimism that the Soviet moves may 
amount to something. In a press conference in early April he claimed that the U.S. 
should take them at “face value” until there was reason not to. The West should 
not, however, ignore past actions of the Soviets in so doing.49 Eisenhower’s 
somewhat Janus-faced approach to the question can be explained by a desire not 
to come across as a warmonger through impeding the course of peace- something 
Soviet sponsored peace movements were already successful in associating the 
U.S. with.  
The State Department view of the peace offensive was one of disbelief. It 
represented a “diabolically clever” plan that would get Western leaders to ponder 
if “maybe these new fellows really are different from Stalin, maybe they do want 
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a modus vivendi”.50 Dulles’ was adamant that the West should not let up pressure 
on the Soviets, declaring “[t]his is the time when we ought to be doubling our 
bets... to crowd the enemy, and maybe finish him, once and for all.”51 
The CIA was less enthused about taking action after the spectacular 
intelligence failure of SE-39. Yet according to Allen Dulles, the changes in tactics 
were in fact greater than any since 1939. He also thought the peace offensive was 
meant to gain ‘breathing space’ by undermining the creation of the EDC and 
Western cohesion generally in order to allow while the new regime to consolidate 
its authority.52 
Consequently, the peace offensive was treated seriously. The CIA, in 
conjunction with the State Department, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs, 
conducted Special Estimate 42 (SE-42) in order “[t]o estimate the significance of 
current Communist ‘peace’ tactics.” A report of the findings and the State 
Department position was sent to all U.S. diplomatic posts and bore the clear 
influence of Foster Dulles. It reached the same conclusions as previous White 
House and State Department studies, stating that Soviet peace moves were simply 
aimed at “[t]he achievement of a ‘breathing spell’ by a tactical retreat [and this 
would] simply be an application of standard Marxist-Leninist doctrine.” 
Diplomats were encouraged to convey to audiences that “the Soviet gestures to 
date…give no assurance whatever of Soviet abandonment of long-range 
Communist objectives; they are instead all consistent with the standard Marxist 
doctrine of ‘tactical retreat’.” The West should not expect any change to Soviet 
strategic objectives since policy was determined “…not so much by individuals as 
by the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state structure and the doctrines of 
Communist ideology.”53 The State Department asserted that it was the growing 
strength of the West through NATO, the EDC and increased European integration 
that was responsible for the Soviet conciliatory attitude. Surprisingly, the 
summary ended by declaring that the U.S. had not yet passed judgement on the 
Soviet peace moves. Such a claim though, was at best either a sop to Eisenhower’s 
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optimistic streak, or intended to negate any criticism from allies (in case of leaks) 
that the U.S. was taking a too close-minded or unreasonable line toward the new 
Soviet moves.54 Subsequent statements by Dulles undermine his claimed 
objectivity towards the Soviet moves: 
We must be constantly vigilant lest we fall into a trap…Soviet 
Communists have constantly taught and practiced the art of deception, of 
making concessions merely in order to lure others into a false sense of 
security, which makes them the easier victims of ultimate aggression.55 
Dulles’ rejection of the peace offensive was also based on his cautious 
attitude towards domestic politics. In the political atmosphere of 1953, any hint of 
‘softness’ towards communism could be political suicide. Attacks from not just 
McCarthyites, but from the right-wing of the Republican Party more generally, 
had the power to derail not only Dulles’ career, but also the plans of the new 
Eisenhower administration. Republicans of the neo-isolationist persuasion sought 
a different approach to communism. They advocated an end to talks with the 
Soviets and sought to reinvigorate the Cold War. By the standards of these men, 
any negotiations with the Soviets had to be based on conditions that would 
ensure U.S. ‘victory’. Anything less would be appeasement.56 Whatever other 
motivations negotiations may have had, they certainly were propaganda vehicles. 
Due to his history of cooperation with Democratic administrations, Dulles 
was hyper-vigilant of such voices in Congress. Compounding this, he had 
recently gone before the Senate to support the nomination of Bohlen as 
Ambassador to the USSR. Bohlen’s acrimonious confirmation, held up by not only 
by his association with the Yalta Agreements but also by insinuations of 
homosexual infidelity illustrated the domestic atmosphere into which the Soviet 
peace offensive was launched. Though Dulles was reticent to defend Bohlen, he 
was also keen to prevent him from influencing policy in Washington, and thus 
making him Ambassador was a convenient solution.57  
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McCarthyism aside, Dulles was acutely aware that Congress in general felt 
the peace offensive represented a change in Soviet tactics, not in overall strategy 
or objectives. This was exactly the position of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. Senator William Fulbright specifically recognized the danger for the 
U.S. that the peace initiatives represented if European allies took them seriously.58 
Fulbright may have been reassured to know that the peace offensive was not 
having such an effect on European policymakers.  
Indeed, the danger the peace offensive represented was a subject of broad 
agreement between the U.S. and Western European allies. The British, French, 
Belgians and West Germans broadly agreed that the Soviets thought the peace 
offensive could help stabilise the new regime, increase popularity at home, and 
divide the West. The British agreed with Dulles’ assessment that many of the 
Soviet changes were the result of the power and unity of the West, including its 
atomic capabilities.59 Similarly, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was 
concerned mostly with the effect the peace offensive could have on the Western 
public. He thought that ordinary Americans would be willing to take Soviet talk 
of détente at face value, when in fact it was only a “pipe-dream.” The pressure of 
public opinion on Western governments could produce what Adenauer called a 
“bad situation.” In combination with continued Soviet rearmament, such tactics 
were of considerable danger to the West.60 Thus Adenauer, with his own unique 
political situation, came to a different view from his Western European 
counterparts, but one similar to Dulles. 
So Much Change, So Much the Same 
By mid-summer, perceptions of the Soviet new course began to change 
among a few key observers. However, key policymakers largely continued to 
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reject the possibility that the changes were sincere. The most glaring example of 
the power of the changes being undertaken by the Kremlin was the East German 
Uprising in June. Allen Dulles briefed the NSC on the connection between the 
new Soviet ‘soft policy’ and the uprisings, noting the decreased harshness of 
Soviet policies both inside and outside the USSR. This change, claimed Dulles, 
had not gone unnoticed by the satellite populations, who saw this as a chance to 
improve their lot without taking the huge risks they would have under Stalin.61  
But many in the administration were so confident that the new course was 
merely tactical that the U.S. missed the larger implication of the uprising on Cold 
War relations. The fact that the Soviets were willing to initiate changes that ran 
the risk of disintegrating the Bloc did not occur to the NSC. The Soviets were 
willing to essentially gamble over something as sacrosanct as the people’s 
democracies, but this did not cause anyone in the administration to ask if they 
would be willing to change course vis-à-vis the West. CIA SE-46 laid out the same 
position as before the uprising, stating that the Kremlin’s soft tactics were merely 
a challenge to the Western alliance and the presentation of a diminished Soviet 
threat could make allied unity more difficult and lead to Western European 
neutralism.62   
Beria’s purge, however, was seen as something that could affect the new 
Soviet ‘soft line’, but only in a manner consistent with Western preconceptions of 
the new leaders as unrepentant Stalinists. At the Foreign Ministers meeting in 
July, Dulles told Lord Salisbury and Bidault that it could signal the return to a 
harsher, Stalinist style of foreign policy. Bidault and Salisbury agreed, though 
they both remained more open to the possibility than Dulles.63 But the 
fundamental belief of all three men was that the Soviet actions were neither 
genuine, nor new. The Foreign Office briefed Churchill that the Soviet new course 
had its basis in Stalinism.64 Soviet ‘peace’ doublespeak was common under Stalin 
and such use of ‘peace’ rhetoric served to cast doubts over the new Soviet peace 
moves. Malenkov’s public utterances would have strengthened the disbelief of 
those who placed no credence in the Soviet changes. For example, Malenkov 
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proclaimed in March 1950 that the Soviets “…shall tirelessly and most steadfastly 
continue to pursue a consistent policy of peace.”65. After years of such statements, 
concurrent with the Korean War, the turnaround in Soviet policy and rhetoric 
would have been hard to accept.  
Current Soviet ‘peace’ proclamations further hardened the Western 
mindset. Ilya Ehrenberg, Soviet representative to the World Peace Council, stated 
publicly that ‘peace’ should be defined as Western European rejection of the EDC 
and withdrawal from NATO.66 The furthest reaching example of Soviet rhetoric in 
this regard was Malenkov’s speech to the Supreme Soviet in August. His 
sustained attack on U.S. policy damaged any possible acceptance of the new 
course by the U.S. Malenkov accused the U.S. of a policy of subversion and 
‘diktat’ towards the USSR.67 The general tone was the same as speeches given 
under Stalin. The U.S., therefore, understood it in the same Cold War mindset of 
Soviet hostility that had been developed under Stalin. Yet what the U.S. missed, 
but was pointed out by Gascoigne to the Foreign Office, were Malenkov’s 
numerous firm statements that could not have been so easily uttered under Stalin:  
There is no objective basis for clashes between the U.S. and USSR; there 
are no disputes or outstanding questions that cannot be settled peacefully 
by negotiation; the cause of the strengthening of peace…is not a question 
of tactics and diplomatic manoeuvre. It is our general line in the field of 
foreign policy. 
Unbeknownst to the West, Malenkov wanted to reduce tensions- and in fact 
needed to do so in order to enact domestic reforms. The assessments of the West – 
that they were meant to gain breathing space - were correct. However, Malenkov 
could not convince the West of his sincerity. He was beholden to the Stalinist 
manner of thinking and speaking that was second nature to the Soviet leadership 
in 1953.68 Those in the West who were hostile to the idea that the Soviets could be 
different from Stalin found their mindset validated by the fact that the new 
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leaders operated within such a Stalinist framework. In this regard, referring to the 
new leadership as ‘children of Stalin’ was in a sense correct. Continuing to 
express themselves in Stalinist discourse, Malenkov and the new leadership 
inadvertently negated any attempted improvement in their image, and through 
this, relations with the West. 69 
Though the majority rejected the Soviet changes, Bohlen reached a turning 
point after the East German Uprising. He argued that it had never been a Soviet 
tactic to alter its power structure merely in order to confuse the West. The U.S. 
could: 
…no longer without detriment to our purposes continue to dismiss the 
present phase of Soviet policy both internal and external as simply 
another “peace campaign” designed solely or even primarily to bemuse 
and divide the West.70 
Convinced that there was something more to the new course, Bohlen pointed out 
that although the Soviets would seek to undermine any hostile alliance, this was 
to be expected. Rather, the new course represented primarily an effort to reduce 
the risk of war. Most importantly for the development of the U.S. stance towards 
the changes underway in the USSR, Bohlen thought the development of a more 
‘liberal’ regime was clearly underway. A requirement of this was: 
…the skillful but nonetheless consistent destruction of the myth of Stalin's 
infallibility and his relegation as a junior member of the Communist 
Valhalla with obviously carefully considered selection of what part of his 
policies or programs can be retained and what discarded.71 
Diplomatic actions to reverse the damage done by Stalin’s policies were 
proceeding in Yugoslavia, Austria, Turkey and Korea. These were meant to pave 
the way for larger agreements. Such sensitive actions would not be taken if they 
were merely part of a tactical and reversible peace offensive. Most tellingly for 
Bohlen, the ‘new course’ was proceeding in the satellites, East Germany included, 
even in the aftermath of the June uprising. As Bohlen saw it, control over the 
satellites was too large a wager to place on a mere peace offensive. 72  
Bohlen thought that the recent moves were unique; all Soviet peace 
gestures since 1945 could be exposed immediately as ploys. The current ones 
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could not. They appeared to Bohlen to be genuine in many regards, specifically 
towards the resolution of the German and Austrian questions. While such efforts 
towards resolution of these issues would make maintenance of the Western 
alliance more difficult, that did not mean the sole reason for them was the 
undermining of the Western position.73 
Policy Planning Staffer Louis Halle also believed that the peace offensive 
was more than tactics. He told Director of the Policy Planning Staff Robert Bowie 
and Chargé at the Moscow embassy Jacob Beam that there was no danger in 
probing Soviet intentions. In fact he thought the danger lay in not approaching the 
Soviets. Halle predicted disunity among the Western allies if the U.S. ignored 
Soviet overtures while other nations investigated them.74 Despite what Bohlen and 
Halle indicated, the U.S. and the West maintained the conviction that the peace 
offensive was only a tactical change. Confirming this assumption, the PSB issued 
a “Status Report on the National Psychological Effort” in late July which stated 
that the Soviet peace overtures had resulted in an increase in neutralism within 
the Western alliance, resulting in delays to the establishment of the EDC and 
further Western European integration.75 This served to confirm the interpretation 
of Eisenhower, Dulles and the majority in the administration.  
By the end of September, the White House still regarded the peace 
offensive as a ploy. In its review of Basic National Security Policy that became 
NSC 162/2, the NSC stated that Soviet strategy would remain flexible in its use of 
different tactics to undermine the West. It raised the possibility that the Soviets 
might want to resolve some issues, and stated the U.S. should remain open to the 
possibility of settlements with the USSR- so long as they were combatable with 
U.S. security interests. Nevertheless, the review concluded “[t]here is no evidence 
that the Soviet leadership is prepared to modify its basic attitudes and accept any 
permanent settlement with the United States”.76 Indeed the British were of the 
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same mindset with the Foreign Office characterising it as “…a series of cheap 
gifts.”77 What is most surprising though is that in the very document that 
establishes the “New Look” of the Eisenhower administration, there is no 
mention of taking advantage of reduced Soviet hostility in order to prepare the 
U.S. for the ‘long haul’ sort of struggle that Eisenhower and Dulles thought the 
Cold War would be.78 Instead, the perception of the Soviets as irredeemably 
hostile held sway. To be sure, if the U.S. did take the opportunity to reduce 
defence expenditure, they would be falling for the ruse that the Soviet peace 
offensive represented. 
 At the Bermuda Conference in December, the White House had not 
changed its position, but the French and British positions had become more 
nuanced. Bidault explained that since the death of Stalin, all Western foreign 
ministries had agreed there was little substance to the changes in Soviet policy. 
The East German Uprising and the purge of Beria, combined with economic 
figures released by the Kremlin, pointed to a new course. The Kremlin, Bidault 
thought, needed a stable international situation in order to improve their 
domestic situation. Simultaneously the Soviets were attempting to split the West 
by dealing with each nation separately. He pointed out the ‘buttering up’ the 
French received from the Soviets in an effort to split them from the U.S. and 
British positions.79 
Churchill largely agreed with Bidault, but stressed that there appeared to 
have been real changes since Stalin’s death, while acknowledging these could be 
due to “…an ingenious variation in tactics.” Nevertheless, Churchill thought the 
West should not dismiss the possibility of change too quickly, and should, while 
maintaining its guard, examine the ‘new look’ of the Soviets.80 Eisenhower, 
however, slammed the door on such a possibility, emphasising that it was 
possible there were changes in the USSR, but it was much more likely that: 
…under this dress was the same old girl, if we understood that despite 
bath, perfume or lace, it was still the same old girl…perhaps we could 
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pull the old girl off the main street and put her on a back alley.81 
Chapter Conclusion  
The NSC’s conclusions in September and Eisenhower’s utterances in 
Bermuda were ultimately indicative of the Eisenhower administration’s 
fundamental understanding of the Cold War in 1953. On Veterans Day, 
Eisenhower proclaimed that “anyone who doesn't recognize that the great 
struggle of our time is an ideological one ...[is] not looking the question squarely 
in the face.”82 If this were truly Eisenhower’s belief, then as long as he saw no 
change in the fundamental ideology of the USSR, he would also reject the idea 
that the new leadership could be different from Stalin.  
The West closely followed the change in leadership in the USSR. It was a 
perfect example, however, of the West seeing what it wanted to. Those at the top 
of their respective governments proceeded from the knee-jerk reaction that 
nothing of consequence would change in the USSR.83 The underlying reasons for 
this were much the same as those for the rejection of the change in Soviet foreign 
policy. Yet Western allied governments remained more open minded about the 
changes in the Kremlin due to popular opinion, and in the British case, the desires 
of Churchill for a summit. 
Just as the leadership change was approached from established anti-
communist mindsets, the ‘new course’ in Soviet foreign policy, highlighted by the 
‘peace offensive’, was similarly rejected by most as an example of Soviet tactics 
and duplicity. In his memoirs, Eisenhower wrote:  
The new leadership in Russia, no matter how strong its links with the 
Stalin era, was not completely bound to blind obedience to the ways of a 
dead man…Consequently, a major preoccupation of my mind through 
most of 1953 was the development of approaches to the Soviet leaders 
that might be at least a start toward the birth of mutual trust founded on 
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cooperative effort…84  
Yet throughout 1953 the policy of the administration was based upon the 
assumption that there was no evidence of change by the Soviet leadership. 
Despite the massive changes in the Kremlin since Stalin’s death and their rapidity 
and frequency, the understanding of the new leaders as unreformed Stalinists was 
so deeply held that only a handful of policymakers in either the U.S. or other 
Western allies came to appreciate the unique nature of the changes in the USSR. 
The majority could not shake the belief, exemplified by Eisenhower and Dulles 
that the Soviet Communist creed was immovable.   
Furthermore, the administration was unsure of Malenkov’s position 
within the Kremlin hierarchy. His apparent demotion in March, so soon after he 
took the reigns of power, was quizzical. Khrushchev’s rise from relative obscurity 
to become one of the most powerful men in the Kremlin made Eisenhower and 
Dulles still more unsure of who led the Soviets. The Kremlin was also, 
intentionally or not, sending mixed messages; any intended signals of ‘peace’ 
were undermined by the continued use of Stalinist rhetoric. Further 
compounding the issue was the lack of good intelligence on such matters. In such 
a situation it is unsurprising that the perceptions formed of the Soviet leaders 
over the previous years led the administration to maintain a course of doubt and 
hostility. 
Despite Eisenhower’s recollections the U.S. position remained one of 
unquestioned distain for the proclaimed Soviet changes. It is possible that 
Eisenhower was embellishing for posterity. However, it is more likely that he 
genuinely did desire to reduce tensions, but found that perceptions of Soviet 
intentions, both his own and those of his advisors, to be too firmly imprinted to 
allow such a chance to be taken. The experience of years of Stalinist foreign 
policy, and the rhetoric that accompanied it, prevented any credence being placed 
in the new Soviet line. Even if Eisenhower or others had been willing to give the 
Soviet new course the benefit of the doubt the domestic political atmosphere 
militated against this: The risk was simply too great in 1953. Furthermore, the 
foreign policy goals of the administration would be in jeopardy if it gambled on 
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softening relations with the USSR. The transatlantic security depended heavily at 
this time on the Soviet threat. In particular, Dulles would not risk the EDC. 
Treated with outright rejection and hostile scepticism at first, the new 
leadership and change in foreign policy were eventually accepted as representing 
fundamental change in the USSR. But Western perceptions of the Soviets in 1953 
made it too soon for most in the West to appreciate. It would not be until 1956 
that there indisputable recognition of the changes that underpinned 
destalinisation. 
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Chapter 2: Divining the Power Structure and the Ascent of Khrushchev, 
1954 
The news that Beria had been executed on 23 December triggered another 
round of discussion as to the effects, if any, it would have on the Soviet hierarchy 
and policy. In the immediate aftermath OIR noted that a purge was a possibility, 
and that the purge confirmed the primacy of the Party.1 The CIA had been 
following the development of the Beria situation closely, and in its tenth paper on 
the matter put forward an explanation that allowing Beria to re-establish control 
over the MVD/MGB was actually a way of giving Beria enough rope to hang 
himself since he would inevitably promote his lieutenants. This set Beria up for 
charges of an ‘anti-Party’ conspiracy.2 
Indeed, Malenkov dominated the Soviet New Year celebrations. He 
responded to a series of questions submitted by American journalist Joseph 
Kingsbury Smith in a manner similar to that in which Stalin had responded to 
James Reston’s questions only a year prior. The OIR immediately drew the 
conclusion that Malenkov was solidifying dictatorial control.3 In the absence of 
hard intelligence on Kremlin affairs, the media acted as source of indirect 
intelligence.  
The Soviets were careful to operate behind a façade of “strict collectivity”. 
Propaganda emphasised that the 200 members of the Central Committee made all 
decisions together. The CIA noted that Malenkov was most powerful, but also 
that Khrushchev was gaining influence. Khrushchev’s prestige had surpassed 
Molotov’s, and Soviet propaganda was careful to stress Malenkov and 
Khrushchev equally when discussing the new economic programme. Most 
importantly, Khrushchev had been First Secretary of the CPSU since August 1953. 
The CIA named this, along with his influence in personnel and agricultural 
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matters, as the source of his power. Although Khrushchev had long been an 
associate of Malenkov, the CIA thought a rivalry was developing.4   
Yet there was also recognition of “continuity and stability” in the Kremlin: 
Dulles’ Special Assistant for Intelligence, Park Armstrong, informed him in March 
1954 that the group of Soviet leaders was essentially the same since Stalin’s death. 
Beria’s death greatly enhanced the stability of the “collective” under Malenkov.5 
That Armstrong recognised the apparent stability in the Kremlin, at least insofar 
as there was no blood flowing, would have disappointed the OIR. But 
Armstrong’s conclusion that there was apparent continuity in the leadership, 
directly from Stalin’s death to the present, served to reinforce the conclusions of 
Dulles and others that any policy changes thus far were tactical and that long 
term changes in Soviet posture and objectives would not be forthcoming. Allen 
Dulles confirmed Armstrong’s conclusions in April, stressing that the collective 
leadership seemed to be stable.6  
But the U.S. was aware Khrushchev’s star was rising. Speaking to the 
Council on Foreign Relations, the political secretary at the U.S. embassy in 
Moscow Robert Tucker noted that Malenkov was likely to be superseded by 
Khrushchev, owing to the latter’s hold on the First Secretaryship.7 Tucker’s 
analysis was given further credence though New York Times journalist Harrison 
Salisbury, a close friend of Bohlen’s. Highlighting his role as an intelligence 
source, the Soviet censor approved a story Salisbury submitted that asserted 
Khrushchev was as powerful as Malenkov. Bohlen concluded that Khrushchev 
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was at least powerful enough to see the story passed.8 Salisbury’s contributions 
highlight that those who were present in Moscow frequently took a different view 
of the developments in the Kremlin than those in Washington. The relationship 
between journalists and diplomats in the Soviet Union was close, usually out of 
necessity. Salisbury’s extensive contacts allowed him insights into the Kremlin 
that Bohlen could not have. It also highlighted that although Bohlen and Salisbury 
had different objectives, they came to very similar conclusions.  
Bohlen also analysed the recent speeches given by Khrushchev and 
Malenkov. He concluded that Malenkov took a more sober view of the 
international situation.9 Bohlen was not alone in this conclusion. Edward 
Crankshaw, Soviet columnist for The Observer, echoed Bohlen’s views. 
Crankshaw’s analysis was a source of intelligence for the London embassy. 
Crankshaw asserted there was an open rift between Khrushchev and Malenkov. 
Malenkov touted peaceful coexistence line while Khrushchev expounded a 
“violently anti-Western” stance.10 But Bohlen noted there appeared to be 
differences among the leaders about the ability of the Soviet system to support 
numerous new domestic initiatives. Consequently, arguments ensued over which 
should receive priority. Bohlen noted that given the nature of the Soviet system 
“when differences on policy become sufficiently acute, a contest between rival 
factions with the eventual elimination of one or the other automatically ensues.” 
But he was quick to contextualise this by stressing that the Soviet leaders were 
also especially aware of the dangers that an open power struggle would bring for 
the Soviet system as a whole, let alone for each other.11  
The State Department tracked Khrushchev’s trajectory closely, aware that 
the pre-eminence one leader or another could have profound effects on U.S. 
foreign policy. In June, an OIR intelligence brief asserted that Khrushchev’s 
power was growing. Most curiously, Salisbury submitted another story to the 
Soviet censor a story regarding the power of the Party Secretaryship. Initially 
                                                       
8 Cable: Bohlen to DeptState, May 27, 1954, FRUS: 1952-1954 Vol. 8, 1234; All foreign journalists had 
to submit their stories for censorship at the Central Telegraph Office. See: Harrison Salisbury, A 
Journey for Our Times (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 322–323, 366–368, 469–470; Harrison 
Salisbury, Moscow Journal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961). 
9 “Current Intelligence Bulletin,” May 27, 1954, CREST, CIA-RDP79T00975A001600020001-1, NARA. 
10 “Despatch: Chipman to DeptState,” July 4, 1954, RG59, CDF 1950-54, 761.xx, LM178, Reel 12. 
11 “Current Intelligence Bulletin.” 
Chapter 2: Divining the Power Struggle and the Ascent of Khrushchev 
 
 74 
rejected, three days later it was mysteriously passed without deletions. Something 
like this could not have occurred, twice no less, if Malenkov held Stalinesque 
power. Yet the OIR asserted that Khrushchev and Malenkov seemed to be 
roughly on the same level. Due to the official adherence to collective leadership 
the OIR concluded that it was possible that Khrushchev’s rise was a carefully 
planned mechanism to balance Malenkov’s power, thus strengthening the 
principle of collective leadership.12 The Moscow embassy agreed with OIR in 
terms of Khrushchev’s apparent rise in power. Just as the OIR had doubts that 
Khrushchev was paramount, the embassy highlighted Malenkov’s press visibility 
increased in June. The Soviet leaders stressed ‘Collectivity’ by listing themselves 
alphabetically. Khrushchev also travelled to Czechoslovakia, and Molotov to 
Geneva: absences of leaders did not indicate a simmering struggle for power.13  
Such developments led Moscow embassy secretary Walter Walmsley to 
conclude that the leaders were in fact taking collective leadership seriously. If 
some sort of struggle were to ensue, it would be a result of policy differences, 
rather than a struggle for power per se.14 To be sure, the interpretation of what a 
power struggle was would prove to be a point of contention between the OIR and 
the Moscow embassy over the coming year. Bohlen was troubled by the tendency 
of the OIR, and the State Department more generally, to interpret all Soviet 
political developments through the prism of a power struggle. He rejected the 
theory that one was currently developing.15 For the moment, there was a rough 
consensus about the likelihood of a power struggle, or at least its effects. In 
September 1954 the OIR concluded in a report on “Soviet capabilities and 
intentions” that the Soviet regime was firmly ensconced in power and would not 
be dislodged by either external forces or a leadership struggle. If a power struggle 
did break out, the Soviet leadership would deal with it inside the Kremlin, and 
any Western hope of a civil war was unlikely.16 By autumn the Kremlin seemed to 
be stable. Bohlen noted that many leaders were on foreign trips simultaneously. 
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This indicated that there was no serious tension that would give them pause 
before travelling.17 Allen Dulles reported that the “succession crisis has to date 
been surmounted with surprising ease”.18  
 
The Military after Stalin, 1954 
Although Eisenhower and Dulles primarily conceived of the Soviet threat 
in ideological terms, this ideology had teeth in the form of the Soviet military. In 
the aftermath of Stalin’s death there were reports that Malenkov would not be 
able to assume Stalin’s position of absolute power due to his position as a “party 
man” and his lack of influence with the Army. As a result, some in the 
administration thought a military coup was possible. Such reports were often 
wild exaggerations, but in the brief period of uncertainty about the leadership in 
the days after Stalin’s death they were momentarily considered in the State 
Department.19  
Once the dust had settled and the power situation in the Kremlin became 
clearer through 1953 and into 1954 the increased prestige of the Soviet military 
under the collective leadership came under scrutiny. The visibility and possibly 
the budget of the Soviet military had increased, but the administration did not 
think it was a source of Kremlin tensions. Regardless, this did not decrease the 
perceived danger of the military. The State Department described as “a big laugh” 
the reduction in Soviet military spending that was announced in August 1953 
since the reduction could have been easily hidden elsewhere in the Soviet budget. 
Even if there were genuine spending cuts, price reductions announced by the 
government in the spring would compensate for most of these. The State 
Department thought the real motivation was the positive propaganda effect it 
could have for the Soviet peace offensive.20  
According to the CIA the military had not traditionally played a role in 
internal political crises. Indeed, “the Soviet armed forces entered the post-Stalin 
period without a history of successful interference in internal political crises by 
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the military as a single, organized element of power.”21 Yet there was a consensus 
that the fortunes of the Soviet military had improved since Stalin’s death. Allen 
Dulles and Bohlen all agreed that it was playing a greater role in Soviet affairs. 
However, Bohlen agreed with the CIA analysis that the military was not playing 
an independent role in politics. Rather, the position of the military was more akin 
to its traditional role in Russian politics than anything else and its improved 
fortunes were due to the end of Stalin’s dictatorship than any actions of the new 
leaders.22 
The rising prestige of the Soviet military, and specifically the promotion of 
Zhukov gave rise to the idea that Eisenhower should use the friendship they 
developed through the Second World War to establish a backchannel to the 
Kremlin. Bohlen frowned upon this suggestion; it was fraught with risk. Zhukov 
had no official government position at this point. If Eisenhower were to contact 
him officially it would have been a breach of protocol. But if he were to write to 
Zhukov unofficially but still seeking, however modestly, to influence affairs or to 
improve U.S.-Soviet relations, the plan could still backfire. With the political 
tensions that so many in the administration thought were present inside the 
Kremlin, correspondence with the president could be construed as disloyalty. 
This was dangerous, not least for Zhukov. In addition, U.S. allies could be 
alarmed that the U.S. was establishing a channel of communication with the 
Kremlin without their knowledge; further undermining an alliance under strain 
due to the Soviet peace offensive.23 The proposed correspondence, however 
innocent, could easily be used against the U.S. 
 
Reading into Soviet Domestic Affairs: The Danger of Suggestion 
The fortunes of the Soviet military were closely tied to the Soviet economy. 
Any changes in either could have a profound impact on U.S. policy. The 
administration thought continued emphasis on heavy industry meant a 
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commitment to arms, and therefore, a continued hostile posture towards the 
West. Likewise, a shift towards consumer goods could be an improvement, since 
it meant less funding for armaments. It also suggested a greater awareness of the 
desires of the Soviet people, indicating a government more responsive to the 
wishes of its citizens, and perhaps therefore more humanitarian. This hope rested 
on the idea that responsiveness to the citizenry, and desires to alleviate hardships 
and suffering, were ultimately incompatible with communism and were thus 
indicative of the possibility of change in Soviet hostility towards the West. 
Alternatively, policymakers often viewed the Soviet people as peaceable, 
hardworking, honest folks who were yearning to throw off the communist yoke (a 
familiar trope in American perceptions of the Soviet people) this could indicate 
that the government was becoming more responsive in order to address unrest on 
the part of the Soviet people.24 The U.S. could exploit such unrest. 
Upon his return from the USSR, former Eisenhower speechwriter Emmet 
Hughes stressed to the President that the “consuming preoccupation” in the 
country was the production of consumer goods rather than armaments. He told 
Eisenhower that if the USSR was “…politically and psychologically geared for 
major aggressive war, then we're living in the l6th century and I'm Martin 
Luther.”25 Yet eyewitness accounts on which this claim were based were 
unreliable at best due to the restrictions placed on foreigners. Furthermore, the 
focus on light industry was not clear-cut. Official government figures were the 
only indication of a shift. The CIA thought that the increased emphasis on 
consumer goods was a deliberate choice by Malenkov to improve “the lot of the 
long-suffering Soviet consumer.” This meant revising the goals of the Fifth Five-
Year Plan and abandoning the 20-year long priority given to heavy industry. 
However, a reduction in the rate of growth of defence and a drastic cut in the 
defence budget would be the result. The CIA was essentially arguing that 
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Malenkov and the other leaders were making a choice to prioritise the welfare of 
the Soviet worker over the continued growth of the defence establishment.26 
The CIA’s conclusions astounded the OIR. The OIR admitted that military 
spending had “levelled off” from its post-war peak, and could yet stagnate. But it 
asserted that the U.S. could not take this as indicative of any reduction to the 
favoured position that the military held in the Soviet economy. Due to the wide-
ranging investment programme the military conducted, and the end of hostilities 
in Korea, the military need not continue with the same level of spending while 
maintaining an advantage in military preparedness and production. The Soviet 
consumer could concurrently benefit due to the relative rise in funding available 
for consumer goods made possible by the aforementioned changes.27 In a scathing 
assessment of the CIA report the OIR stressed that Malenkov said that the new 
emphasis on consumer goods was not a reversal in policy: rather, the past success 
in building heavy industry was what made the current increase in light industry 
production possible. The differences between the CIA and OIR boiled down to 
whether the new light industry production reflected a decrease in heavy industry 
production, or whether the economy could maintain heavy industry production 
and simultaneously increase consumer goods output as well.28 
Whatever the Soviets were intending there was significant disagreement 
over the effects it would have on Soviet military readiness and on the threat posed 
by the Soviet Union. Head of DRS Mose Harvey thought that the CIA was 
overemphasising the importance of the economic changes. He doubted that there 
was any reduced emphasis on military preparedness or heavy industry.29 The 
head of the OIR, Allen Evans, felt the criticisms of the CIA report had far reaching 
implications for the assessment of intelligence on the USSR. He forwarded the 
report to Park Armstrong, Robert Bowie and head of National Estimates at the 
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CIA, Sherman Kent. Evans emphasised that their critique was necessary to 
“…turn back the tide of erroneous exposition… in the NIE process.”30  
The State Department accused the CIA of taking Soviet developments too 
far, and that this was dangerous without verifiably ‘good’ information not only 
about the situation, but also about Soviet intentions. Essentially the CIA had 
raised the possibility that increased consumer spending could mean less emphasis 
on the military, and by extension, a more peaceable Soviet posture. The OIR was 
alarmed that the CIA would even raise the possibility, fearing that such optimism, 
however guarded, could taint future estimates of Soviet developments. The 
disagreement between the CIA and the State Department would come to be part 
of a larger, longer running battle over how to interpret the changes in the USSR. 
The CIA would prove to be more accepting of the changes in the USSR and the 
possibility that they reflected wider changes in the Soviet system and leadership. 
The State Department consistently downplayed the significance of changes that 
could see a thaw in the Cold War, and thus require adjustment in their 
perceptions of the Soviets.  
In April Khrushchev stated that although consumer goods production 
would increase, the emphasis on heavy industry would not slacken. This 
reinforced the OIR’s position.31 Khrushchev’s statements were in line with OIR’s 
argument that advances in industry allowed an expansion of consumer goods 
production without a reduction in heavy industry. Although the OIR had 
detected tensions between Malenkov and Khrushchev, they did not know that 
Khrushchev’s statement was part of a larger argument over the direction of the 
Soviet economy. Malenkov’s avocation of light industry was anathema to many in 
the Presidium, and Khrushchev was taking advantage of this to outmanoeuvre 
him.32  
Again, the lack of intelligence led existing perceptions to hold sway. Due 
to the the void of information on the struggle between Khrushchev and 
Malenkov, the State Department discounted the economic changes in the USSR. 
But Allen Dulles still stressed the redirection of the Soviet economy towards light 
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industry. He spoke of the apparent realisation of the new leaders of the need to 
reorient the Soviet economy. Stalin left a drastically imbalanced economy that 
massively favoured heavy industry over consumer goods and agriculture. Dulles 
said that the collective leadership was also aware of the critical decrease in labour 
productivity due since the average worker was being forced to work too hard for 
too little in return, be it in the form of low wages or the scarce availability of basic 
goods. Dulles liked to tell jokes at the expense of the Soviet leaders when giving 
speeches. He used one in this instance to illustrate the problem the leaders faced:  
…a Soviet officer was telling a peasant how the Soviet Union intended to 
deal with America. “We will pack twenty atom bombs in 20 leather 
suitcases and distribute them all over America,” he said. The peasant 
nodded doubtfully, whereupon the officer asked him indignantly if he 
didn't believe the Russians had 20 atom bombs. “Oh, I wasn't thinking of 
the bombs” the peasant answered. "But where are you going to get the 20 
leather suitcases?”33 
Yet the State Department doubted the extent to which the announced shift 
towards light industry mattered as an indication of a change in the outlook of the 
Soviet leaders. The State Department considered the budget announced at the 
Supreme Soviet in April to be an example of Soviet duplicity and continued 
hostility. Soviet military spending continued at ‘Stalinist’ levels. Although there 
were reductions in official military spending, it was likely just better concealed. 
State Department sources pointed to previous budgets that listed arms 
development under social and cultural budgetary headings. A total of 43 percent 
of the budget was classified by State Department analysts as either defence 
spending, or in unclassified headings that could be used for military purposes.34 
Continued investment in heavy industry signified to the U.S. that the Soviets 
were still expanding such production along Stalinist lines. Indeed, this appeared 
even more damning since consumer goods, though receiving an increase from 
eight to fourteen billion roubles, were still allotted far less than the 100 million 
increase that the military received.35 A Time correspondent summed up the views 
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of his State Department source:  “Viewing Russia through the Soviet budget, it is 
difficult to discern any “new look” for the [Soviet] people or the world, any trend 
towards consumer and peace[able] industry. But it is not hard to spot the “old 
look” in the military area.”36 For most in the administration, the budget 
represented the true motives of the Soviet leaders. 
 
Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy and U.S. Perceptions 
Concurrent with the Soviet de-emphasis on military spending and 
increase in consumer goods the Soviet leaders made a number of gestures and 
statements to highlight the changes in foreign policy since Stalin’s death. These 
focussed heavily on ideology, in what would prove to be a foreshadowing of the 
20th Party Congress. 
The Soviets had been grappling with the doctrine of inevitability of war 
with capitalism for some time. In November 1953 the Soviet journal Zvezda 
published an article by M. Gus on “The General Line in Soviet Foreign Policy”. It 
stated that human action through the peace movement could indefinitely prevent 
another world war. Gus’ argument was subsequently attacked in the Soviet press 
under the premise that so long as capitalism existed war would occur at some 
point. According to Bohlen this revision was likely due to the fact that the 
inevitability was war was an argument needed by the regime to maintain control. 
If Gus’ argument that war could be paralysed indefinitely was allowed to gain 
traction then the Soviet people could begin to ask why the USSR and U.S. could 
not have more normal relations, and why more could not be spent on consumer 
goods.37  
This debate was not only taking place in Soviet journals, but also in the 
Presidium itself. Malenkov’s funeral oration for Stalin began the trend of public 
statements that emphasised the peaceful resolution of issues between the U.S. and 
USSR. Almost exactly a year later Malenkov publicly repeated these sentiments. 
He stressed that relations with the West improved over the previous year. 
Furthermore, he added that modern atomic warfare must be avoided, as it would 
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spell the end of civilisation. But for all the peaceful rhetoric in his speech, 
Malenkov attributed the failure of tensions to relax further, and therefore the need 
for a prepared Soviet military, to “aggressive circles” advocating Western 
rearmament and the formation of NATO.38  
Malenkov’s assertion that the West was responsible would have 
undermined his own peaceful rhetoric for American ears. Yet it was Molotov’s 
suggestion that the USSR join NATO, or his proposal for a European Security 
organisation as an alternative to NATO, that also caused the State Department to 
view Soviet statements about peace as pure propaganda: Molotov’s suggestions 
were merely part of the peace campaign to encourage neutralism in Europe and 
hinder rearmament.39  
The meeting of the Supreme Soviet in April 1954 further convinced the 
State Department that the domestic economic changes in the USSR were not 
indicative of a larger change in the regime or in foreign policy. Whereas at the 
Supreme Soviet meeting in 1953 the resolution of differences between the West 
and USSR was a continuing theme, the 1954 meeting saw a return of Stalin-era 
bombast. But the DRS had no good explanation why the Soviets reverted to 
Stalinist rhetoric, offering only that the talk of war was meant to lessen 
disappointment if promised consumer goods did not materialise. DRS never 
thought the Soviets were serious about improving relations, emphasising to Time 
correspondents that Stalinism never ended:  
If we hadn’t seen Uncle Joe buried, we’d think he was in a back room 
someplace writing these speeches. They’re right out of his book…“[t]hese 
ought to convince some people, maybe, there is no ‘new look’ in Russia, 
that Malenkov and Khrushchev are following faithfully in Stalin’s steps.40 
Yet this opinion was not universal. Robert Tucker argued that under Stalin 
Soviet policy had been characterised by repression at home, tension abroad, and a 
hardening propaganda line against the West. When Stalin died Tucker stated that 
“[t]he question following Stalin's death was not so much whether changes should 
be introduced but what kind of changes should be made and in what direction the 
changes should proceed.” The Soviet leaders had to reform: Stalin’s “dead end” 
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policies would have to go since they had been the “glue” for the Western alliance. 
There was greater flexibility in formulating policy, according to Tucker. 41 
By the end of the summer of 1954 the OIR and DRS had a different take 
than the one that had been leaked to Time. The Soviet conciliatory posture was the 
best way to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Peaceful coexistence meant to 
“allay fear in some parts of the non-Communist world, to create the impression 
that there has been a basic change in Soviet policy, and thereby to destroy the 
incentive for Western defence and to undermine U.S. policies.” Yet the OIR and 
DRS concluded that the leaders would have no qualms about returning to 
aggression whenever they felt it would bring better results.42 The peace offensive 
was apparently just sheep’s clothing, nothing more. Although Ray Thurston, in 
charge of Eastern European Affairs at the State Department, dismissed seemingly 
monumental events such as the normalisation of relations between Moscow and 
Belgrade as a sign of the “change of pace in Moscow since Stalin died”, he 
dismissed this as part of an alteration in tactics without any modification of the 
objective.43 The dispute over tactics and objectives aside, there was no discussion 
of what these changes meant for the U.S. 
The prevalence of such a mindset in the Russian section of the State 
Department meant that when Bohlen sent back an extremely detailed analysis of 
recent revisions in Soviet communist doctrine it had little effect. Articles in 
Kommunist had captured Bohlen’s attention since they actually downplayed the 
differences between communism and capitalism while arguing that peaceful 
coexistence was possible between the two systems. These articles represented a 
continuation of the argument over the inevitability of war that had been 
continuing for almost a year in Soviet political journals. The most recent of which 
seemed to be definitive.44 But DRS and OIR interpreted this as a red herring. Yet 
despite the other disagreements with the State Department over the interpretation 
of Soviet domestic reforms, the CIA agreed that the ultimate objectives of the 
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Soviets remained the same, no matter what they said in their journals or the 
modification in their tactics at the present.45 Though it suspected there might be a 
‘new course’, the CIA still thought the goals of Soviet Communism remained the 
same. 
 
The Union of Social Soviets 
Soviet charm itself was noteworthy. A diplomatic reception in November 
1953 witnessed what may have been the first genuinely cordial drinking session 
between the Soviet leaders and Western ambassadors of the post-Stalin era. 
Bohlen recalled that he and the British and French Ambassadors were invited to 
drink with Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Zhukov and Mikoyan, as well as the 
Chinese Ambassador and Walter Ulbricht. Bohlen, as necessitated by protocol, 
could not partake in toasts to nations such as the GDR and China that the U.S. did 
not recognise, but took no offense. Instead, the toasts continued, including ones 
towards the U.S., Britain and France. The lack of hostility toward the West was 
noteworthy. Kaganovich became increasingly drunk, uttering more and more 
“Bolshevik jargon”, but never anti-Western slogans.46 
Just as the change in foreign policy posture and domestic reforms were 
scrutinised, the apparent newfound conviviality of the Soviet leadership did not 
go unnoticed. It was less substantial than actual policy changes, but as part of the 
peace offensive and general softer image the Soviets were trying to foster it was 
dangerous nonetheless. The new leadership made a sustained effort to be more 
social, welcoming, and less hostile than was the norm under Stalin. Previously 
any point of contact between the Soviet leadership and Western representatives 
was dangerous: Stalin could use these contacts against those he wanted removed. 
This threat was now gone. But there was more to it: the leaders were certainly 
aware that they had rivals in the leadership who could make the same charges as 
Stalin, and so would not have been as convivial as they were unless there was a 
consensus among the leadership to appear effort to appear friendly at diplomatic 
receptions.  
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The transition from angry, cold adversaries to something akin to 
backslapping, wisecracking uncles was so stark that it gained the attention of the 
upper echelons of policymakers in Washington. Park Armstrong sent Walter 
Bedell Smith, acting Secretary of State at the time, an intelligence brief specifically 
on this topic. It asserted that over the past year the Soviet leaders had consistently 
sought to lighten the atmosphere and decrease their isolation from the diplomatic 
community in Moscow. There was a four-fold increase in attendance of Presidium 
members at public appearances and diplomatic functions, especially Western 
ones.47  
Ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. cabled Dulles with a report 
of a seemingly transformed Soviet UN representative Andrey Vyshinsky. 
Previously dour and vehemently anti-American in his rhetoric, Vyshinsky 
appeared prior to a Security Council session to greet various other dignitaries, 
including the Yugoslav representative. According to Lodge “he succeeded in 
creating the impression that he was relaxing his previous aloofness.” His 
entourage went out of their way to be jovial. Lodge did not think there was 
anything to this other than a way to make it seem like there was meaningful 
change in the Kremlin, and as part of a larger campaign to drag out disarmament 
talks and stall the EDC.48 Allen Dulles also noted the increased fraternisation with 
the West, but discounted any greater change in Soviet objectives.49 Furthermore, 
Bohlen discussed with Malenkov the difficulty for Western diplomats to make 
informal contacts with their Soviet counterparts and received assurances in return 
that this was being addressed.50 The following month the State Department 
reported a marked increase in the number of receptions attended by Soviet 
officials, counting nine in November 1954 alone.51 Bohlen noted that Malenkov 
and the other Presidium members went out of their way to emphasise their 
serious desire for normal relations with the U.S.52  
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The State Department informed Time correspondents that the greater 
availability of Soviet officials made further informal contacts possible. They were 
making themselves available to journalists and diplomats in a manner not 
witnessed before. Though the State Department clearly recognised the advantages 
of increased informal contacts between diplomats, it dismissed the change of 
attitude. It was thought that the Soviets recognised it could only advance the new 
course more generally if they appeared good-natured. Indeed, there was even an 
element of anti-Stalinism detected in it insofar as it was the opposite of what 
Stalin did since the Second World War.53 Again, the administration dismissed the 
Soviet changes as long as the reasons for them were not honourable to American 
eyes. 
 
The Influence of Public Opinion and Domestic Politics 
The jovial attitude displayed by the Soviet leaders was in stark contrast to 
the scourge of red baiting in the U.S. In 1953, McCarthyism was very much a 
political force. By January 1954, polls showed support for McCarthy at its highest 
point ever: 50 percent approved of him. However, the number of people 
disapproving of him was also at its highest point: 29 percent, as more and more 
people became polarised by his actions and no longer answered ‘no opinion’. This 
trend continued, and by March 1954, support had declined to 46 percent, and 
those holding an unfavourable opinion of him rose to 36 percent. As a result, the 
GOP took steps to distance themselves from him.54  
In this instance, public opinion caused Eisenhower to remain weary of 
Soviet gestures. Politically there was too much risk. Eisenhower was notoriously 
cautious of McCarthy and the right wing of the GOP. He deferred from 
denouncing right wing excesses during the 1952 campaign. Once in office, 
Eisenhower was keen on maintaining party unity.55 Support for McCarthy and his 
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tactics may have been on the wane, but it was still substantial. The fear of 
communism that McCarthy was trumpeting was not yet lessening.  
Dulles was perhaps even more aware of public and Congressional opinion 
and the power it could have to destroy his foreign policy plans. Dulles had 
written a reference for Alger Hiss, and had worked with him to set up the UN. 
Such skeletons were especially dangerous. But Dulles also may have agreed that 
the State Department had not been as rigorous as it should have been with 
security. A staunch McCarthyite, McLeod was made security chief to vet State 
Department Staff.56  
Such concern over domestic opinion would have militated any desire to 
seek peace with the new Soviet leadership. Even had there been more concrete 
proof of a change in outlook in the Soviet leadership, the domestic situation made 
it too dangerous to risk. Enemies of the administration could too easily distort it 
for political gain. Yet by March, public support for McCarthy was on the wane, 
and the outcome of the Army hearings further dented McCarthy’s reputation. 
Therefore, if domestic politics was the primary reason for not probing Soviet 
peace offers it would be reasonable to have expected the administration to 
become more amenable to this as the domestic political atmosphere became more 
conducive to détente. Yet this did not happen. At the end of 1954 Eisenhower and 
Dulles still rejected the idea of change in the USSR that could be more than 
tactical.  
One explanation is that although public approval of McCarthy and his 
followers was falling, the polls the State Department relied upon showed reduced 
public optimism about relations with the USSR. 42 percent of respondents 
thought the situation with the USSR was getting worse, while only 29 percent 
thought it was improving. A staggering 63 percent felt that there was going to be 
another world war, and 60 percent predicted that the U.S. would have to fight the 
Soviets “sooner or later”. This was the most pessimistic poll result since the 
autumn of 1952. Yet in the face of this pessimism, 62 percent of people still 
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supported a meeting between Eisenhower and Malenkov. This optimism was 
more restrained that in the past year, but the prevailing sentiment was that the 
U.S. should at least try.57 By the end of 1954 those feeling that war was coming 
“sooner or later” lessened to 57 percent. Interestingly, the press was more 
optimistic in this regard.58 
The seemingly contradictory opinions held by the public about U.S.-Soviet 
relations could have led the administration either to attempt new initiatives, or 
towards a retrenchment of existing policies and ideas about the USSR. In this case 
public opinion offered no clear incentive either way. As a result the 
administration took no risks. Indeed, to someone like Dulles, the public 
pessimism would have supported his own views of the Soviet leaders. Rather 
than pessimistic or rigid, he would have thought himself supported in his realism 
about the situation.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
The apparent changes to the Soviet military budget, structural reforms, 
and charm offensive were no match for the political caution and ingrained 
perceptions of the Soviets held in the administration. There was yet no significant 
change in how the Eisenhower administration conceived of the Soviet Union, the 
Soviets were still seen as possessing the same threatening and qualities they did 
in 1953.  
At the beginning of 1954 Dulles addressed the Council on Foreign 
Relations and summarised the foreign situation and the threat of communism. 
Using the language he had established as his hallmark over the past year he 
emphasised that the U.S. must plan for the Cold War in the long-term since 
communists were planning for “an entire historical era”. Lenin and Stalin had 
given instructions to weaken and bankrupt the West gradually. Stalin noted that 
once this was achieved it would “be the moment for the decisive blow.” Dulles’ 
used Soviet communist doctrine to buttress his argument for massive retaliation 
and the EDC, both of which would strengthen the West in an economically 
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effective manner through nuclear weapons and collective security. Rebuffing the 
apparent modification in Soviet outlook and mannerisms over the past year, 
Dulles rejected that there was any fundamental change in the mindset of the 
leadership; only a pragmatic realisation that their hold on power was best served 
by acknowledging human nature:  
There are signs that the rulers are bending to some of the human desires 
of their people. There are promises of more food, more household goods, 
and more economic freedom. That does not prove that the Soviet rulers 
have themselves been converted. It is rather that they may be dimly 
perceiving a basic fact, that is that there are limits to the power of any 
rulers indefinitely to suppress the human spirit.59 
Compared with Dulles’ feelings about the new Soviet posture at the end of 
the year there was little difference. Though Soviet tactics were modified, Soviet 
hostility remained. The new ‘soft’ line was a shift indeed, but one only meant to 
encourage neutralism and this divide the West.  He conceded that the U.S. should 
be ready for talks with the Soviets, but without relaxing is defence and certainly 
without any expectations of change on the part of the Soviets.  At this time Dulles’ 
was motivated by a desire to satisfy world opinion rather than a genuine desire 
for resolving issues. Indeed, efforts towards negotiations should be crafted 
towards “[e]xposing the falsity of the Communists' “conciliatory” line and placing 
on them the onus for the persistence of unsettled problems, tension and the 
danger of war…” and forcing the Soviets to give substance to the peace 
offensive.60 
Thus, Dulles’ naturally cautious nature meant he was frustrated that 
anyone took the Soviet new course seriously. He would not sanction action that 
offered even the consideration of serious change in the USSR. Inside the White 
House, both Dulles and Eisenhower were criticised for their inaction. In the 
months after Stalin’s death those fondest of psychological warfare proposed 
various courses of action to distract the Soviet leadership from foreign policy by 
manipulating tensions within the leadership and promoting nationalism within 
the Soviet Bloc. Allies who feared provoking the Soviets stymied this. In this 
regard the East German Uprising and Beria’s arrest and execution represented 
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missed opportunities.61 Indeed C.D. Jackson had left the administration precisely 
because he felt his position in this matter had been ineffective. Jackson thought 
that in 1954 the danger of hostilities with the Soviets would be at its lowest point 
since the end of the Second World War. He told Eisenhower and Dulles in 
February 1954 that if they had “the guts and the skill to maintain constant 
pressure at all points of the Soviet orbit” significant gains would result; yet 
“everyone agreed, and nothing happened.” Jackson blamed Dulles’, stating that 
bold action was prevented by fears of provoking the Soviets.62     
Dulles’ perceptions of the Soviets and his innate conservatism prevented 
him from either having a more nuanced view of changes in the Soviet Union, or of 
advocating a more dynamic policy to promote change. But it was not only Dulles 
who was reticent to modify his views. Ray Thurston, Director of the office of 
Eastern European Affairs in the State Department, took a similarly jaundiced view 
of Soviet foreign policy changes. Indeed, to Thurston even the Yugoslav 
rapprochement did not indicate any change in Soviet objectives.63 This is yet 
another instance of those watching the Kremlin, who certainly had a grasp of the 
magnitude of such actions, dismissing them as without further meaning other 
than immediate tactical gain for the Kremlin. A longer-term vision of what these 
changes may have meant for the Soviet system was non-existent. Thurston’s 
position indicated that Dulles was not unique in his doubt of the Soviets.  
Allen Dulles similarly thought that the Soviet leaders had not altered their 
objectives, which remained “the elimination of every world power center capable 
of competing with the USSR, [and] the spread of Communism to all parts of the 
world”. But Dulles thought that the Soviets had not simply embarked on their 
‘soft’ line in foreign policy only to divide the West. Rather, he recognized that the 
Soviet leaders likely realised that the achievement of their objectives was a long-
term project and therefore coexistence was preferable in the interim.64 In line with 
the CIA’s reports on domestic reforms Dulles did not seem to be willing to jettison 
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all chance of there being some longer term implications of the recent changes, 
even if Soviet objectives were seen as static. Allen Dulles realised that coexistence 
was a relative term. He highlighted that in the face of the Western military build-
up the Soviets were now relying on their extensive subversive network. This 
network “dwarf[ed] the Comintern of pre-war days.”65 
Allen Dulles was not alone in his assessments. At the end of 1954 The NSC 
Planning Board remained convinced that the Soviets had not modified their basic 
hostility towards the U.S. As such, they would seek to expand their power “by 
every means they find advantageous.” The peace offensive and diplomatic 
niceties were the best current methods of advancing Soviet communism. 
However, the best response to the changed Soviet tactics was a point of 
contention. The State Department felt that negotiation was a useful means of 
exposing Soviet insincerity with the peace offensive. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS), however, felt this was dangerous, and that talks should only take place if 
there was an actual change in Soviet objectives.66 Essentially the JCS felt the U.S. 
should only negotiate if the Soviets first quit being communists. The State 
Department, JCS, and CIA all agreed that since the Soviet leaders remained 
committed to spreading communism, any changes that occurred inside the 
Kremlin in terms of leadership, foreign policy, or doctrine, were ultimately 
inconsequential.  
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Chapter 3: What the Leadership Changes Meant for the U.S.  
Malenkov Ousted 
The Soviet leadership was of great interest to the administration because 
in the absence of reliable intelligence about Soviet intentions it remained the best 
indication of the trajectory of Soviet policy. The changes after Stalin’s death and 
Beria’s purge made many suspicious of the stability of the leadership. There were 
clear differences among the Soviet leaders on how to proceed in domestic and 
foreign affairs, which were closely intertwined. Thus the continuing assessments 
of possible power struggles and the fortunes of the men involved offer insights 
into the mindsets of those who wrote them and the influence they had on 
perceptions of the Soviet leaders. 
Throughout 1953-54 American officials in both Washington and Moscow 
were careful to note any indications of tension between Soviet leaders. By mid-
1954 the administration thought Khrushchev was on par with Malenkov, and 
possibly was the more powerful leader owing to his position as First Secretary of 
the CPSU and the support he commanded from the military. When Malenkov was 
ousted in January 1955, no one had predicted it would happen at that moment. 
But it was not a complete surprise to administration either. 
In early January 1955 Bohlen reported that Khrushchev was the most 
powerful member of the Presidium. Since Stalin’s death, Khrushchev had 
consistently improved his position among the other leaders, but Bohlen did not 
think this meant there was a power struggle. Rather he fit all this into a longer-
term pattern of “readjustment” since Stalin’s death. Indeed, Bohlen doubted the 
rise of Khrushchev was necessarily anything personal, but rather more likely to 
reflect the popularity of Khrushchev’s policy positions.1   
Given Bohlen’s report, no one in the administration should have been 
surprised by Malenkov’s downfall- Bohlen made it clear that it was more as if 
Khrushchev rolled Malenkov down a hill than pushed him off a cliff. Yet the first 
reports of Malenkov’s final eclipse were from William Forrest, correspondent for 
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the British News Chronicle. Forrest was obviously aware that Malenkov had been 
of decreasing stature for over a year, but that hardly made for good copy; it was 
better to say that the “Kremlin Struggle for Power is On”.2 Forrest speculated that 
Khrushchev would come out on top, and that this would be the end of peaceful 
coexistence.3 
It was possible that Forrest learned of the situation in the Kremlin through 
a leak in the British embassy in Moscow. The Foreign Office, however, did not 
think that the leadership was in crisis. Like Bohlen, it was of the opinion that the 
post-Stalin situation was simply evolving. Indeed, the Foreign Office went as far 
as to say that Khrushchev was simply acting as a spokesman.4 It emphasised that 
the fact that Khrushchev was “throwing his weight around” did not necessarily 
indicate a power struggle- even if the rivalry between Malenkov and Khrushchev 
had long since set in.5 Those in Whitehall were seemingly reticent to dispatch with 
the idea that collective leadership had ended. Whitehall was not alone in its 
caution, as the Quai d’Orsay, while publicly having little comment on the 
developments, expressed off the record that Malenkov could merely be giving 
Khrushchev enough rope to hang himself.6 Once again, various verdicts were 
reached from those in different circumstances, illustrating that with incomplete 
information perception and circumstance heavily influence conclusions. 
Developments further down the pecking order fed the perception that 
power shifts were underway. When Anastas Mikoyan was sacked as Minister of 
Trade in late January it seemed to Bohlen that the Soviet emphasis on light 
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industry was being reversed.7 Time correspondents in Washington viewed this as 
one possibility, and were quick to emphasise that this meant a return to ‘Stalinist’ 
heavy industry. This suited Time’s narrative of the Cold War, which necessitated 
portraying the USSR as the evil ‘other’ in a ‘us versus them’ mentality. Time also 
pointed to the possibility that Mikoyan’s apparent downfall could be the 
beginning of the downfall of someone larger, such as Malenkov.8 Time proved 
prescient in this instance, and Malenkov’s ouster was announced in early 
February. In London, the press feted Forrest as the “hero of Fleet Street” and the 
Foreign Office was taken by surprise.9 As a journalist Forrest was not hamstrung 
by politics and thus did not need to exercise the level of caution of those in 
governments.   
In Washington, the Kremlin shift sparked frenzied analysis by the DRS 
and the CIA. DRS predicted little change in policy as a result of the shift since 
Malenkov had not been sole leader since the spring of 1954 at the latest. Indeed, 
the DRS thought that Malenkov’s departure was part of a process that had begun 
soon after Stalin’s death.10 Such an interpretation of Khrushchev’s rise is 
interesting since DRS had long supported the notion of a power struggle in the 
Kremlin. Its definition of a ‘power struggle’ seemed more akin to a marathon than 
a wrestling match. 
At the next meeting of the NSC, Allen Dulles noted that the signs of 
Malenkov’s fall had been visible for over a year. This was not necessarily due to a 
failure on Malenkov’s part, but rather the outcome of the ‘second round’ of the 
struggle that began after Stalin’s death. The difference between Malenkov and 
Beria was that since Malenkov had not tried to usurp power for himself, the other 
leaders did not purge him. However, according to Dulles the current battle 
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represented the death of collective leadership, and Khrushchev was now 
dominant. Khrushchev had thus far used policy to marginalise Malenkov. He was 
blamed for the lack of success of the consumer goods programme, as well as the 
failure of the ‘soft line’ in Europe and the reversals that the USSR had suffered 
there in the past years.11 
Kremlin intrigues represented a ‘black box’ to Western intelligence. 
Therefore, agreement was seldom universal about the causes and repercussions of 
power shifts. The exhaustive 70-page report the CIA published in late March 
highlighted this since it was not completely in line with Dulles’ own report to the 
NSC. Indeed, at this time the CIA was not even sure when exactly Malenkov was 
ousted.12 The CIA report stated that Malenkov likely fell victim to the collective 
leadership as a whole, rather than Khrushchev alone. But the report also stated 
that Khrushchev did not appear strong enough to dominate the other leaders- 
though he undoubtedly enjoyed their support.13 The report was balanced in its 
reflections on the reasoning for Malenkov’s downfall. One theory was that his 
demotion represented the outcome of a personal power rivalry. The other position 
argued that it was a conflict over policy matters. There were in fact many 
possibilities involving an element of both of these factors: the CIA highlighted 
that Malenkov could have simply been the scapegoat for the failure of the 
consumer goods drive, or that the collective leadership had degenerated into a 
fight over “Stalin’s mantle”.14   
Just as the CIA acknowledged a number of possibilities, so did numerous 
sources in the administration. The month prior to Malenkov’s dismissal was 
marked by frequent attacks against those who supported light industry;15 in other 
words, Malenkov and his supporters. In the West, policy was seen as the main 
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driver behind the recent shift. Bohlen was the most prominent official who took 
this view. He felt that the struggle was essentially over the future direction of the 
USSR. It could advocate heavy industry and further develop its military potential; 
or it could pursue light industry and improve the standard of living. Bohlen 
pointed to long-term indications of this tension as far back as the beginning of 
1954, and hesitated to call the situation a ‘triumph’ for Khrushchev. As far as 
anyone could tell, the collective leadership as a whole ousted Malenkov. 
Khrushchev’s support for heavy industry- that he emphasised along with the 
problem of German rearmament- seemed to indicate a return to a tougher line in 
Soviet foreign policy. Yet Bohlen insisted that ‘tougher’ did not mean ‘Stalinist’, 
but was simply a different tack than that taken in 1953-54.16 He also emphasised 
the importance of agriculture in the policy debate, citing it as a key component of 
Khrushchev’s power. Indeed, if agriculture were favoured, it would have been at 
the expense of light, and not heavy, industry.17 Bohlen, however, felt that these 
rivalries were a result of policy differences, and that the policy differences 
themselves were the true impetus behind the shift in power.18  
 Kennan, a long time friend of Bohlen’s, disagreed. In his guise as a CIA 
consultant Kennan argued that it was precisely the issue of rivalry that was to 
blame for the shakeup. The policy differences, as far as he could see, were not 
strong enough to cause such an open break. Kennan argued that honest policy 
differences had always been allowed inside the Presidium, and never had 
personal political consequences, provided the final decision was respected and 
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such disagreement not voiced outside a very small group.19 Kennan thought that 
policy was being used to further personal political ambitions. Referencing broader 
issues of Soviet reform since Stalin’s death, Kennan pointed to a fundamental 
disagreement over changes in Soviet economic policy. One such issue was 
whether coercion could still be used to increase production, or whether incentives 
(in the form of consumer goods) were needed. This in turn impacted whether 
light industry would be favoured: if more emphasis was going to be placed on 
agriculture, the Kremlin needed to give farmers something on which to spend the 
money. This in turn affected foreign policy: those who supported light industry 
must have felt that the international situation would be stable for the immediate 
future, since reduced emphasis on heavy industry would have an impact on 
military preparedness.20 
Both positions held dangers for the Soviets- not supporting heavy industry 
flew in the face 30 years of economic dogma. But agriculture was in a desperate 
state. Both Malenkov and Khrushchev developed plans to increase agricultural 
production. Malenkov’s seemed to be better in the long-run, Khrushchev’s in the 
short run. According to Kennan, this allowed Khrushchev to argue that Malenkov 
was not taking the immediate interests of the Soviet people into account. 
Combined with Malenkov’s support for increased consumer goods, Khrushchev 
was in a perfect position to attack Malenkov for ‘right deviationism’. Kennan did 
not think this was coincidental. Kennan saw an opportunity for the U.S. to foster 
‘Titoist’ tendencies by extending an olive branch to the USSR- thus cutting the 
ground beneath those who favoured heavy industry and continued tensions, and 
proving Malenkov right. 21 
Dulles echoed Kennan, stating that rivalry was behind the power shift and 
that it was certainly more important than policy differences.22 There were a 
number of reasons that the idea of infighting would have appealed to Dulles. For 
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one, it fit in with his perception of the Presidium as filled with conspiratorial 
Bolsheviks well trained in the arts of deceit and infighting. Dulles also did not 
think there had been any substantial change in Soviet policies during Malenkov’s 
tenure. Therefore, the idea that there had been a falling out based purely on policy 
matters would not have made much sense to Dulles. 
 
Perceptions of the Kremlin Power Structure and Collective Leadership  
At the end of January 1955, Eisenhower approved NSC-5505 setting out 
the objectives of U.S. political warfare against the Soviet Bloc. Among these were 
a reduction of Bloc capabilities and alteration in Soviet policies in order to reduce 
the threat posed to the U.S. These were further subdivided into four sub-
objectives, one of which was to “[i]ncrease the chance of evolutionary change over 
time of a nature to reduce the Soviet threat.”23 Given the historical animosity 
between the U.S. and USSR, perhaps the most surprising part of NSC-5505 was 
the following:  
It is sometimes assumed that a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
achievement of all three of these objectives is the removal or overthrow of 
the present Soviet regime.  It is not safe to assume that it is either a 
necessary or a sufficient condition. While unlikely, it is not impossible 
that over a number of years or decades the policies of the regime might 
evolve in ways favorable to U.S. interest.24 
The NSC agreed that the Soviet system could reform. Of course, the likelihood of 
this was an issue of considerable debate. However, such a notion was hardly 
viable under Stalin. Thus, there was a clear recognition of change in the USSR 
away from Stalinism.  
 As a result NSC-5505 asserted that the U.S. should adopt a strategy that 
would promote evolutionary change in the USSR. It should “encourage the 
current trend toward ‘constitutionalizing government’ rather than a return to the 
Stalinist system.” The U.S. should be aware of the divisive issues in the Soviet 
hierarchy: consumer goods, police power, agriculture, and foreign policy. This 
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would allow U.S. policy to be crafted in a way that would encourage outcomes 
favourable to U.S. interests.25 Furthermore, the objectives of NSC-5505 were in 
stark contrast to Dulles’ statement just after Stalin’s death that the U.S. needed to 
disintegrate the USSR in order to win the Cold War.26 Perceptions were clearly 
changing. 
Yet this all rested on who was in charge, and in this vein various agencies 
responsible for divining the current trends in the Kremlin provided numerous 
angles on the leadership situation. The hallmark of all this was the emphasis on a 
power struggle, what exactly a power struggle constituted, and how likely one 
was.  Unaware of the statements of NSC-5505, some outside the administration 
such as Time, other press outlets, and certain academics such as Walt Rostow, 
rejected the idea that there had been substantial change in the Soviet system, even 
if there had been in the leadership, and continued to hope for a power struggle. 
Dulles’ view that personal rivalry was at the core of the Kremlin power 
shifts was related to the long standing hope in a number of quarters of the 
Eisenhower administration that an overt power struggle would break out. So far 
this had not happened. Nevertheless, Malenkov’s ouster reignited the speculation 
that changes in the Kremlin could serve U.S. interests and thus scrutiny 
continued.  
The CIA noted certain differences from past power shifts that indicated a 
new manner of business in the Kremlin. Rather than being killed, as was the norm 
under Stalin, Malenkov was merely demoted. Indeed, the fact that the collective 
leadership continued was itself a significant break. The Presidium indeed seemed 
to be acting collectively- at least insofar as no one member could take such actions 
without the consent of the other members. The CIA predicted that Khrushchev 
would have to cooperate with the “old Bolsheviks” (Molotov, Bulganin, 
Kaganovich) in order to maintain his leadership. Furthermore, the fact that 
Khrushchev appointed Zhukov as minister of defence underlined that he was not 
following Stalin’s lead. Stalin would never have appointed someone so popular to 
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a post of such power. The assumption was that Khrushchev was doing so to 
cooperate with Zhukov, or in exchange for his support in ousting Malenkov. The 
CIA did not foresee Khrushchev claiming the Premiership as Malenkov did- 
rather, Khrushchev would be “cagey”, and control the government through the 
Party Secretariat.27 
The emphasis on the Party was recognised by the intelligence apparatus in 
the State Department, which noted that the Party appeared to be the paramount 
institution in governing the USSR, and seemed to be working with the Army, via 
Zhukov, to use the popularity of the military for the Party’s benefit.28 This fact, 
just as in 1954, led to a great deal of consideration of the position of the military in 
Soviet policymaking. William Forrest argued that while the army had indeed 
become more visible in the wake of Malenkov’s ouster, true power still resided in 
the Party Presidium. Now that Zhukov was both defence minister and in the 
Presidium it seemed obvious that the military would have a greater voice in Party 
affairs. Some in the State Department saw this as a distinctly good thing.29  
General Lucius Clay told Eisenhower that Zhukov and the military were 
now the real powers behind the throne.30 But according to the State Department 
the Army was not a threat to power. Both Bulganin and Zhukov were close to 
Khrushchev. Instead, the regime was simply fostering the image of the army 
having a more prominent role. In addition, 77 percent of army personnel were 
Party or Komsomol members. As such, there was little chance of a military coup 
or a power struggle between the two, especially as the State Department asserted 
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that Soviet officers thought more about personal advancement than political 
power.31 
Bohlen argued that the position of the military did not affect the Soviet 
hierarchy at all. The elevation of Bulganin to Premier would not affect Party-
Army relations since he was primarily a politician. As for Zhukov, it was not the 
first time a professional soldier held the position of minister of defence, as many 
claimed. Bohlen saw little reason that the mere presence of Zhukov would 
enhance the fortunes of the Army. Nor was there evidence that the military was 
playing a greater role in politics than in the past. Malenkov’s dismissal appeared 
to have been something sorted out within the top party ranks. Instead, the 
military had improved its position mostly by virtue of Stalin’s death. Policy 
choices, in this case the re-emergence of heavy industry as the primary beneficiary 
in the Soviet planned economy, was all that indicated the military was in a 
slightly better position.32  
The fortunes of the army notwithstanding, the intrigues of the Kremlin 
continued to foster hopes of a power struggle. Due to the dearth of reliable 
information any sort of rumour was considered valuable intelligence. The 
dispatches of Time correspondents illustrated that this lack of verifiable 
information was not an issue when providing copy to their editors, nor to their 
sources in the State Department who furnished them with such material. The 
State Department filled in the blanks with its own interpretation of events. A 
series of dispatches on the Khrushchev-Malenkov ‘affair’ credited the ‘old 
Bolsheviks’ with special “cunning” in their ouster of Malenkov. The State 
Department did not think that the fact that Malenkov was not executed indicated 
change in the Kremlin. Time cited the numerous demotions of Molotov through 
the years as proof of this. Rather, Khrushchev kept Malenkov in the Presidium as 
a useful scapegoat in case new agricultural policies failed.33 Bohlen agreed with 
Time on this matter, echoing the possible use of Malenkov as a scapegoat. What 
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was of specific interest to Bohlen though, was that Khrushchev had consolidated 
power through promotion of his cronies rather than execution of opponents.34 In 
this regard, Bohlen realised the change from Stalinism. For those who felt there 
had been little departure from Stalinism since 1953, the fact that Malenkov 
retained his Presidium position, not to mention was still alive, was problematic 
for a perception of the USSR as Stalinist.  
Indeed, Time promoted the idea of Malenkov as sole leader since 
dictatorship was necessary for their editorial position of an unchanged and 
Stalinist USSR. However, with the exception of a brief period after Stalin’s death 
no one in the administration ever truly thought Malenkov had attained any sort of 
total power. Malenkov’s association with the consumer goods drive and the 
appearance of articles criticising light industry indicated that there was a split in 
policy, hardly something that happens in a dictatorship. Malenkov’s public 
statements tended to support the drive, while Khrushchev’s gave only qualified 
support. Yet the fact that the drive happened at all suggests that Malenkov was 
not the only backer of the programme, and must have had a majority in the 
Presidium.35 Indeed, it was in the period from Stalin’s death to Malenkov’s 
dismissal that highlighted that collective leadership was succeeding- though not 
always harmoniously. Bohlen certainly thought so. Although Malenkov’s defeat 
meant that Khrushchev was the most powerful member of the Presidium it was 
premature to think that collective leadership was finished.36 This was anathema to 
anyone who felt that Soviet Communism was inherently totalitarian. Time 
attacked Bohlen for his position.  
The durability of the collective leadership seemed to be greater than Time 
gave credit. The CIA felt that it was still a viable situation, and that collective 
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leadership was now a hallmark of the Kremlin. Beria’s purge and Malenkov’s 
ousting may have weakened collectivity, but Khrushchev was not supreme. The 
Kremlin seemed to be carefully continuing to cultivate the image of collectivity. 
Meeting with the Hearst delegation in January, Bulganin stressed that “principle 
of collective leadership with us is unshakeable.” The CIA concluded, “collective 
leadership appears to remain a fact”.37 Given the State Department’s faith in the 
emergence of a power struggle, the conclusions of the CIA made it clear that 
division remained on this issue. Though Malenkov’s dismissal was a more of a 
power transfer rather than a purge, the head of Russian Affairs at the State 
Department, Walter Stoessel, asserted that a power struggle was still going on. 
Though Khrushchev was the most powerful, he did not think he had consolidated 
power. Stoessel leaked as much to Time correspondents, feeding their 
interpretation that the issue of power in the Kremlin was necessarily one of 
violent intrigue.38 Rumours of Malenkov’s liquidation began to circulate among 
Western governments when he was not seen at the closing session of the Supreme 
Soviet. 39 The rumours proved to be false, but it illustrated the degree to which 
Western intelligence, and therefore perceptions, often relied heavily on hearsay. 
Indeed, many in Washington seemed to be letting their imaginations run 
wild. In the midst of this, Bohlen remained the singular voice arguing that there 
was nothing to indicate a crisis in the Kremlin. He felt that even though there 
were differences in opinion within the Presidium, collective leadership was not 
finished. According to the Moscow embassy, Khrushchev had to take the opinions 
of the leaders into account since his position was not at all ‘Stalinist’. Therefore, 
the embassy felt that the opinions expressed in the Soviet press were also the 
opinion of the Presidium. These articles stressed the importance of collective 
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leadership, and cited Lenin as the ideal collective leader.40 However, many in DRS 
still considered Khrushchev to be the sole leader in the Kremlin.41  
Louis Halle, formerly on the PPS and now ensconced in academia, 
maintained some influence in administration despite his falling out with Dulles. 
His note to Robert Bowie provided a long historical view of collective leadership, 
which he was convinced never worked. He cited the first and second Roman 
triumvirates and Napoleon as examples. According to Halle, while collective 
leadership had lasted so far, one-man rule would return to the USSR. He advised 
Bowie that the CIA would not admit this: in the absence of evidence the tendency 
was to “hold course.” Halle advised the administration to avoid any actions that 
could strengthen hardliners. He singled out liberation rhetoric as something that 
would inadvertently hurt any Soviet leader who advocated reduced tensions with 
the West, and admonished Bowie to remember that “[t]he future leadership of 
Russia could also be, at least in part, a product of our policy and tactics.”42 If 
presented as his own, Halle’s ideas would gain little traction because of the 
discord between he and Dulles.  
For Bowie and the rest of the State Department, the longer-term changes 
through 1955 at the top of the Kremlin hierarchy were evidence of Khrushchev’s 
power. His position at the top, though, was hardly Stalinesque. DRS concluded 
that Khrushchev’s ascendance to the top marked the end of this period of flux but 
saw significant departures from previous Kremlin reshuffles. The restructuring 
after Stalin’s death took place quickly, and significantly, without mass violence or 
purges. Beria’s purge, while seemingly the exception to this rule, only resulted in 
the death of Beria and a few of his lackeys. DRS felt that because Malenkov’s 
dismissal was more accurately described as a demotion since he still held a 
position in the Presidium. The DRS asserted that these changes were overall the 
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result of policy differences exacerbated by personal rivalries. Most significant, 
though, was the overall lessening of police power and the abrupt end to 
glorification of Stalin and, indeed, even to the present leaders. The emphasis now, 
even after Khrushchev’s ascendency, was still on collective leadership.43 Even if 
this was a façade, it was a stark departure from Stalinism nonetheless.  
Despite the myriad interpretations of the leadership changes, there was 
remarkably little intelligence on which to base decisions. As such, Halle may have 
been correct about the CIA maintaining course. At the end of 1955 NIE-100 
predicted that the leadership situation or the nature of the Soviet system was 
unlikely to change over the coming years; manoeuvring for power would 
continue, but it would be confined to the Kremlin and would not effect stability.44 
Such conclusions mattered. The idea in NIE-100 that a Stalin figure would re-
emerge was premised on the conviction that nothing had changed in the 
Kremlin’s manner of business. Conversely, acceptance of collective leadership 
meant a step away from Stalinism and reflected a mindset amenable to the 
recognition of further changes.  
 
U.S. Debates about Soviet Policy and the Leadership Changes 
The leadership question could have a significant impact on U.S. policy. It 
could tell the West something about Soviet intentions and objectives and whether 
they were changing. Soviet capabilities were often central to this debate. Much of 
the debate in the USSR in late 1954 and early 1955 had centred on the balance of 
light and heavy industry. In January the editor of Pravda, Dmitri Shepilov, whose 
position meant he was ideological whip, attacked those who supported light 
industry. Bohlen considered this a direct attack on Malenkov’s policies.45 
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 The question of the leadership and the direction of Soviet policy were 
tightly linked. Jacob Beam thought that given the current trend of Soviet policy no 
one would be surprised if the Soviets negated existing treaties with the UK and 
France.46 Bohlen reported that the leadership changes appeared “to be [the] logical 
climax of deep-seated differences among top Soviet leadership on policy.” Yet the 
U.S. should not focus solely on the heavy-versus-light industry debate in their 
examination of the meaning of the changes for U.S. policy. The greater issue was 
the future of Soviet economic development in general and its implications for 
foreign policy. The recent meeting of the Supreme Soviet seemed to confirm that 
the issue of heavy industry was critical. The appointment of Zhukov further 
supported this interpretation. Bohlen agreed with the prevalent idea at the time 
that Khrushchev’s triumph meant a return to a tougher foreign policy, and even 
perhaps to Stalinist tactics.47 The OIR also thought that Malenkov’s replacement 
by Bulganin indicated the primacy of heavy industry.48  
 If so, this would be a significant change. Ever since Stalin’s death the 
attacks on the U.S. in the Soviet press had been reasonably constant. The amount 
of anti-American propaganda recently returned to the levels of the ‘hate America’ 
campaign of the Stalin era. It was difficult to know how much of this indicated a 
genuine shift towards greater hostility, and how much could be a way of 
justifying increased spending on heavy industry. Bohlen noted that this 
hardening of attitudes did not mean the Soviets would take actions that could 
initiate hostilities. In fact, the belligerent tone could benefit the West if it aided in 
the ratification of the Paris Accords. The best course of action would be for the 
U.S. not to give any post facto justification for the expected hostile stance.49 This 
echoed earlier advice from Kennan and Halle that the best course for the U.S. was 
to forego any actions that could empower hardliners.  
                                                       
46 “‘Russian Peace’, Lambert to Gruin,” January 27, 1955, TCD, Reel 166, HL. 
47 “Cable: Bohlen to Dulles, No.1278.” 
48 “OIR Biographic Brief: ‘Bulganin, New Soviet Premier...,’” February 8, 1955, RG59, BEA, OSA, 
RRLDP,  Box 1, Bulganin, N.A., 1 of 2, NARA. 
49 “Cable: Bohlen to Dulles, No.1288,” February 10, 1955, RG59, CDF, 761.00, 1955-59, C0016, Reel 1, 
NARA. 
Chapter 3: Hopes for a Power struggle and Static Perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 107 
Bohlen’s position that the U.S. could expect a tougher stance from 
Khrushchev was echoed by many press outlets, most prominently the Boston 
Herald and Chicago Sun Times. The Baltimore Sun went as far as to say that the 
Soviets would be tougher than ever before. The Wall Street Journal predicted a 
tough political game from Khrushchev, and thought that the leadership changes 
meant the regime was unstable. The New York Times, in contrast, viewed the 
possible increased role of the military as stabilising. Away from the New York 
Times’ offices, Moscow based correspondent Harrison Salisbury took a different 
line, and emphasised that there could be tough words but the Soviets would still 
try to decrease tensions out of self interest.50 Harrison’s significant experience 
inside the USSR yielded a different conclusion than that of his colleagues in New 
York, who could only rely on their existing perceptions to interpret events. 
Interestingly, Salisbury and Bohlen frequently shared information on Soviet 
developments, but in this instance came to different conclusions about the 
direction of Soviet policy. They agreed, however, that the best course for the U.S. 
was to avoid any actions that could encourage Kremlin hardliners.  
Time dispatches just before Malenkov’s demotion expected a Soviet 
reversal towards heavy industry. For Time this indicated a tougher foreign policy, 
and a loss for those who supported the “staged” new course of emphasis on 
consumer goods.51 This meshed with Time’s view of Khrushchev as a Stalinist who 
was leading the advocates of heavy industry back towards pre-eminence. Time 
also reported that it was difficult to know for sure who advocated the softer line 
towards the West, but if the U.S. thought it was Malenkov then “…we’d only be 
accepting what the communists want us to believe”. This was consistent with the 
line Time had long parroted that there had been no change since Stalin’s death. 
They once again asserted that despite all indications to the contrary that there had 
been no policy changes since 1953.52 However, all of this editorialising was largely 
conjecture, since with the exception of the New York Times none of these outlets 
                                                       
50 “Daily Opinion Summary,” February 10, 1955, RG59, OPOS, Box 8, DPOPF, Nos. 2533-1/3/55-July 
29 1955, NARA. 
51 “‘Russian Peace’, Lambert to Gruin.” 
52 “‘Khruschev IV’, Beal to Williamson & Saint.” 
Chapter 3: Hopes for a Power struggle and Static Perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 108 
had correspondents in Moscow. Furthermore, the dispatches of those in Moscow 
were subject to Soviet censorship. Nevertheless, the State Department continually 
collected, analysed, and condensed the positions of the press for the consideration 
of those at the top of the department hierarchy. Public opinion mattered to Dulles. 
The CIA steered a middle course after the announcement of Malenkov’s 
dismissal. It argued that the power struggle was centred over economic policy, 
specifically the debate over light and heavy industry. A reversion to emphasis on 
heavy industry was likely. Bohlen initially agreed, emphasising that 
Khrushchev’s primacy meant a return to a Stalinism- i.e., tougher, more militant 
domestic and foreign policies.53 However, the CIA did not think this meant that 
consumer goods production would necessarily fall. Such a move would hurt 
Khrushchev’s popularity and could turn Malenkov into a martyr with the Soviet 
people. Khrushchev, however, would take a more belligerent tone towards the 
U.S., even if this were only a way to conceal Soviet weakness.54 The CIA thought 
that isolating the U.S. and weakening the Western alliance would be 
Khrushchev’s foreign policy priorities.55 This remained the same as it had been 
over the previous two years. The Germans, French, Belgians, and Dutch all 
concurred, indicating that the CIA was not coming to unreasonable conclusions, 
even if they were unenterprising.56 
 The assertions of consistent Stalinist policy on the part of Time was a 
reflection of opinion in DRS- indeed, this was often the source of leaks that were 
the basis of their dispatches. But the CIA had a different perspective. It recognised 
real and “significant change in the USSR’s economic policy occurred during 1953 
and 1954 while Malenkov was Premier.” There was a real, albeit marginal, 
increase in the proportion of the economy devoted to consumer goods while the 
emphasis on heavy industry remained constant. By 1954, there was greater 
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urgency in agricultural production. Though the shift towards consumer goods 
was not large in budgetary terms, nor did it greatly affect the amount spent on the 
military, the CIA nevertheless felt it was of great significance. As far as it could 
tell, the Central Committee approved this in September 1953.57 If true, then it 
certainly had the backing of Khrushchev who became First Secretary of the CPSU 
at the same time. Therefore, when Bulganin announced the budget in February 
1955 it was a departure from the previous two years; heavy industry was re-
emphasised, consumer goods production scaled back, and defence spending rose. 
Agriculture retained its improved position, however. This was likely a result of 
Khrushchev’s emergence as leader. 58 
The CIA also saw the departure from Malenkov’s policies as important for 
communist doctrine. This could affect U.S. security. Malenkov famously stated in 
1954 that nuclear war would spell the end of civilisation. He quickly revised his 
position to say that it would only mean the end of capitalism. Yet this also 
reflected Malenkov’s position on the inevitability of war. The CIA understood 
Malenkov as believing that nuclear weapons made war less likely due to mutual 
destruction. This was in contrast to Bulganin, who felt that war was still 
inevitable, and therefore continued to support spending on the military.59 Clearly 
at one point the CIA had developed an image of Malenkov as the more level-
headed leader. It emphasised his position in consumer goods and nuclear 
weapons, and the departures they represented from the positions of Stalin, to 
illustrate that there had indeed been a clear departure from pre-1953 positions 
during his time as Premier. As such, there was likely to be a reversion to more 
hard-line positions now that he was out, at least if the statements of Khrushchev 
and Bulganin prior to February 1955 were anything to go by.  
The CIA quickly recognised its error, noting the flexibility of communist 
doctrine and foreign policy since Malenkov’s demotion. The Austrian Treaty was 
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the first such example of this continuing flexibility. The emphasis on economic 
development in the Third World illustrated that there had was a departure from 
Stalinism, and not one that necessarily meant there would be more hostile 
bilateral relations. The CIA concluded that after Malenkov there would be “…a 
new course of action, characterized by the use of conciliatory deeds, and designed 
to regain the advantage in Europe which was lost when the Paris accords were 
drafted” and the “continuation of the long-term policy of conciliation toward the 
Sino-Soviet bloc's neighbors initiated soon after Stalin's death.”60 This conclusion 
was a bit muddled. The CIA seemed to have meant that conciliatory practices 
would be re-emphasised, rather than a “new course of action”, since practices 
such as these were central to the peace offensive in the aftermath of Stalin’s death. 
Indeed, this conclusion did more to show the continuity from 1953-55 in Soviet 
foreign policy more than anything else. Of course, there had been divisions in the 
Eisenhower administration about the course the Soviets were taking since 1953, 
and whether it represented a departure from Stalinism. The CIA seemed to think 
so, even if many others did not.  
 To be sure, a PPS report argued that substantive foreign policy changes 
toward reconciliation with the West would only be forthcoming once the Soviet 
leaders, whoever they were, felt secure in their position. Otherwise, the leaders 
could be attacked for softness toward the West. Yet this was entirely dependent 
on the person in charge being willing to negotiate. According to the PPS, if they 
were anything like Stalin, the West could expect little.61 This was precisely the 
point Kennan (and Bohlen and Halle) made to the CIA in February: the U.S. 
should be conciliatory, and cut the rug from beneath the hardliners.62 At the very 
least this would encourage spending on consumer goods, which might reduce the 
available resources for heavy industry and the military, thus reducing Soviet 
aggressive capabilities. Eisenhower and Dulles remained unreceptive to such 
actions. 
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Khrushchev on Top- A New Threat or More of the Same? 
Once Khrushchev’s primacy in the Kremlin was clear Allen Dulles briefed 
the NSC that it was nevertheless difficult to tell if Khrushchev held anything like 
the power Stalin had.63 Others outside the administration, such as Robert Tucker, 
were less circumspect and thought that a wholesale reversion to Stalinism was 
unlikely. There would be more emphasis on the military and heavy industry, but 
there would be more flexibility than there ever was under Stalin.64  
During his ascent to power Khrushchev often expressed doctrinaire 
positions on questions of ideology and his hostility to the West was outspoken. 
OIR traced Khrushchev’s position on the Cold War back to the fact that he owed 
his present position to Stalin and the purges. His hard-line nature was the result 
of being a “ruthless lieutenant to Stalin” and this illustrated his true colours to 
OIR.65 This interpretation was understandable; public statements of Soviet leaders 
formed a great deal of U.S. intelligence. Khrushchev’s statements were often more 
bellicose than Malenkov’s.66 Unbeknownst to the U.S. Khrushchev was 
manoeuvring himself for power and was purposefully taking positions in 
opposition to Malenkov. Yet the inclination was to focus on what tended to 
reinforce existing perceptions. Khrushchev’s hostility in many of his statements 
meshed with the perception of communism, and especially Stalinism, as innately 
expansionist. This was also often the case with other leaders. Even though 
Malenkov’s record of advocating improved relations and emphasis on consumer 
goods seemed to reflect a changed Soviet manner many in the State Department 
still felt that nothing had fundamentally changed in the Soviet Union. The State 
Department’s reaction to Malenkov’s removal was to assume that there would be 
a return to Stalinism, implying that indeed there had been a change in style, if not 
in objectives. This, as much as anything, was a result of Khrushchev’s blustery 
style and the positions he had taken in opposition to Malenkov. Although he was 
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careful to pay it the necessary heed in public, Khrushchev was characterised as 
not believing in peaceful coexistence. To him it merely meant the absence of war. 
As a result, the OIR described thought of him as rigid and unquestioning in his 
belief in communism.67 
Noting many of the same specifics of Khrushchev’s rise as the OIR report, 
the CIA also found that the Party had been Khrushchev’s vehicle for power, as it 
was Stalin’s in the 1920s. The CIA also noted his emphasis on agriculture and its 
role in his increasing prominence, as well as his support for heavy industry in 
opposition to Malenkov. Echoing the OIR’s comments on Khrushchev’s use of 
Stalin’s legacy, the CIA also noted how Khrushchev stressed his close relationship 
with Stalin in the autumn of 1954. Since Stalin’s death the CIA characterised 
Khrushchev as energetic and dynamic, but also aggressive and demagogic. This 
also reflected the OIR's comments, though the CIA admitted that since 
Malenkov’s downfall Khrushchev was more reserved.68 All in all the image of 
Khrushchev as a doctrinaire Stalinist was built on very little hard intelligence. 
This consisted mostly of public statements, reports of those who met with him at 
receptions, and reports of the Soviet press. Naturally as both a Soviet and a 
communist Khrushchev made statements that were threatening to the U.S. These 
certainly did nothing to dispel the perception of him as a Stalinist. Events would 
soon unfold that would support this perception and further hamper a changed 
perception of Soviet Communism.  
 
Disagreement over the Meaning of Soviet changes 
Mirroring the controversy over the direction of Soviet foreign policy, there 
was long running disagreement over the significance of the changes in the USSR 
for U.S. policy. This had a number of implications for intelligence assessment and 
the way perceptions were formed of the Soviet Union. The dispute again centred 
on the question of a power struggle in the Kremlin. Indeed, whether Malenkov’s 
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fall was indeed the result of a ‘power struggle’ was debatable. In the wake of 
Malenkov’s dismissal Bohlen reiterated to Dulles that the Moscow embassy found 
no evidence that personal rivalries were more influential than policy in the 
shakeup. Bohlen emphasized that the policy differences between the leaders 
seemed to be so deep that they could not simply be manoeuvres in struggle 
between personalities. To be sure, the emphasis on a ‘power struggle’ by the State 
Department was itself dangerous. For Bohlen, the emphasis on discovering the 
roots of such a struggle was distracting as there was very little the U.S. could ever 
learn about it. What mattered was the policy: personalities were only important 
insofar as they embodied specific policies. Bohlen thought that the current leaders 
learned the lessons of the 1920s well, and would not risk an open power struggle 
simply for the sake of power. If one were to erupt, it would be over genuine 
policy differences.69 Bohlen certainly thought that a power shift occurred, but he 
vehemently disagreed with the DRS assessment that a violent power struggle to 
assume Stalin’s mantle was taking place. Such an assertion was a “facile cliché” 
and he rejected the idea forwarded by DRS that Beria’s arrest was the genesis a 
power struggle that raged ever since. The collective leadership was too stable for 
this.70  
The fundamental issue was the nature of the USSR after Stalin’s death. 
Bohlen and the Moscow embassy as a whole felt that there had been significant 
changes, whereas the DRS and much of the State Department did not. DRS 
analysis in April 1955 prompted Bohlen to send withering criticism of DRS’s 
conclusions to Walworth Barbour, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs. In it, Bohlen took aim at the DRS, and its head, Mose Harvey. 
The problem with the conclusions of the DRS was not the facts expressed, but 
their presentation. DRS was giving the impression that nothing had changed in 
the USSR and that Stalinism was alive and well. Questions asked in the paper, 
such as “[h]as Soviet policy changed in any fundamental way” were straw men. 
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Due to the fear in Washington of being soft on communism, the answers were 
foregone conclusions. This resulted in reports filled with ‘safe’ clichés rather than 
any real analysis. Indeed, DRS often implied that there had been no change.71 
Location played a key role in the differences of opinion. Those in Moscow, such as 
Bohlen and others, were ahead of the curve in noticing the changes in the USSR. 
Now Bohlen was calling out the DRS for failing to even consider the changes.  
Yet Bohlen was no Pollyanna. The fact that he recognised changes in the 
USSR did not mean that the West should relax its defence. But the U.S. could be 
more attuned to political developments. The rigidity of DRS analysis mean that it 
was unprepared to meet future Soviet changes or challenges. The DRS assertion 
that Soviet objectives and tactics remained the same as under Stalin was especially 
dangerous in this regard. Such a statement contained an element of truth, as 
indeed the expansion of communism remained an objective. However, those who 
were unfamiliar with Soviet affairs could think it meant there was no difference 
from 1953, thus obscuring the changes that occurred. Bohlen also took issue with 
the assertion that the Soviets would continue with “Cold War tactics”. Again, it 
was not that Bohlen thought the statement was false, but rather that it could be 
interpreted differently. If the DRS meant that the state of affairs that had broadly 
existed between the USSR and West since 1917 would continue, then it was true. 
However, if the DRS were referring to the 1947-53 period, then it was 
objectionable. Bohlen slammed the DRS for seeing often noting the changes, but 
misinterpreting or rejecting them, noting that the changes post-Stalin:  
…must be summed up as a visible attempt to return to diplomacy, to 
rejoin the world which Stalin's cold war had forced them to secede from. 
Every day brings new evidence in this field and the evident desire to 
reenter world trade; to reestablish cultural exchanges, sport connections, 
etc. (sic)72 
DRS could not simply dismiss the changes as non-existent.  
Bohlen also alleged that DRS missed the subtleties of the changes in 
ideology and the greater trend of destalinisation calling DRS analysis “extremely 
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superficial” for underemphasising attacks on the cult of personality, and not 
realising that this was ultimately an argument in favour of collective leadership. 
Overall Bohlen viewed the DRS as rejecting, or at least minimising any changes in 
the USSR since Stalin’s death.73 The reticence of DRS to contemplate change was 
longstanding, as the debate with the CIA over the Soviet economy in 1954 
illustrated. To be sure, there were a number of possible reasons for this. Dulles’ 
demand for positive loyalty when he arrived at the State Department surely had a 
long shadow. Politically, not to mention practically, it was much safer to plan as if 
nothing had changed in the USSR. But Bohlen was not arguing that DRS should 
not consider such contingencies. Rather, he was urging it, and the State 
Department as a whole, to allow for the possibility of change in the USSR so the 
U.S. could better predict Soviet moves and prepare for all eventualities in a much 
more nuanced manner than the continued reliance on the stale concept of a 
Stalinist leadership or power struggle would allow.  
Naturally, Mose Harvey could not let the matter rest. He retorted that DRS 
highlighted the decline of Malenkov over many months. It could not be accused 
of promoting the idea of a sudden or bloody power struggle. DRS had 
consistently reported myriad small changes in the USSR, but was criticised by the 
Moscow embassy for this since it gave the impression of an ongoing power 
struggle. This was in contrast the embassy view that short of a major crisis the 
leaders would not risk an open fight for power, as it would likely threaten the 
existence of the Soviet regime.74 Harvey asserted that the Moscow embassy itself 
did not raise the possibility of a shift in power until December 17, 1954. This was 
untrue according to Bohlen, who highlighted cables that pointed to the rise of 
Khrushchev as early as May 1954.75 Harvey in turn accused Bohlen of 
overemphasising the consumer goods programme and its permanency. Harvey 
did not think the changes presented a long-term change to the Soviet system since 
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they could easily be reversed.76 Indeed, as he had stressed to the CIA in 1954, 
Harvey argued that it was possible due to increases in overall efficiency and 
production, and thus an increase in consumer goods did not mean a reduction in 
heavy industry or military production. Harvey did not consider consumer goods 
alone as an indication of a more peaceful Soviet outlook. 
The Bohlen-Harvey exchange dealt heavily with the nature of the power 
shifts in the Kremlin. Harvey said the embassy held the idea that it would take a 
major crisis to cause a change in the leadership. This led to debate over what such 
a crisis would entail. It was certainly true that Bohlen placed policy above 
personality or power as the major driver in the Kremlin. Harvey, however, did 
not think the Soviet system capable of serious “ninety degree” turns and that the 
real changes would be “two degree” turns. It was the culmination of these that 
mattered, and thus DRS had consistently highlighted them.77 But was West 
German rearmament or the argument over light versus heavy industry not a 
‘crisis’? Harvey did not say. However, Bohlen roundly rejected the accusation that 
the he or the embassy had said that a crisis was necessary. Rather, Bohlen thought 
that Harvey was confusing dissention with division in the Soviet leadership, and 
thus creating the idea of a power struggle between the leaders where there was 
none. Indeed, Bohlen argued that the embassy had never thought that there 
would be “radical” or “sharp-turn” changes, but that within the limits of what 
could be expected of the Soviet leaders there could nevertheless be quite 
substantial change- and the DRS was not recognising it as such.78  
The argument was personal, and to non-specialists, pedantic. 
Nevertheless, it was a personification of the argument over the possibility and 
pace of change in the USSR and the defining features of the Soviet system since 
Stalin’s death. Bohlen offered a balanced summary: 
DRS believes—and this letter confirms it—that the controlling factor in 
internal Soviet development has been a fight for power between Stalin's 
successors to which domestic policies, particularly to the economic field, 
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have played no part at all and as the letter makes plain, that collective 
leadership is a sort of temporary propaganda device while the battle is 
being fought. We at the embassy have never stated that collective 
leadership is eternal…We have stated, however…that the men running 
the Soviet Union are well aware of the danger of a genuine struggle for 
power to create another Stalin (which should not be confused with 
differences of opinion within the collective group) and have been making 
a genuine and not fictitious effort to operate the Soviet dictatorship more 
along the lines of the Leninist period.79 
This illustrated that Bohlen was ahead of the curve in his recognition of the 
change in the USSR. In this sense it was beneficial that Bohlen had been ‘exiled’ to 
Moscow, whereas if he were in Foggy Bottom he may have been slower to see 
these changes. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that he would have been as reticent or 
cautious as DRS. Bohlen had a long history of ‘avant-gardism’ in the State 
Department, especially with Dulles, with whom he had a rocky relationship. But 
the best evidence for Bohlen’s continued recognition of the importance of the 
Soviet changes was the fact that he had urged the State Department to consider 
them since 1953.80 
 Bohlen was critical of Harvey and DRS not for their consistent reporting of 
these changes, but for their implied conclusion that a power struggle was ongoing 
and could be expected to break out into the open at some point. Instead of hoping 
for such an event, the U.S. should instead pay heed to what the changes in the 
USSR meant for U.S. policy and investigate how these changes could benefit or 
hurt U.S. interests. This led to another problem: what exactly constituted a ‘major 
change’? The Kremlin was an enigma and assigning a level of importance to 
changes in the Soviet system necessarily included a degree of speculation. While 
Dulles and Harvey insisted the changes were merely minor adjustments in order 
to divide the West of gain advantage, Bohlen clearly thought that a series of ‘two 
degree’ turns cumulatively meant a substantial change in course. Failure to 
scrutinise these changes was the worst thing the West could do. 
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Chapter Conclusion 
Efforts to ascertain who was most influential in the Kremlin mattered a 
great deal. The issue who held the most power could have serious implications 
for U.S. policy. The perceptions of policymakers were critical in interpreting the 
Kremlin power struggle. However, the reshuffle also represented a potential 
challenge to the existing perceptions of many in Washington. However, it was too 
early to yet form a consensus of what Khrushchev’s ascent meant regardless of 
whether he would emerge as a ‘new Stalin’ or if he was part of a collective 
leadership.  
However, what mattered was policy, and Bohlen was ahead of the curve 
in seeing and accepting the possibility of serious change in the USSR. This change 
necessitated a rethink of perceptions of the USSR and the intentions of its leaders. 
Failure to do so risked leaving the U.S. unprepared for further change in the 
Soviet Bloc or for any challenges that the new Soviet line presented. But the 
political climate and bureaucratic tendencies of Washington militated against 
recognising these changes. The greater political insulation of the CIA allowed it to 
go further than the State Department or White House in allowing for such a 
possibility. Nevertheless, the perception of the USSR as inherently conspiratorial, 
subversive and expansionist was too widespread and too deeply engrained in the 
minds of those with the most influence over policy. Furthermore, this perception 
had come to serve a purpose: it justified the U.S. posture in the Cold War as a 
defender of democracy, peace, and truth. The same image that many media 
outlets peddled. A new, liberalised Soviet Union would directly challenge this 
perception. It was also fraught with dangers- if the Soviets did indeed prove to be 
changing only out of tactical need, and then the U.S. could be in greater danger 
than before. Domestic politics were charged with anti-communism, and this in 
turn rested on the same image of Soviet Communism as subversive and 
essentially anti-American. Anyone who modified their perceptions or challenged 
the intellectual status quo was risking a great deal.  
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Chapter 4: Challenges to Existing Perceptions 
A number of factors created resistance in the administration to ponder the 
changes taking place in the Kremlin. Chief among these was the engrained 
perception of the Soviets as incapable of change so long as they remained 
communists. This in turn was based on the view of Soviet Communism cultivated 
since 1917, but especially over the past decade. Yet other factors influenced the 
inaction of the administration: domestic political opinion and the relationship 
with U.S. allies. However, by the end of 1955 the beginnings of a change in 
perception of Soviet Communism would be apparent.  
Domestic politics and the force of public opinion were part of the reason 
the Eisenhower administration did not to take destalinisation seriously. Though 
McCarthy was a spent force by 1955, and the Democrats controlled both houses of 
Congress, it was still risky to treat the Soviet leaders with anything but suspicion.1 
Thus, anyone in the State Department or White House gave pause before 
advocating a line of action or change in perception of the Soviet leaders that 
required giving them the benefit of the doubt regarding the changes that had 
occurred in the Kremlin since Stalin’s death.  
Indeed the support voiced in the press over the actions and statements of 
Eisenhower and Dulles were in response to either their scepticism of Soviet 
changes, or their past handling of U.S.-Soviet relations. One poll in February 1955 
gave Eisenhower a 5:1 approval rating for his handling of the Soviets, and another 
a 68 percent approval rating.2 Indeed, if such an overwhelming majority of people 
approved of Eisenhower’s past handling of the Soviets ( characterised by intense 
scepticism, if not outright dismissal) there was little incentive to change course.  
Public approval of Eisenhower and Dulles’ past Soviet policies mixed with 
distinct pessimism about the durability of ‘peace’. Most people thought that there 
would be a war with the USSR in the next two years.3 This should have been a 
catalyst for probing Soviet intentions or taking the changes in the USSR more 
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seriously. Khrushchev’s emergence as the most powerful of the Soviet leaders 
prevented this, especially as State Department reports often regarded Bulganin as 
a front man, while Khrushchev was expected to usher in a tougher foreign policy 
line. Others raised the possibility of Zhukov becoming a ‘new Stalin’, while still 
more thought that having the military involved more was a good thing as it 
promoted stability through the cautious and nationalistic nature of the army.4 In 
line with this commentary were the overwhelmingly positive comments in 
response to Dulles’ speech in which he drew a distinction between Russian 
Communism and Russian Nationalists.5 The implication, that the U.S. had no 
problem with nationalism, played on the trope of the Soviets as having duped the 
Russian people into communism, and thus proved a popular line to repeat on 
Dulles behalf.  
The Re-Emergence of Lenin 
In Moscow, Bohlen and the embassy noted that the mention of Stalin’s 
name was now taboo. The anniversary of his death went largely unnoticed. This 
theme would continue through 1955. Pravda used Lenin’s works to support 
collective leadership. The embassy noted the omission of Stalin and emphasis on 
Lenin: it highlighted the importance that the image of collective leadership held 
for the Soviet leaders. The embassy noted as much.6 Later, The CPSU publicly 
criticised Stalinism. It praised collective leadership and condemned the cult of 
personality as “foreign” to Marxism-Leninism.7 Soviet specialists in Britain also 
noted the re-emergence of Lenin as a key doctrinal figure in the Kremlin. Isaac 
Deutscher wrote that Leninism was re-emerging in the Kremlin, especially with 
the idealisation of Lenin’s work in Soviet life. 8  
Due to the political sensitivity of even allowing for change in the USSR, it 
was not surprising that some of the most innovative ways of exploiting 
destalinisation came from those outside the administration. An associate of CD 
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Jackson, JK Jessup, noted that Khrushchev’s “Whistling Shrimp” speech made no 
references to Stalin. He suggested that the U.S. use the term ‘Stalinist’ to their 
advantage. The U.S. should label any policy of the Soviets that was incompatible 
with peaceful coexistence as ‘Stalinist’.9 CD Jackson thought the idea was 
“terrific!” and forwarded the suggestion to Nelson Rockefeller, who had taken 
over as Special Assistant to the President for Psychological Warfare. Jackson told 
Rockefeller that Marx, Engels and Lenin were all part of Khrushchev’s current 
vocabulary, but Stalin was conspicuously absent. Jackson pressed Rockefeller to 
use Jessup’s ‘Stalinist’ angle. Thus:  
[t]he division of Germany is a Stalinist division; the border of East 
Germany is a Stalinist border; the satellites are Stalinist prisoners. Such 
statements not only have the virtue of being true, but of putting 
Khrushchev and Company at least on the verbal defensive.10  
Jackson’s excitement to use the changes in the USSR to harry the Soviet leaders 
highlighted that he was very much aware of destalinisation. However, no one 
acted on his suggestions at the time, and the first instances of the administration 
using Stalinism for propaganda effect did not occur until after the 20th Party 
Congress.  
 
Slowly Modifying Perceptions and Resistance to Change 
In January 1955, NSC-5501 laid out that U.S. policy would be formulated 
on the assumption that Soviet hostility towards the West was unchanged and that 
the Soviet leaders would seek any advantage to spread Communism.11 After 
Khrushchev and Bulganin emerged as the most prominent leaders (though not in 
equal measure), the State Department scrutinised the utterances of both men for 
indications of the future of Soviet policy. The Office of Soviet Affairs took all of 
Bulganin’s statements from the Stalin period, and this only served to reinforce the 
perception of the Soviets as relentless expansionists who could not possibly deal 
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rationally with the U.S.12 The State Department was studying the past so carefully 
that they were blind to the present.  
 The emphasis on Soviet history was much of the reason that the recent 
Soviet emphasis on peaceful coexistence was so concerning. Soviet history 
provided numerous examples of peace and coexistence being part of Soviet 
rhetoric during the Stalin era. Therefore, the awareness of history led the U.S. to 
view coexistence in its current incarnation as more dangerous than outright Soviet 
aggression. When estimating Soviet actions through 1959, the CIA reasserted the 
determination of the Soviet leaders to see communism triumph. Coexistence was 
a way to allow the Soviet military and economy time to grow, and such periods of 
strategic retreat were possible for communists before their ultimate victory. But 
this had no effect on the hostility of the leaders to capitalism or their willingness 
to see communism spread across the globe.13 Khrushchev, Bulganin and the other 
leaders would not be very good communists if they did not try to convert other 
nations to communism; they could hardly be expected to act otherwise. However, 
this was not a sentiment voiced in the administration. 
Nonetheless, Allen Dulles stressed that Soviet foreign policy was changing. 
As it became clear that the Soviets would sign a treaty with Austria, Dulles 
thought it could hardly be a bluff and characterised such a move the most 
significant Soviet action since the end of the Second World War. It indicated a 
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growing flexibility on the part of the Soviet leaders. This new accommodation on 
the part of the Soviets opened up greater risks for their hold over the Satellites.14 
But an Austrian Treaty also held the possibility of creating a neutralist bloc in the 
centre of Europe. This, according to Dulles, combined with the diplomatic charm 
offensive that was well underway, was part of a larger effort to prevent German 
rearmament.15 
The changes in Soviet Communism were slowly becoming increasingly 
clear to the State Department. DRS admitted that power akin to Stalin’s was no 
longer possible in the USSR. This was a significant departure from its previous 
position. In the wake of the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to Belgrade DRS leaked to 
Time that the Soviet leaders must have concluded that the brand of international 
communism that Stalinism represented was no longer possible. Hence, the new 
leaders sought to reconcile themselves and the Soviet system to this new reality.16 
If DRS thought that the Soviet leaders had adapted then this implied that they 
themselves recognised the changes in the USSR since Stalin’s death.  
Yet DRS’ recognition of change was convoluted. After assuming never-
ending hostility on the part of the Soviets for so long, perceptions did not change 
quickly. DRS accepted some of the changes in the USSR. However, it also stressed 
that the changes were only for the benefit of the Soviets themselves and that they 
remained hostile to capitalism. This was ridiculous: no one could expect the 
Soviets to make changes for the benefit of the West, or cease their hostility 
towards capitalism- lest they cease being communists. Indeed, the position of the 
State Department reflected Foster Dulles’ conviction that the Soviet mission to 
Belgrade was the result of U.S. pressure to bring West Germany into NATO. 
Nevertheless, there was a recognition that the relaxation in tensions that was 
occurring could be to the benefit of the U.S.17 This was a stark departure from the 
previous DRS position that tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union, whether 
in the form of the Soviet emphasis on peace or in the diplomatic charm offensive, 
were crafted solely to undermine the West. Ultimately Eisenhower and Dulles 
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thought that the new flexibility on the part of the Soviets could offer more 
opportunities, but crucially did not mean the Soviets had given pursuing victory. 
As Time explained in an American football analogy:  
A passing game in football carries danger as well as desperation. One of 
those long spirals might connect…The mistake, however, is to conclude 
that by aborting a passing technique the opposition has given up hope of 
winning the game.18 
There was now recognition of change in the USSR. The issue was how 
various parts of the Eisenhower administration interpreted these changes. The 
CIA stated that although there had been changes in Soviet tactics there had been 
no change to basic Soviet hostility towards the West. Therefore, it was not 
foreseen that the Soviets would settle any major issues, and certainly not if they 
involved concessions to the West.19 As a result, the administration either 
dismissed Soviet conciliatory gestures, or if it accepted them, only with the caveat 
that they were only acting for their own benefit. As the response to the Soviet visit 
to Belgrade demonstrated, any recognition of changes in the Soviet Union were 
accompanied by the statement that the Soviets were still trying to ‘win’.  
The report of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel made it clear that the 
desire of the Soviets to meet (in Geneva) “…cannot be traced to a genuine interest 
on their part to ease any tensions for the sake of peace and harmony. It must be 
traced to a specific Communist interest in improving the Soviet position in the 
international struggle for power” and that “the objective of the Soviet Union is to 
convert or conquer the world”.20 It concluded that if the U.S. went to Geneva with 
the purpose of reducing tension it would only strengthen the position of the 
Soviets. U.S. policy goals were essentially the same as these, but this missed the 
panel entirely. The PPS also evaluated the situation. It quoted Eisenhower that 
“there is a change going on” in the USSR, but came to no firm conclusions. 
Though the PPS acknowledged that some experts denied any real changes, one 
PPS staff member, LW Fuller, was convinced otherwise and expressed this to 
Bowie. Though Lenin and Stalin had rather loosely interpreted Marxist doctrine 
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when needed, the current Soviet leaders were now shaping policy around 
developments rather than dogma. Fuller found it hard to deny that there had 
been a significant change over the past years, most recently with the conclusion of 
an Austrian treaty. Crucially, Fuller indicated that the Russian Revolution had 
now become ‘middle aged’. Although the worldview of the Soviet leaders still 
derived from Marxism, zealotry was in decline. These changes were happening at 
the upper echelons of the Soviet system, and hardly seemed to be the result of 
personality clashes. They were too widespread for this. Fuller did not think that it 
mattered so much who was in charge, and cited the Moscow embassy in support: 
“our general concern...is not who runs the Soviet Union, but where it is headed.”21 
Bohlen told the NSC that he had tried to get the State Department to study 
the differences between dictatorship and collective leadership. Bohlen thought the 
results would be illuminating as collective leadership implied a reliance on 
institutions. Such institutions became more important and took on formal roles. 
One example was the army, which had become more akin to the JCS in the U.S. 
Yet Bohlen asserted that “…circumstances have [changed]- Stalin has died. They 
are trying to give their regime some stability…[t]he period of adjustment after 
Stalin’s death has not yet finished.”22 Bohlen was making a very fine distinction 
between the men involved in the Kremlin and their objectives. He was arguing 
that though the men involved were the same that had worked under Stalin, their 
tactics, and even their objectives, had altered. Bohlen rejected the assertions of 
many in the State Department, White House, and press that Soviet attempts to 
improve relations were part of a larger strategy to subvert the West. He stressed 
that  “[t]he Soviets are not engaged in a gigantic Machiavellian plot to lull people 
to sleep.”23 Bohlen deduced that the Soviets felt that improved relations would net 
better returns than continued mistrust and hostility. 
                                                       
21 “Memo: Fuller to Bowie,” June 13, 1955, RG59, PPS Subject Files 1954-62, Box 98, USSR, 2 of 2, 
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Indeed, Bohlen did not think that the Soviet leaders were necessarily the 
problem: communism was. He pointed out that since 1917 whenever Soviet 
interests and the interests of international communism have conflicted, the latter 
always won. Consequently:  
China is far more dangerous to us today than the USSR. USSR has 
expanded virtually to the limits of traditional Russian ambition…[b]ut 
China hasn’t. Further, China is still “in the marijuana period” 
ideologically. It still believes the myths of Communism. The Soviets have 
sobered.24 
Bohlen was asserting that the Soviets not longer followed their own 
ideology. The feeling that the Soviets had settled down from their ‘teenage years’ 
echoed the remarks of Fuller. Just as Fuller recognised that the methods of the 
Soviet leaders were changing, so did Bohlen in his assessment of the Satellites. 
Without Stalin and his reliance on force, the Soviets would likely grant greater 
autonomy.25 Bohlen acknowledged that destalinisation was creeping into foreign 
policy. Given the greater demands the satellites, the leadership realised they had 
to grant greater economic and political freedom since they were unwilling to 
crush dissent.  
Dulles, however, was still resistant to admitting the changes in the USSR 
could be to the benefit of the U.S. Although he admitted that the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the FRG and the USSR was a major practical step 
from previous Soviet positions, he told Adenauer that there could be nothing but 
“ceaseless conflict” with international communism; its “limitless objectives” could 
only be interrupted by “tactical pauses”. Over the past years the U.S. had seen 
various changes on the part of the Soviet leaders take precedence temporarily but 
“current Soviet policies are evidently directed towards disguising the features of 
militant communism.”26 Clearly the assertions of Bohlen since 1953, and most 
recently to the NSC that the Soviets were not engaged in a “Machiavellian” peace 
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plot had no effect on Dulles’ perceptions as they reflected the assumptions made 
about Soviet intentions in NSC 5501.27 
 In the wake of the Geneva Summit, Park Armstrong wrote to Dulles with 
his conclusions about Soviet policy:   
…since Stalin's death, and especially since early 1955, the Soviet leaders 
have been increasingly active in seeking a gradual reduction of 
international tensions…The nature of these motivations suggests that 
current Soviet policy is more than a short-term tactical shift, but its 
duration will probably be pragmatically determined.28 
This was the second instance of a Washington based State Department officer 
supporting such a view. Dulles now had the State Department assistant for 
intelligence and a PPS member supporting the position of Bohlen that the Soviet 
shift in policy was neither short term nor tactical. This shift in thinking was finally 
beginning to affect him. After Geneva he acknowledged that the Austrian 
Settlement and entry of the FRG into NATO meant the Soviets were in a “less 
menacing” position. Much of this he credited to U.S. policies. But he told the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:  
I think we are getting to a relationship [where] we can deal with [the 
Soviet Union] on a basis comparable to that where we deal with 
differences between friendly nations. We have differences, and they are 
hard differences, but we know they will not lead to war.29 
This was a significant public statement. As will be shown in later chapters, Dulles 
openly accepted the change that destalinisation represented, but only in a very 
cautious manner. Yet by late 1955 he was even willing to speak to Congress about 
the shift in Soviet demeanour. This is notable given his weariness of 
Congressional opinion. Yet when NIE-100 was published in November its basic 
conclusions were much as the same as NSC-5501 in January. Although there had 
been: 
…[a] pronounced change in Soviet tactics, we see no indication that the 
USSR has given up its long-range aim of achieving a Communist-
dominated world…What they apparently have decided is that the 
existing world situation requires a shift from the previous line if they are 
to make progress toward the ultimate aims.30 
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Yet herein lay the issue: neither Bohlen nor Fuller nor anyone else denied that the 
Soviets had given up on communism. Refusing to consider alterations to U.S. 
policy on the basis that the Soviets remained communists was either a short-
sighted and shallow conclusion, or a transparent way of preventing any change in 
U.S. policy. What mattered was how the Soviets were acting on the world stage, 
and this had most definitely changed.  
The fact that NIE-100 maintained the line of the Eisenhower 
administration towards the USSR that it had held since 1953 is not surprising. 
Indeed, with perceptions of the Soviets and their methods only beginning to 
change it would have been unlikely that those who held such shifting views 
would have pressed them so firmly as to be expressed in an NIE. Rather it should 
be noted that the acceptance of change in the USSR was gaining traction, even 
with Dulles. 
The Shift to ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ 
The Soviet shift towards ‘peaceful coexistence’ represented an incremental 
change in the overall Soviet use of ‘peace’ as a weapon against the West in the 
Cold War. CD Jackson wrote to Eisenhower regarding the persistent and skilled 
use of ‘peace’ by the new Soviet leaders. According to Jackson, most people 
realised that Soviet claims of peace were bogus, but repeated often enough; some 
of it did “rub off”. He also pointed out that due to the danger posed by Soviet 
expansion the U.S. had unwittingly contributed to Soviet peace propaganda 
through its own defence build-up. The only logical response to such Soviet 
aggression was military preparedness. This perversely contributed to the success 
of Soviet peace propaganda: “while the Soviets were capitalizing on the repetition 
of the symbols of peace while actually waging war, we were forced to capitalize 
on the symbols of war while actually trying to preserve the peace.”31 Jackson 
noted that there was little that could be done to rectify the discrepancy at this 
point: the Soviets had effectively monopolised anything related to ‘peace’: 
everything from Picasso and his “peace dove”, to petitions and peace campaigns 
were all Soviet creations and their use by anyone else was now tainted.32 
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The PPS was aware of ‘peaceful coexistence’ as a Soviet tactic since 1924.33 
So it was no surprise that when ‘peaceful coexistence’ became established in 1954 
the press regarded it at best with extremely guarded optimism, and at worst as 
the newest form of a Kremlin peace trick that would undermine the West. The 
danger again was in the form of ‘soft tactics’ that could lead allies to adopt 
neutralist positions.34 Yet the Soviets were giving peaceful coexistence more 
backing than peace offensives under Stalin ever did. Bohlen took notice when 
Kommunist actively altered the meaning of peaceful coexistence. Kommunist 
downplayed the differences between communism and capitalism while 
continuously citing how communist doctrine supported peaceful coexistence. It 
even went as far as to claim that the USSR had never tried to export revolution 
and had no plans to do so in the future.35 The article specifically rejected the idea 
that the Soviet emphasis on peaceful coexistence was “Soviet propaganda”, a 
“communist myth”, a “trick” or “bait for public opinion or [a] temporary tactic”.36 
Bohlen told Dulles the article was the “most authoritative statement on 
this subject of the post-Stalin period”. He acknowledged that Kommunist did not 
directly confront Marx’s doctrine that capitalism inherently bred war.37 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviets were seeking to buttress peaceful 
coexistence by publicly seeking a loophole in communist doctrine was significant. 
The Soviets were trying to convince sceptical fellow communists of the 
correctness of the changed Soviet line. But it was also aimed at Western 
policymakers. The Soviet leaders could only hope they would interpret it as a sign 
of Soviet peaceful intentions. But this was bungled when Kommunist took a swipe 
at ‘liberation’ rhetoric.38 
Dulles remained silent on the article, and the consistency of U.S. policy in 
the coming months indicated that the article was understood as a way to give a 
phony peace campaign more credibility and provide an interlude while Soviet 
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power increased. Allen Dulles saw the transition towards peaceful coexistence as 
due to the realisation by the collective leadership that that the success of 
communism globally remained a long-term goal. Therefore a period of 
coexistence was necessary.39 Peaceful coexistence saw a different use when 
Khrushchev and Bulganin replaced Malenkov in January 1955. Both men went to 
pains to stress peaceful coexistence, though Khrushchev’s statements were 
generally seen as emphasizing Soviet strength as well, in contrast to Bulganin’s, 
which were more conciliatory. This ‘good cop, bad cop’ routine was broadly 
consistent through 1955. After the Geneva Conference Khrushchev and Bulganin 
were careful not only to stress peaceful coexistence, but also and consistently 
buttressed their peaceful proclamations with those expressing Soviet strength, 
attacking colonialism and their fundamental trust in communism.40 Such a tactic 
only furthered doubts about the sincerity of the peace offensive.41 
 
A Glacial Shift in Perceptions? 
The shift towards the consistent use of ‘peaceful coexistence’ on the part of 
the Soviets did little to change the view held by Dulles, Eisenhower and the 
intelligence establishment that the switch was lipstick on a pig. Eisenhower had 
long since concluded that the Soviet threat was fundamentally based on political 
and psychological elements. Peaceful coexistence was a hallmark of this strategy.42 
But since Eisenhower conceived of the Cold War as ideological at heart, this did 
not lessen the Soviet threat. Rather it made it more difficult to contain since it was 
harder to repulse an enemy who was attempting to spread its ideology through 
‘peace’. In January 1955 NSC-5501 summarized the peace offensive as “the most 
effective tactic for dividing the free world and isolating the U.S. from its allies”. It 
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would require a major undertaking for the U.S. to maintain the same level of 
unity in the face of the new, peaceable, Soviet line.43  
In January 1955 Foster Dulles slammed the use of peace in Soviet foreign 
policy. He thought the Soviet version of peace was a perversion that would be 
achieved by extending a state of conformity and submission to a dictatorship. 
Relying on his interpretation of Soviet Communist doctrine, Foster Dulles went 
on to say that the Soviets realized that war would be necessary, but they hoped 
that the peace offensive would win as many to their side as possible before force 
would be necessary.44Allen Dulles echoed his brother when he briefed the NSC in 
May 1955 on the danger the Soviet ‘soft line’ and the goal of creating a ‘neutralist 
bloc’ in Europe.45 The conclusion that the Soviets were out to undermine Western 
unity and undermine its military preparedness could only have caused the U.S. to 
further doubt Soviet ‘peace’ sincerity.  
In the run-up to the Geneva Summit in July 1955 the prevailing attitude 
towards the Soviet peace offensive was that it did not mean any greater change in 
Soviet objectives but was rather a ploy to divide the west and gain breathing 
space to take care of domestic issues. Even if this was actually a fairly accurate 
interpretation of Soviet intentions,46 the Eisenhower administration failed to 
discern any other changes in the USSR since the peace offensive was either 
interpreted within existing perceptions of Soviet communist intentions, which 
confirmed the Soviets as subversive and hostile, or were dismissed as tactical 
changes, which also confirmed malign intentions. The Geneva Summit therefore 
became a battleground of peace propaganda, with Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ 
proposal countering Soviet disarmament offers.47 Eisenhower could have been 
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sincerely interested in peace, but was also trying to score propaganda points. In 
this instance, the Open Skies proposal derailed the Soviet peace offensive by 
making the U.S. look peaceful and the Soviets intransigent.48 
After the summit there was little change in how the Eisenhower 
administration perceived the peace offensive and Soviet objectives. In preparation 
for the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting in October, Dulles remained convinced 
that the Soviet turn towards conciliation was a result of the failure of Soviet 
tactics, and that it was the success of Western unity that caused this. The U.S. had 
to remain vigilant and committed to collective security.49 This was the same 
position he advocated since 1953. Yet Dulles also stated that “[w]e must not rebuff 
a change which might be that for which the world longs.”50  Indeed, in one of the 
first indications that Dulles acknowledged serious change in the USSR he thought: 
… it is possible that what the Soviet rulers design as a maneuver may in 
fact assume the force of an irreversible trend. Our own conduct should be 
to encourage that to happen.51 
In the wake of the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting, NIE-100 recognised 
the role that Stalin’s death played in changing Soviet foreign policy, 
acknowledging that the new leaders desired a reduction in tensions, but only as a 
way to reduce the Western defence effort and divide Western allies.52 Indeed, 
although NIE-100 noted a “pronounced change in Soviet tactics”, there had been 
no indication of any change in the ultimate Soviet objective of a communist 
dominated world. The new peaceful coexistence strategy created problems for the 
Western alliance: indications were that it would last for some time, and combating 
less hostility from the Soviets was more challenging than responding to overt 
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aggression.53 Defence build-ups were a nonsensical response to this specific threat, 
and played into Soviet propaganda by making the West appear as a warmonger. 
This could sway many neutral countries towards the Soviet camp. Western 
nations that undertook defence build-ups and alliances could find these 
commitments hard to justify in the face of apparent Soviet peaceful intentions. All 
of this could lead to perhaps the most damaging result of ‘peaceful coexistence’: 
blurring the lines between the communist and non-communist world.54 This 
would lead to a fundamental danger to the U.S.: the Soviets could rely on force 
inside the bloc to maintain cohesion; the U.S. had to rely on persuasion. After the 
Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting Bowie emphasised to Dulles the danger of the 
Soviet position. The conspicuous avoidance of menacing attitudes was crafted to 
make allies doubt the need for collective security.55 Bowie thought that the success 
of the Geneva Conference in lowering tensions actually put the West at a 
disadvantage. In combination with an emphasis on peaceful coexistence, lowered 
tensions left the West even more exposed to Soviet political warfare attacks, 
especially those emphasising ‘peace’. However, this ran up against the established 
imperative of maintaining the image of the Soviets as the aggressor that 
underpinned so many of the administration’s Cold War assumptions.  
Publicly Dulles put an optimistic spin on altered Soviet tactics. Although 
he often emphasized the danger they posed he told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that the revised Soviet emphasis on peaceful coexistence proved that 
Western policies were working, rather than Soviet policies being flawed. 
According to Dulles, for the past 30 years the Soviet system was based on violence 
and intolerance of other systems and he cited Stalin’s assertion “that anyone who 
did believe in the policy of violence either did not understand Soviet communism, 
or had gone out of his mind.” But doctrinal changes such as various roads to 
socialism and the lessening reliance on violence caused the Soviet leaders to 
“…throw out of the Soviet Union what has been their Bible for the last 25 or 30 
years” and proved that “…the unity and firmness and resolution of the free 
nations during the past few years have caused Soviet policy to fail, and today they 
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are trying to figure out how they are going to get a better one.” Dulles actually 
regarded the changes as bringing the Soviet system closer to the American one.56  
Ever since Stalin’s death Dulles had rejected the possibility of change, but 
now he was treading a fine line. It was crucial that he maintain the sense of 
danger posed by the revised Soviet tactics, especially the peace offensive, while 
also stressing that the revisions were the result of Western policies of collective 
security and rearmament. This was Dulles’ way of rationalising the situation to 
his advantage; he acknowledged the changes in the Soviet system, but in a way 
that emphasised the danger they posed and that underlined that it was U.S. led 
resistance to Soviet expansion that had caused the changes in the first place. Such 
hedging also prevented him from being attacked as soft on communism. All of 
this meant the U.S. should hold course. 
Dulles’ testimony displayed his lawyerly ability to convince himself of 
seemingly contradictory positions. He acknowledged sweeping changes in the 
Soviet system: “…I wrote this in my book of six years ago- the most significant 
thing that would happen would be if they would begin to teach in the Soviet 
Union something different from the Stalinist doctrine…” Indeed, Dulles 
suggested that present developments could be so important that they may not be 
appreciated for a decade or more.57 Perhaps Dulles was somehow referring to the 
glacial pace it had taken him to admit in public that his own mindset had indeed 
changed, since after three years of denying any change in the Soviet Union, he 
was now admitting, on the record, a shift in Soviet policy of first-rate importance. 
Befuddlingly, though, he also specifically denied the suggestion that his outlook on 
Soviet Communism had changed at all in the past three years, stating he took 
“…some satisfaction in going back to some of the things I wrote ten or five years 
ago, and they seem to me to be the about the same things I believe in now.”58 
The PPS agreed with Dulles interpretation that while Soviet tactics had 
changed since Stalin’s death, the fundamental objectives remained. The Austrian 
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treaty, Yugoslav rapprochement, Geneva Summit, and Soviet tour of Asia were 
only undertaken as part of the larger campaign to promote a ‘softer’ Soviet image 
that was to their advantage. Projecting an image of peace was good for the 
Soviets: smiles were better at undermining the West than scowls. But for the PPS, 
this change had been a result of European collective security, of which the U.S. 
was deeply involved.59 An ulterior motive was always suspected of the Soviets.  
A specific concern in Washington was that the Soviet peace offensive 
would undermine European unity and defence. Adenauer agreed, and warned 
against the dangers of ‘peace’. Dulles and Adenauer shared similar conceptions of 
the communist menace, and both felt the current Soviet tactics were transitory.60 
Adenauer had little faith in the Western public to see the danger the Soviets 
posed: 
The masses in the free countries who influence public opinion strongly 
have no clear idea on communism…[t]hey know nothing about it and 
they live in a feeling of security that is wholly unjustified… it is an 
essential task to inform our peoples on this: what communism teaches… 
[and] what happened to the people which it has subjugated.61 
The woolly naïveté that Adenauer ascribed to the Western public made 
Soviet peace pronouncements extremely dangerous. He insisted that no one 
should be “taken in” by it. The inclination to say, “’after all, the Russians are not 
so bad’” was “contagious” and “led to some disturbing and destructive 
consequences in Europe.”62 Whereas Dulles thought that the West had been 
successful in maintaining unity, Adenauer thought Soviet peace tactics were 
successful doing the opposite. At the moment the danger was from the Soviet 
backslapping, “…keep smiling approach”.63 But domestic U.S. politics also 
concerned Adenauer. He feared the neo-isolationists in Congress as much as he 
did the Soviet army or communist movements in Europe.64 The combination of 
American isolationist tendencies along with the peace offensive posed serious 
security problems for the FRG and Westbindung. As a result, Dulles could not 
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share his gradually altering perceptions of Soviet Communism with Adenauer. In 
fact, Adenauer’s anti-communism hindered the American realisation of change in 
the USSR. 
If Adenauer had kept up with the U.S. popular opinion he would not have 
been so concerned. Returning from the USSR William Randolph Hearst Jr. 
claimed that the Soviets were only interested in peace out of necessity.65 Hearst, 
like others, dismissed peace from the Soviets that may be given out of anything 
but the purest altruism, but even then Hearst suspected that the Soviets had 
ulterior motives. It was seemingly impossible for the Soviets to prove peaceful 
intentions without outright surrender. The whole notion was strikingly familiar to 
George Kennan’s characterisation of Stalin in previous years that nothing short of 
the delivery of all American military forces to the USSR would tame the Soviets, 
but even then they would suspect an imperialist trap.66 Hearst also asserted that 
the goal of the Soviet leaders remained world domination.67 
Indeed, the idea of Soviet desires for peace as fundamentally disingenuous 
was widespread in the press as well as in the administration. Time correspondents 
stressed that a changed Soviet “game” did not reflect any less of a hope to “win”. 
This sentiment was closely related to the idea of Soviet emphasis on peace only 
being a response to Western cohesion and rearmament. In this instance the Soviet 
rapprochement and visit to Yugoslavia was a response to West German 
integration into NATO.68 Indeed, Dulles made this same point to Eisenhower prior 
to the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting.69 Neither Eisenhower nor Dulles 
thought that the USSR was anywhere near collapse. Rather they thought that their 
desire for relaxation was a result of overextension, and this was a result of 
Western policies.70  
A consensus in some quarters on the nature of the Soviet threat did not 
equate to agreement on how to meet the challenge. Indeed, the Eisenhower 
administration was accused of not having any coherent strategy to counter the 
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peace offensive.71 To be sure, after more than four years of continuous Soviet 
peace rhetoric the Eisenhower administration lacked a plan to address it. 
However, this was also due to the nature of the challenge. The only way to 
counter was seen as a temporary Soviet alteration in posture was to wait it out, 
and when the Soviets reverted to violence towards the West say ‘I told you so’. If 
the Soviet objectives were unchanging as Eisenhower, Dulles and most of the 
press claimed, then much of a ‘plan’ was not needed, only patience that the 
Soviets would not permanently be able to restrain their violent nature.72 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
The administration still assumed the key Soviet objective to be worldwide 
communist domination. As such, any lack of hostility from the Soviets was 
immediately suspected as dishonest. The Soviet peace offensive was viewed 
through such a lens. By late 1955 important policymakers had come to accept that 
the change in the USSR was not merely tactical. The sustained nature of Soviet 
peace propaganda and gestures towards the west, in combination with the effects 
of destalinisation caused Eisenhower, Dulles and others to begin to accept that the 
Soviet Union was indeed changing. This acceptance, however, was only 
expressed in private, however, and even then with the caveat that the changes 
being undertaken could make the USSR more, not less, dangerous. This was due 
to a long history of mistrust, and domestic political imperatives, and the positions 
of U.S. allies. Destalinisation was not yet accepted as a genuine trend, and the 
leaders themselves were still regarded as fundamentally unchanged. If they were 
using different tactics it was only because they were better suited to the situation. 
Therefore, the Soviet leaders were not yet recognised as a different breed. But the 
acceptance that the Soviet Union was undergoing serious change allowed the 
perception of the Soviet leaders as rigid, doctrinaire Stalinists, to begin to break 
down. 
                                                       
71 “‘Cold War’, Shepley to Williamson,” February 23, 1956, TCD, Box 1, Folder 11, HL. 
72 Ibid. 
Chapter 5: To the 20th Party Congress 
 
 
 
138 
Chapter 5: To the 20th Party Congress 
By late 1955 differing views had emerged in the administration on the 
changes taking place in the USSR The Geneva Summit played a role, but it would 
not have had any effect were it not for certain policymakers that found 
themselves in the vanguard of the development of a new understanding of Soviet 
intentions: an understanding that predated the summit. Bohlen was the most 
prominent, but he was gaining support from many in Washington such as Park 
Armstrong, Jacob Beam, and LW Fuller. From outside the government Kennan 
was calling for the administration to adjust policy to the new Soviet reality, as was 
Louis Halle (although in both cases their feuds with Dulles made the secretary 
reluctant to accept their analyses of the changes in the Soviet system). None of 
these men ceased to see the Soviet Union as a threat to the U.S. and the West. 
Rather, they had recognised that the Soviet ‘new course’ and new leadership 
represented both a challenge and an opportunity. If the U.S. did not adjust its 
perceptions and policies the U.S. would miss an opportunity to gain concessions 
or improve its position in the Cold War. In contrast, Dulles continued to view 
ultimate Soviet objectives as unaltered. He did not yet recognise a need for a 
changed outlook or policies. But events in 1956 would see Dulles adopt the new 
perception of the Soviet leaders that he had begun to fashion in 1955. This 
perception accepted the leaders as qualitatively different from Stalinists. Dulles 
was cagey with his new ideas and voiced them mostly in private. He spoke of 
them only in qualified terms in public. Indeed, for the first months of 1956 he 
maintained much the same position as he had since 1953: that of ‘no basic change’, 
as did Eisenhower.  
U.S. Assessments and Influencing Change 
By 1955 the Eisenhower administration understood the limitations of 
psychological warfare.1 As a result, NSC-5505/1: “Exploitation of Soviet and 
European Satellite Vulnerabilities” included a reassessment of the type of change 
possible in the Soviet Bloc. It emphasised that the U.S. should seek evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary change in the USSR. Efforts at inducing rebellion and 
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revolution behind the Iron Curtain had failed. The U.S. should therefore study 
how Soviet policy was likely to evolve and whether it could be stimulated in 
directions favourable to the U.S. Nonetheless, the administration concluded in a 
review of NSC-5505/1: 
…there are as yet no indications of substantial evolution in a direction 
favorable to the U.S. Certain evidence is perhaps hopeful. For example, 
there has been some reduction in the powers of the secret police. The 
managerial class seems to want less political interference in business 
operations…Nevertheless the Soviet Government remains a monolithic 
communist state, committed to its long-range objectives, hostile to the U.S., and 
determined to combat U.S. moves to strengthen the unity of the free world.2  
The recent statements of Soviet leaders supported the notion of the Soviets 
as hostile and expansionist. Speaking in Bombay during a tour of South Asia in 
November 1955, Khrushchev reasserted the Soviet commitment to Marxism-
Leninism, telling doubters that they would have to “wait for pigs to fly” before 
they disavowed Lenin.3 Khrushchev had any number of reasons for making such 
a statement- the interests of his audience in Bombay most obviously- but growing 
tensions with China would have doubtless played a role as well. Yet to the ears of 
Eisenhower, Dulles and others, this only served to further their conviction that the 
Soviets remained the same men, with the same objectives, as they were under 
Stalin.4  
It was a transitional period for the Eisenhower administration. The 
perception of the Soviet leaders as communists with the same goals of world 
domination remained prevalent. Nonetheless there were flashes of a new 
understanding of the methods pursued by the leaders since Stalin’s death. Dulles 
acknowledged that the Soviet leaders had come to “pursue their foreign policy 
goals with less manifestation of intolerance and less emphasis on violence.”5 As 
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these actions fulfilled Eisenhower’s demand for peaceful gestures in his 1953 
‘Chance for Peace’ speech, Dulles could hardly have said otherwise in public. 
Indeed, in Dulles’ mind these actions were the result of the firm stance taken by 
the U.S. Dulles and Eisenhower therefore rejected Soviet gestures and emphasis 
on peaceful coexistence as mere “propaganda gambits”. By 1956 the 
administration realised that psychological warfare was unlikely to have any 
effect. This resulted in a pivot towards cultural infiltration as a way of promoting 
evolutionary change in the USSR. But in order for Dulles and Eisenhower to even 
countenance cultural exchange programmes there must have been a change in 
their perceptions of the Soviet leaders. It was still a political gamble for Dulles to 
allow Soviets to explore the U.S.6 This would have exposed him to charges of 
weakness towards the USSR, and that the Soviet exchanges would have been rife 
with spies. The hysterical anti-communist atmosphere that characterised the early 
years of the Eisenhower administration had subsided a great deal; this was a 
chance Eisenhower and Dulles were willing to take. Domestic politics 
notwithstanding, they would not have done so without a change in their own 
preconceptions of the Soviet leaders. 
Yet, leaders only acknowledged a change in Soviet tactics, not objectives. 
The PPS highlighted the increased flexibility of Soviet policies since 1953. Dulles 
and the State Department remained largely dismissive of this flexibility; it was 
simply a newer, better method of pursuing the same long-range objectives of 
spreading communism and undermining the West. Furthermore, smiles were a 
better way to undermine the West and attract neutrals and newly independent 
nations to the Soviet cause.7 Yet as Bohlen, Halle, Kennan and Fuller pointed out, 
the significance lay precisely in the changed tactics. The U.S. could hardly expect 
the Soviets to renounce communism. Indeed, the PPS recognised that the changes 
in tactics were indeed a tacit agreement on the part of the Soviets that the 
fundamental disagreements between the West and the USSR not be allowed to 
lead to war.8 This was itself a significant admission. Yet Dulles stubbornly clung 
to the fact that the Soviets were still communists, and thus rejected any suggestion 
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of improving relations. Dulles’ all-or-nothing attitude prevented him from seeing 
the benefit of incremental changes.  
Initial Reports of the 20th Party Congress 
U.S. reactions to the 20th Party Congress came in three stages. Firstly were 
the reports of the Congress prior to Khrushchev’s Secret Speech; secondly, were 
the reports of the speech after its existence and general contents were known to 
the West; and third, U.S. reactions when it finally obtained a copy of the speech.  
U.S.  Predictions of the 20th Party Congress were rather subdued. USIA 
issued guidance to its posts that nothing surprising was expected from the 
Congress, and that further guidance would be issued if any sensational news did 
emerge.9 In retrospect such a statement is startling, but such thoughts were 
common in the weeks prior to the Congress. Bohlen was reticent to offer any firm 
predictions, but did say he did not see any important policy changes coming as a 
result of the Congress. He predicted that peaceful coexistence would continue as 
the dominant foreign policy theme.10  
Once the 20th Party Congress began it became clear that significant 
changes were indeed in the offing, even if they were not immediately apparent. 
Two themes gradually emerged: Stalin was further ‘downgraded’; and a number 
of ideological changes were announced in order to better the position of the USSR 
abroad. 
From the outset of the 20th Party Congress Stalin was under attack. In his 
opening address Khrushchev took pains to stress the importance of collective 
leadership while criticising the ‘cult of personality’- though he neglected to name 
Stalin directly.11 Mikoyan followed with a far more damaging speech that sought 
to dismiss much of what Stalin had done and instead emphasised Lenin’s 
leadership and ideas. He ended by damningly calling for a replacement of Stalin’s 
‘Short Course’ on the history of the CPSU.12 Even Molotov besmirched Stalin’s 
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memory. He spoke in support of current policies, thereby criticising himself, and 
the Stalinist policies he had advocated in the past.13 
Bohlen noted that it was not only the attacks on Stalin’s policies or 
excesses that constituted destalinisation. The tremendous attention paid to 
collective leadership was in itself an implicit form of destalinisation.  The attacks 
on the cult of personality and police power, in combination with the emphasis on 
collective leadership made the 20th Party Congress so interesting to the West. In 
addition, as Bohlen predicted, Khrushchev had so far not done anything to 
enhance his power. Almost every speaker supported collective leadership. Bohlen 
recognised that Khrushchev was the most powerful of the leaders, and the nature 
of collective leadership meant that there would be some disagreement, which 
could eventually lead to a breakdown of such an arrangement. This did not mean, 
however many in the West wanted it, that a power struggle was likely. There had 
been serious disagreements since 1953; Malenkov’s ‘deviation’ towards light 
industry and Molotov’s opposition to any number of foreign policy initiatives 
were examples, but collective leadership remained in tact, and this was a serious 
break from the Stalin period. Indeed, Bohlen was adamant that so far what the 
Congress had done was lay down further barriers to one-man rule.14  
Although there was no shortage of disagreement between the Moscow 
embassy an the State Department over various changes in the USSR since Stalin’s 
death, the events of the 20th Party Congress actually provided numerous points of 
agreement. An exhaustive State Department report on the Congress highlighted 
many of the same points as Bohlen had. In years past Stalin was simply ignored in 
favour of references to Lenin. But now he was being attacked much more directly: 
The principal effect of the Congress was to call into question many 
aspects of Stalin's rule…caustic references were made to one-man 
decision making, leader-worship, over-centralisation, mistakes in 
economic policies, ossified conduct of foreign relations, distortions of 
ideology, propaganda, and Soviet history, unhealthy developments in 
Soviet law, and arbitrariness in law enforcement.15 
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The damage to Stalin’s reputation done at the 20th Party Congress prior to 
the Secret Speech was not a complete shock. The reduced role of Stalin’s image 
had been noted since 1953.16 At the Congress two methods of attack were 
predominant; direct attacks on Stalin’s policies or ones that were associated his 
time in power; or, if speaking of something positive that came about during his 
reign, simply omitting any mention of his role. Foreign policy under Stalin was 
described as inflexible and the international position of the USSR diminished. 
Stalin’s record was torn to shreds in the hands of his former lieutenants.17 
The State Department realised the myriad risks in attacking Stalin. It 
destroyed the idea of communist infallibility. It also put the current leaders in an 
awkward position since they all rose to power under Stalin. Nevertheless, the 
gains were apparent. The regime could now embark on new policies without 
being attacked by Stalinists. Indeed, removing Stalin allowed the leaders to rely 
on Lenin as the source of legitimacy. The State Department thought that the 
emphasis on Lenin in turn was more attractive to many in the developing world 
and to the non-Communist left. According to the OIR the Soviet leaders: 
…doubtless weighed the effects on Communist Parties at home and 
abroad, including the Chinese Communist Party…To attack the symbol 
would bring both gains and losses, but the net result apparently has 
considered to be favorable. The Congress offered an opportune occasion 
since it is formally the Party's most authoritative body and its approval, 
however automatic, could be portrayed as carrying the greatest sanction.18 
The re-emphasis of Lenin and other figures in Soviet political history did 
not go unnoticed. Harrison Salisbury reported that the purges were to be 
reassessed and many of its most prominent victims rehabilitated. The attack on 
Stalin had gone far even before the Secret Speech. In a speech to the 20th Party 
Congress, Mikoyan openly mocked the oath that Stalin took at Lenin’s funeral; 
leading Salisbury to write that “[n]ot only has the statue of Stalin been hurled 
from its fundament, the leaders have danced upon the fragments.”19 But it was 
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also done to reveal the Leninist foundation.  
The U.S. view was not isolated. There were fears among allies about the 
emphasis on Lenin. Both the French and British were concerned that the 
repudiation of Stalinism and “return” to Leninism could be interpreted by the 
uninformed as a “new and enlightened Soviet policy.” It was a real possibility in 
France where many intellectuals had only recently accepted the horrors of 
Stalinism. The response was to encourage the distribution of academic studies of 
Leninism that highlighted Lenin’s true nature as undemocratic.20 
The emphasis on collective leadership at the 20th Party Congress would 
make it difficult for a new Stalin figure to emerge. Salisbury stated that 
Khrushchev’s avocation of collective leadership, as well as his opening of the 
records of the secret police, made it unlikely that he sought Stalin’s position. But 
Salisbury noted that these changes were hardly concrete. There were no changes 
in the Party apparatus that would prevent one man from consolidating power. 
There seemed to be a “comrades agreement” among the leaders that whatever 
their differences they would not revert to Stalinism.21 But through speeches at the 
Congress Khrushchev, and Mikoyan especially, were making it difficult for 
anyone to want to claim ‘Stalinist’ as a label. In contrast to the emphasis on Lenin, 
Stalin’s name was only mentioned to smear it. It had been uttered only ten times 
in the ten days of the 20th Party Congress.22 The Soviet leaders willingly jettisoned 
Stalin and many of the damaging policies associated with him. Such a change 
should have brought to the attention of the West the possibility that the 
leadership followed Stalin during his tenure out of necessity, rather than 
ideological affinity. But there is no evidence of this thought occurring to either 
Eisenhower or Dulles. 
The internal nature of the return to Leninism highlighted by Bohlen, and 
the foreign propaganda potential highlighted in London and Paris and by 
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Rostow, made it clear that re-emphasis of Lenin was a well-crafted component of 
the attack on Stalin. The State Department and some Sovietologists immediately 
took note. The ideological changes announced at the 20th Party Congress were 
interpreted a danger to the U.S. abroad. The changes announced were not new: 
they had been happening in stages since 1953. But the U.S. recognised that the 
Congress formalised them into official Party doctrine.23 The most important of the 
changes announced were:  
! The ‘two camp’ theory that divided the world into ‘imperialist’ (the 
West) and democratic (the Soviet bloc) nations was abandoned. Now a 
“third camp” of neutrals was allowed 
! The achievement of power through parliamentary processes was 
condoned 
! Evolutionary rather than revolutionary attainment of socialism was 
deemed acceptable 
! Co-operation with leftist parties, akin to the popular fronts of the 1930s, 
was sanctioned 
! Different, ‘national roads’ to socialism were acknowledged 
! The inevitability of war thesis was abandoned 
 
These ideological changes were crafted to maximise the appeal of the 
USSR and Soviet Communism abroad. Permitting parliamentary processes, 
working with other leftist parties, and evolutionary attainment of socialism all 
had deep appeal to communists not only in Europe, but also in the developing 
world. These changes had the most potential among the newly independent 
nations of the developing world. The 20th Party Congress did not initiate any of 
these changes- it merely codified them, as they had all be part of processes 
undertaken since Stalin’s death. But the administration thought the Congress 
allowed the Soviet leaders to announce them in a way that they would be taken 
seriously by those whom they hoped to sway. 24 
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The Eisenhower administration viewed these changes with alarm. They 
made the Soviets appear less violent.25 In combination with the denouncement of 
Stalin and the ongoing peace offensive there was a real sense of danger in 
Washington that the USSR, by manipulating the emotions of decolonisation, 
would come across to many in the developing world as the true champion of 
peace. 
 
The 20th Party Congress and the Battle over Peace 
The effect of the 20th Party Congress on perceptions of the Soviet peace 
offensive occurred mostly prior to the knowledge in the West that Khrushchev 
had given a ‘secret speech’. The revelations of the speech naturally had an impact, 
but no greater than those of the developments of the rest of the Congress. As 
such, the various speeches and resolutions made by the Congress were 
scrutinised for any clues about the future of Soviet foreign policy, including, the 
peace offensive.  
Even in the period prior to the Secret Speech there were numerous 
developments of interest. Bohlen noted that the overriding foreign policy theme 
was ‘peaceful coexistence’.26 But other important foreign policy themes, as noted 
above, were also developed. These revisions, in combination with the Soviet 
emphasis on peace, were crafted to make Soviet ideology more alluring and the 
Soviet leaders less threatening. Bohlen told the State Department that the 
revisions were a necessity: the Soviet peace campaign made little sense without 
them. Khrushchev needed to publicly reconcile communist militancy with Soviet 
emphasis on peaceful coexistence. In this case, the doctrine of the inevitability of 
war, which had been undergoing public revision in Soviet journals and the press 
since late 1954, was finally scrapped. Indeed, all of the substantive doctrinal 
revisions were essential since Soviet foreign policy had been proceeding along 
ideologically different lines since 1953. But the elimination of the inevitability of 
war between communism and capitalism struck Bohlen as especially important. 
Echoing his June 1953 cables to Dulles, Bohlen argued that the Soviets would not 
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embark on such a fundamental change to Soviet ideology merely as a way to 
confuse or divide the West. 27 
The State Department agreed that the changes announced at the 20th Party 
Congress were the crystallisation of changes in the making since 1953. It was now 
admitting that the Soviets had been looking for a new policy after Stalin’s death, 
but that the changes only occurred over time. Peace was at the forefront of this. 
Rather than rely on force or violence, the Soviets had come to the conclusion that 
they would ‘catch more flies with honey’. To the PPS and DRS, the jettisoning of 
Stalin’s force based policies was wise: peaceful coexistence would help attract 
support in the developing world in pursuit of a “zone of peace”, as well in the 
Western public and left-wing parties, and even in the U.S. where it was hoped it 
would create resistance to further arms spending.28 Indeed, it was admitted the 
Soviet leaders must have thought Stalin’s policies were incorrect, yet rather than 
posit that this could be due to farther reaching changes, the State Department 
only went so far as to call the emphasis on peace ‘tactical’. In a sense, these 
changes actually made the Soviets more dangerous, not less, since the new tactics 
had a much broader appeal.29   
Even after the U.S. knew that Khrushchev had made a speech highly 
critical of Stalin, the focus remained on the ideological reforms of the 20th Party 
Congress.30 A PPS report underlined that the most important foreign policy theme 
of the Congress was the official sanction of peaceful coexistence because “in the 
Soviet lexicon still denotes a maintenance of maximum possible pressures for the 
exploitation of the weaknesses and contradictions in the outside world in order to 
enhance Soviet power.” The report also noted Khrushchev’s assertion at the 
Congress that communism would triumph over capitalism.31 Of course, he could 
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hardly have been expected to say otherwise. But in an important development the 
author of the report, Richard Davis, emphasised that the switch towards peaceful 
coexistence seemed to be for the long term and made the return to Stalinist style 
rule less likely. He did not think that peaceful coexistence was a trick- too much 
thought had gone into it- and so the U.S. should cautiously accept it.32 This was a 
serious assertion. Davis was confident enough in his conclusion to share it with 
the rest of the PPS and the NSC. This was not the action of someone who was 
unsure of his conclusions, or feared the ramifications of openly airing them. 
Though Bohlen and Davis both highlighted the importance and 
unprecedented nature of the peace offensive, their words did not affect the public 
posture of the administration. USIS instructed its missions abroad that the Soviet 
leaders had broken from their previous emphasis on force and violence, but only 
because they realised they would gain more from peaceful tactics. Dulles 
contributed to this when he emphasised that “Soviet rulers must now see that 
their foreign policies encounter effective resistance when they are identified with 
the use of violence” and as a result the Soviets were trying to appear more 
respectable.33  
Parts of the Eisenhower administration were again discrediting the Soviet 
shift and the benefits it could bring the U.S. simply because the motivations were 
not honourable. It was as if rather than rejoicing in the fact that a niece had 
stopped smoking and appreciating the consequent health benefits, Uncle Sam 
instead dismissed it since the niece only quit since men found non-smokers more 
attractive. USIS guidance accordingly advised that the U.S. should ignore the 
changes (fewer cigarettes) and instead emphasise in its broadcasts that the 
fundamental objectives (more male attention) remained the same. Just as the 
gestures of the Soviets and events of the past three years did not yet amount to 
enough reasoning to challenge the deeply held perceptions of the Soviet leaders 
as communist expansionists, the events of the Congress so far did not represent 
anything shocking enough to change the minds of Eisenhower or Dulles. The 
Secret Speech would later do just that.  
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The Initial Response to the 20th Party Congress 
Though there was agreement that the changes of the 20th Party Congress 
so far were largely a crystallisation of policy alterations underway since 1953, the 
developments of the Congress were perceived as threatening nonetheless. “It’s 
dangerous as hell“, said one State Department source to a Time correspondent, 
“[t]he Russians will be harder to handle until we can expose their game again”. 
Bohlen agreed: the ideological shifts of the Congress especially were “dangerous 
and seductive”.34 An image of the Soviets as the enemy had been build up so 
thoroughly that it was second nature to dismiss any Soviet changes were to the 
detriment of the U.S. and the West.  
There was consensus between the State Department and the Moscow 
embassy on how to counter the ideological shifts. The U.S. needed to make it 
abundantly clear that the 20th Party Congress changed little in terms of how 
communists would act once in power. Bohlen believed the means did not matter 
since the end result would be dictatorship, and he even suggested referring to the 
collective leadership in public as a “collective dictatorship”.35 Although he 
suggested this particular phrase, Bohlen doubted the effect that a broader 
propaganda drive could have. Indeed, it could play into the hands of the Soviets 
as they had likely planned for just such a response. Bohlen pointed out that Lenin 
wrote so voluminously that something could be found to support practically any 
argument. Such an anti-Lenin propaganda campaign could “boomerang”. Dulles 
agreed. A frontal attack on Lenin was a poor idea; it would be better if material on 
Lenin’s true nature could be made available globally by “indigenous [press] 
agencies”.36  
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Dulles publicly downplayed any change and insisted that the emphasis on 
Lenin and the ideological alterations announced were instead the result of 
western policies. The changes were a tactic in themselves: Dulles stressed that 
both Lenin and Stalin had taught communists to ‘zigzag’. The West should not be 
so naïve to believe there had been any lasting change. Dulles cited Khrushchev’s 
statements following Geneva that communism would triumph as proof of this. If 
the West were to be taken in by the new Soviet line, then the result would be a 
return to aggression on the part of the Soviets when the West as least prepared.37 
Speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in late February 1956 he 
stated that for the past 30 years Soviet foreign policy had been based upon 
violence and intolerance of any non-Soviet sanctioned system. Yet now peaceful 
coexistence and different roads to socialism were accepted. Thus, Dulles saw the 
Soviet changes not so much as a change in tactics as the result of a failed foreign 
policy. This failure was caused by Western pressure. Interestingly though, Dulles 
admitted that the Soviet “new program” had been in place ever since the 
rapprochement with Tito. Now that violence had been shelved in the arsenal of 
Soviet tactics, the danger to the West now was from competitive coexistence. 
But what Dulles said next was a serious break from the rhetoric he had 
been recycling since he became Secretary of State. After each Soviet alteration 
away from Stalinism Dulles emphasised that there had been no basic change in 
Soviet objectives or policies, and that the danger to the West remained the same. 
Yet in response to a question about the relative strength of the U.S. and USSR, 
Dulles stated that the Soviets were actively changing their system to become more 
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like the U.S. He thought it would take another decade for these changes to be 
totally clear. Stalinism was the stumbling block to better relations according to 
Dulles, but now “…they are going to throw out of the Soviet Union what has been 
their Bible for the last 25 or 30 years.”38 Dulles did not clarify how Soviet 
objectives were remaining static while the Soviet leaders actively reformed the 
Soviet system to be more like American capitalism. But Senator George Aiken 
noticed the difference in Dulles’ outlook, and demanded to know if he had 
undergone such a drastic change in thinking, as his recent utterances would lead 
some to believe. Characteristically Dulles emphasized that he believed the same 
things he did five or ten years ago.39 Yet in a recent speech Dulles stated that 
“Some day, I would not want to guess when, Russia will be governed by men 
who put the welfare of the Russian people above world conquest. It is our basic 
policy to seek to advance the coming of that day.”40 At the very least this was a 
softening of his rhetoric, as Senator Aiken had noted in his appearance on Capitol 
Hill. Dulles was accepting the reality of change in the USSR while publicly 
dismissing the meaning of these changes. Ever cognisant of Congressional 
opinion, Dulles was hedging his public statements to avoid getting ahead of the 
curve of American political opinion of the changes in the USSR. Indeed, many 
Senators expressed the opinion that although Soviet methods had changed, the 
original objectives were not abandoned. But it was notable if Democratic senators 
were accusing Dulles of being “overly-optimistic” about the Soviets.41 On one 
level Dulles was simply restating the goals of NSC-5505/1. Yet Dulles was not the 
sort of person to publicly repeat things he did not feel confident in. To be sure, he 
continued his ‘no basic change’ line long after NSC-5505/1 was written. Instead, 
the 20th Party Congress was having an effect on his perception of the Soviets. This 
was the impetus behind his statement that the Soviet leaders were capable of 
change, and that this was what the world was not witnessing. 
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Speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations Allen Dulles revealed his 
own modified image of Soviet Communism. There was no longer a monolithic 
communist organisation. Instead, the 20th Party Congress sanctioned various 
brands of communism and “change [was] the order of the day”. The U.S. could 
never have expected these events, said Dulles, and the ”Soviet leaders are now 
frightened of what they have unleashed…The effect of recent developments on 
students, for example, is far-reaching.” But Dulles noted that different brands of 
communism could also be more dangerous to the U.S. by allowing communism to 
adapt to local conditions. The U.S. needed to counter these by creating maximum 
opportunities for change and evolution in the USSR in a direction favourable to 
the West.42  
The U.S. Learns of the Secret Speech 
Despite the emphasis by Dulles on the changing nature of Soviet 
communism, and by extension, the communist movement generally, the official 
position of the administration remained was unchanged prior to learning of the 
Secret Speech. In March the NSC asserted that Soviet hostility towards the non-
communist world had not changed, nor had its objective of creating a communist 
dominated world. This was the same position set out in NSC-5501 in January 
1955. The difference, according to the NSC, was only one of tactics. Rather than 
violence and coercion, the Soviet leaders were now relying on “division, 
enticement and duplicity.” The danger lay in the fact that wherever the Soviets 
used a ‘soft line’, Western allies would be prone to explore it.43 Bohlen was the 
first American to learn of the Speech on 10 March. 44 This was too late to be 
incorporated into the revised policy. However, the 20th Party Congress was not 
mentioned in even a general sense. Both the ideological developments and the 
attacks on Stalin were known of by 21-22 February via cables from the Moscow 
embassy.45 Thus the events of the Congress, prior to the Secret Speech, had little 
effect on the review of U.S. policy and the Soviet threat. 
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There was little deviation from the established line that the USSR retained 
the same threatening objectives in the weeks that followed. Preparing to speak on 
Capitol Hill, Undersecretary of State Hoover was encouraged by Jacob Beam to 
emphasise that although Khrushchev and others had renounced Stalin’s most 
heinous methods at the 20th Party Congress, the policies themselves were not 
attacked. This apparently illustrated that the Soviet leaders were seeking to 
disassociate themselves from Stalin in order to gain support domestically while 
making themselves more respectable abroad. The weakness of this, according to 
Beam, was that the current leaders had been Stalin’s accomplices. Beam suggested 
that Hoover simply tell the U.S. Congress that Stalin’s reputation had been in 
decline since his death and the speech was the latest development in this trend.46 
At this point the U.S. only knew that Khrushchev had been critical of Stalin. Such 
paltry intelligence necessitated that policymakers fit this information into what 
the U.S. knew of destalinisation thus far. As a result, Beam and Hoover made 
sense of the explosive Secret Speech by rationalising it as the latest in a series of 
tactical moves meant to gain advantage for the Kremlin. 
But the U.S. was gradually putting together a picture of what Khrushchev 
had said. It was becoming clear that his speech was far more critical than the 
other speeches at the 20th Party Congress. Finding intelligence on the Congress 
meant looking to Yugoslavia and its unique position in drama of destalinisation. 
The Belgrade daily Borba welcomed the criticism of Stalin and noted that the 
Congress appeared to necessitate serious revisions in Party doctrine and history 
regarding Stalin’s role in Soviet history.47 The CPSU was, however, holding 
meetings throughout the USSR to inform Party members of the new line on Stalin 
and Khrushchev’s speech. Other intelligence was inconclusive. The speech was 
well known among the Soviet citizenry and the accusations against Stalin were 
shocking enough to bring some to tears, while others welcomed the denunciation. 
A Soviet source told the Moscow embassy that the speech revealed Stalin as a 
coward who was paralysed by the German attack in 1941, and that “within days, 
                                                       
46 “Memo: Beam to Acting SecState (Hoover),” March 19, 1956, RG59, CDF 1955-59, 761.00, C0016, 
Reel 4, NARA. 
47 “The XXth Congress of the USSR About Stalin...,” Borba, March 20, 1956, RG59, BEA, Office files of 
AsstSecState For Euro Affairs 1943-57, Box 30, Stalin Committee, NARA. 
Chapter 5: To the 20th Party Congress 
 
 
 
154 
Stalin’s name will be wiped from the slate of Soviet history.”48 Such conflicting 
reports did not help policymakers make sense of the actions of the Soviet 
leadership. 
 
The U.S. and Foreign Opinion of the 20th Party Congress 
Khrushchev had irreversibly denounced Stalin. That much was clear, even 
if the specifics were remained hazy. In the weeks following the 20th Party 
Congress the State Department collected reports on reaction to the Congress. To 
the Western allies the Congress did little to change the Soviet threat, although the 
French remained the most receptive to the ideological changes and therefore 
represented a danger to allied unity.49 But there were differing interpretations of 
the Congress. Indeed, The British had put forward the idea that by discrediting 
Stalin and sullying the idea of a Stalinist “golden era” the Soviets were preparing 
the Soviet people for even more sacrifices under a new five-year plan.50 The British 
were under the impression that Khrushchev could be instituting a greater 
emphasis on heavy industry and rearmament. The Italian Vice Premier and Social 
Democratic leader Giuseppe Saragat theorised that the campaign against Stalin 
was done by the Soviet leaders out of fear that another Stalin figure could emerge. 
Destalinisation was a way to ‘burn the bridge’.51  
Reports from non-aligned nations made for disconcerting reading for 
those in Washington as they often indicated a tendency to accept Soviet changes. 
The Yugoslavs felt that the changes were genuine political ones and not mere 
tactics. The Yugoslavs viewed both the ideological changes enshrined by the 20th 
Party Congress, and the denouncement of Stalin, as very real policy choices. The 
Yugoslav Ambassador in Bucharest told the U.S. delegation: “[the] 
renouncification of Stalinism was a great deal more than merely the tactic of 
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blaming [Stalin]…for present unsatisfactory conditions. It was a change in basic 
policy.”52 
The reaction of Western allies and non-aligned nations had the effect of 
reinforcing the initial rejection of the changes at the 20th Party Congress. U.S. allies 
were in broad agreement with U.S. assessments. Non-aligned and third world 
nations however, wanted to give the Soviets the benefit of the doubt. This made 
the U.S. think that as far as destalinisation was aimed at improving the image of 
the USSR in the developing world, it was working. Thus, even though 
destalinisation was something that in one way reduced the threat of the USSR, it 
was also conceived as something that raised the threat as well in another manner. 
The 20th Party Congress and U.S. Propaganda 
U.S. information outlets needed to say something about the 20th Party 
Congress before U.S. had a copy of the speech. Though propaganda was 
obviously crafted for the greatest effect, the way in which it was created sheds 
light on how the administration was coming to view both the Secret Speech and 
destalinisation.   
There were initially two propaganda lines, one for inside and one for 
outside the Soviet Bloc. For those in the USSR and satellites the State Department 
broadcast radio commentaries that emphasised the absence of criticism of Stalin’s 
agricultural policies. Noting that half of the Soviet population was engaged in 
farming, the radio broadcast argued that Khrushchev had been even more 
supportive of collectivisation than Stalin himself. Indeed, Khrushchev was 
currently renewing a drive for the elimination of private garden plots- something 
Stalin had also attempted. The bottom line was there could be no meaningful 
break with Stalinism without an end to collectivisation.53  
Outside the Soviet Bloc the U.S. tactic was to raise possible bad outcomes 
of Stalin’s denouncement. The U.S. did not openly reject the possibility of change, 
but asked how was the West to know if the ‘new’ regime wouldn’t be worse than 
Stalin? Aimed at Western Europeans, this line stressed that evolutionary change 
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in the USSR would not come from relaxation and neutralism. Real change would 
only come if Soviet leaders were convinced of the firmness and determination of 
the free world even in the face of changing communist tactics: in other words, a 
continuation of current policies. Yet the most poignant argument was that 
Stalinism and communism could not be separated. This fit well with repeated 
public comments from the administration that the Soviet leaders were no different 
from Stalin.54 Yet it was also disingenuous: it was not the actual view of the 
administration as shown by the remarks Foster Dulles made regarding nationalist 
versions of socialism in 1955, the statements of Allen Dulles following the 20th 
Party Congress, and of course as U.S. support for Yugoslavia illustrated.55  
The administration was taking a bullish stance. Harrison Salisbury did not 
think this wise and recommended a more gentle approach to the USIA. A “hard 
sell” of the anti-Stalin campaign, he insisted, could provide a point of unity for the 
Soviets. The Russian people would likely start to question the Soviet system on 
their own.56 If the U.S. got involved it could be intrusive and counterproductive. 
USIA Deputy Director Abbott Washburn agreed, noting that too much ‘pressing’ 
of the anti-Stalin line by the Voice of America could hurt the U.S. cause. Yet USIA 
guidance clearly showed that Washburn differed from Salisbury in his conception 
of “hard sell”. Washburn thought it good policy to use USIA output to provoke 
questions among those in the Soviet bloc- questions that would lead to public 
opinion pressures.57 USIA output therefore questioned the sincerity of the anti-
Stalin campaign and demanded proof of Soviet intentions. In the satellites USIA 
pointed to the support current leaders gave to Stalin during his lifetime.58 This 
was hardly taking a soft stance- it was clearly aimed at undermining the 
legitimacy of the Kremlin. USIA was making hay while the sun shone.  
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U.S. information agencies incorporated into their guidance the idea that 
Stalinism and Communism were peas in a pod. The official line was that the 
world now knew the horror of Stalin’s crimes. The true meaning of the attack on 
Stalin was unknown, however, USIA suggested that it was a way for the current 
leaders to improve their own standing. This hardly represented meaningful 
change to the State Department, which emphasised that world domination 
remained the Soviet objective - all the 20th Party Congress meant was that the goal 
would now be pursued with less violent means. It did not indicate the Soviets had 
changed; U.S. propaganda reminded readers and listeners that the current 
leadership remained Stalinist.59 Some took up JK Jessup’s ideas from the previous 
year and drew attention to such ‘Stalinist’ policies as the occupation of Eastern 
Europe and the division of Germany.60  
The State Department was spinning the 20th Party Congress as an event 
that sought to hide the continuity of Stalinist policies by exposing the very worst 
of Stalin’s crimes, thus presenting the Soviet leaders as a new breed of 
communists. The State Department emphasised to anyone who tended to give the 
Soviets the benefit of the doubt that the Congress was simply psychological 
warfare. The leaders were of the same ilk as Stalin. Thus the public line agreed 
and disseminated by the State Department illustrated the continuity in thinking 
about the changes in the USSR since Stalin’s death. The 20th Party Congress was 
certainly the most explosive event thus far in the saga of the Soviet leadership 
since 1953, but it was built on a foundation of anti-Stalin feeling that had been 
growing since Stalin’s death, and made possible by leadership changes. Since the 
Eisenhower administration had been responding to these since 1953, the reflex 
was to dismiss the Congress as merely a sort of Soviet trickery, even in the face of 
mounting evidence that something of serious implication for U.S. policy had 
occurred.  
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USIA’s message of constant scepticism extended beyond the 20th Party 
Congress; when rumours that the Cominform would be disbanded reached 
Washington its significance was immediately dismissed. According to the USIA, 
the Cominform had long been a shell organisation- it had not met since 1949 and 
its principal work was the publication of the biweekly For a Lasting Peace, for a 
People’s Democracy. Therefore, disbandment would hardly be a blow to Soviet 
control over the satellite communist parties. But, disbanding the Cominform was 
thought to be a way of increasing the respectability of Soviet Communism abroad, 
especially in Yugoslavia and India, both of which had suggested ending the 
organisation. It was merely another move to appeal to socialists and neutralists 
abroad, and in this respect it was meant to work with the ideological revisions 
announced at the Congress. Indeed, when the Cominform was officially 
disbanded on 18 April USIA instructed its posts that it “…should endeavour, 
whenever appropriate, to indicate that dissolution…would be practically 
meaningless.” The U.S. press was uniformly unimpressed. The New York Times 
noted, as USIA did, that it “never amounted to much”, and the Washington Post 
also pointed out the propaganda value of the move. Both DRS and Allen Dulles 
agreed with this characterisation.61 Although the end of the Cominform was 
assumed to be meaningless, Foster Dulles maintained the sense of danger posed 
by Soviet Communism. Speaking to Congress later in the summer, he insisted the 
Soviets maintained underground ties with foreign communist parties. Therefore, 
the CPSU remained the “’general staff’ of the ‘world proletariat’”. But Foster 
Dulles conceded that destalinisation, and specifically the Poznan riots, had 
shaken this relationship. No longer were foreign communist parties controlled 
through Stalinist terror- they had gained a degree of independence.62 This was a 
significant departure from the previous view that the Soviets were firmly in 
charge of communist parties abroad, and was at odds with the idea of the Soviets 
as the ‘general staff’ of communism. If he indeed felt that there was no change in 
the Soviet command of the communist movement, then he had little to gain by 
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mentioning how communist parties outside the USSR were more independent. 
Dulles’ comments indicate that he was grappling with the changes occurring in 
the communist movement, and clearly did not think the Kremlin was firmly in 
control. 
The public response to the 20th Party Congress provided an interesting 
point of comparison for the administration’s internal treatment of these issues. It 
showed that there was a level of critical thinking about the events of the Congress. 
In terms of concrete steps, the OCB created the Special Working Group on the 
anti-Stalin Campaign to address these issues. It included representatives from the 
State Department, CIA, and USIA and was tasked with determining U.S. policy 
towards the anti-Stalin campaign and recommending ways for the to exploit 
destalinisation.63 The creation of the Special Working Group indicated an 
understanding of the gravity of the situation, especially as the State Department 
representatives Jacob Beam and Park Armstrong were high-ranking officials. The 
group would meet frequently over the next year.  
Indeed, Armstrong interpreted the 20th Party Congress in a much different 
manner than the public pronouncements. He emphasised that the Congress 
opened up to questioning much of Soviet history. The Soviet leaders appeared to 
be trying to separate the ‘good’ Stalin from the ‘bad’, and were highlighting the 
dangers of one-man-rule, rather than discrediting Stalin’s policies per se. 
Armstrong pointed out that the Soviets did not take such actions lightly- they 
knew the risks: discipline problems abroad; questioning of Soviet authority; and 
the close relationship the leaders had with Stalin. They seemed to be relying on 
the popularity of destalinisation with the intelligentsia, military and the 
managerial classes. According to Armstrong, destalinisation was clearly a way to 
prevent another Stalin; but if the USSR was to be run without a dictator, then a 
different response to authority was needed. The Soviet people needed to feel they 
could be heard and could engage in some criticism.64 The Congress seemed to be 
the beginning of such a move.  
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Though Dulles was beginning to modify his perception of the USSR prior 
to the 20th Party Congress, what he shared with others remained hostile towards 
destalinisation. In guidance to USIA posts in April he encouraged rejection of 
Soviet changes that had culminated at the Congress. Soviet objectives of 
expanding communism and dividing the Western alliance remained. In fact, the 
Congress made these objectives more threatening as the Soviet leaders made clear 
their dedication to communism “in unmistakeable terms” and had laid out a plan 
of action to achieve them. The attack on Stalin did not set back the Soviet 
advance- indeed it was credited by USIA as a way to advance Soviet interests by 
increasing the respectability of Soviet Communism abroad.  
This was part of a more general Soviet shift away from violence. Rather 
than welcome this, USIA saw the more peaceful Soviet stance as a greater threat 
since it could split the western allies. Indeed, the Soviet use of peace was regarded 
with distain since it came not out of any genuine regard for peace, but out of 
pragmatism- the Soviet leaders had moved towards a “…greater reliance on 
enticement, division, and duplicity in pursuit of their aims.” Violence had not 
been totally rejected either, and the 20th Party Congress made it plain that use of 
force was still acceptable in circumstances where socialism was threatened.65  
The “basic tasks” of USIA remained to make it clear to audiences that the 
fundamental aims of communism had not changed as a result of the 20th Party 
Congress. The Soviets may have set aside Stalinism, but as Dulles put it, this was 
only due to the Soviets realising that “…that their foreign policies encounter 
effective resistance when they are identified with the use of violence.” USIA 
quoted Dulles further:  
We do not assume fatalistically that there can be no evolution within 
Russia, or that Russia's rulers will always be predatory. Some day Russia 
will be governed by men who will put the welfare of the Russian people 
above world conquest. It is our basic policy to advance the coming of that 
day. 
But the guidance also quoted Dulles’ statement from 3 April:  
The downgrading of Stalin does not of itself demonstrate that the Soviet 
regime has basically changed its domestic or foreign policies. The present 
rulers have, to be sure, somewhat modified or masked the harshness of 
their policies. But a dictatorship is a dictatorship whether it be that of one 
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man or several. 66 
USIA channelled Dulles to disseminate the idea abroad that there had been little 
change in the USSR since Stalin’s death. According to USIA, the attack on Stalin 
and the Congress did nothing to change this until there were deeds that showed 
that the USSR could never return to Stalinism. Publicly, the only deed that the 
Eisenhower administration would accept as proof was a renouncement of 
communism. 
Views of the Soviet Leadership 
Prior to the 20th Party Congress there was speculation in the 
administration that Khrushchev could solidify his position, or even become a 
‘new Stalin’ as a result of personnel changes. The Soviets altered the composition 
of both the Presidium and Party administration, however, Western policymakers 
found this inconclusive. These changes confirmed Khrushchev as the most 
powerful leader, but also failed to promote him to the level of dictator. The 
ideological changes and attacks on Stalin augured against anyone taking this step 
for themselves.  
 Khrushchev appointed a number of his protégés as candidate Presidium 
members; among them were Leonid Brezhnev, Dmitri Shepilov and Averky 
Aristov. However, the eleven full members remained the same.67 According to 
Bohlen, these additions did not indicate substantial changes in the Party 
leadership, though they did confirm Khrushchev’s continued predominance.68 
Although the leadership appeared to be continuing much along the lines as before 
the Congress, it was now more “youthful and less Stalinist”.69 
Molotov’s decline helped to confirm this. Policies he advocated were 
sharply criticised at the 20th Party Congress, not only by others, but even by 
himself. It had been noted for some time that he could lose his position as Foreign 
Minister, but if that were to happen, he would escape “Stalinist methods”, and 
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would probably be “kicked upstairs” to a ceremonial position.70 As far as the U.S. 
was concerned Molotov’s diminished prestige was a direct result of his continued 
affection for Stalinist foreign policy and reticence to accept the changes that were 
advocated by Khrushchev; notably the Austrian Treaty and rapprochement with 
Yugoslavia.71 He was described as failing to see the changed international 
situation since 1955, which necessitated a more flexible foreign policy, and 
flexibility was something Molotov was hardly associated with by American 
policymakers. In June 1956, he was sacked in favour of Dmitri Shepilov, though 
he retained his position as first deputy Prime Minister.72 He was neither killed nor 
exiled, and this was a distinct change from Stalinism.  
As Molotov was nudged out Khrushchev was appointed to lead the CPSU 
Central Committee Bureau of RSFSR Affairs. The Bureau was intended to 
coordinate the activities of the RSFSR and the Soviet state. The State Department 
asserted that Khrushchev’s leadership of the Bureau made him the de facto head 
of the Russian Republic. Bohlen found it striking that Khrushchev was the only 
Presidium member appointed, but it was unclear if this was a political move, or 
merely an administrative one.73 Even if it were the latter, few would have 
forgotten Stalin’s use of the Party administration to consolidate power.  
Bohlen sincerely believed that Khrushchev did not seem to be any more 
than “chairman of the board”. Both Khrushchev and the other leaders were 
insistent that collective leadership was the only possible way forward.74 
Furthermore, Bohlen did not think the collective leadership was a charade: there 
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was a left and right opposition of sorts: Molotov was the ‘left’, and Malenkov, 
with his erstwhile support for consumer goods, was on the ‘right’. As Bohlen saw 
it, the Presidium members were working towards the type of arrangement Lenin 
had overseen- members could disagree in private and not fear deadly retribution. 
Indeed, they would still be treated as comrades. Such a setup was not as 
outlandish as some in Washington thought: shared power had existed before, 
noted Bohlen, who cited the Doges of Venice as proof.75 The decision not to allow 
another Stalin was likely taken when he died. But the decision to attack him may 
have come later. It was necessary, according to Bohlen, to destroy the Stalin myth 
in order to rebuild the Party and reduce police powers. Bohlen believed that 
destalinisation began soon after Stalin’s death, and Beria’s purge was a necessary 
part of it.76 From this perspective, destalinisation was thought out well ahead of 
the Congress, even if only in a general manner and subject to the influence of 
events in the meantime. 
Kennan vehemently disagreed. As a CIA consultant he provided several 
analyses of the 20th Party Congress to Frank Wisner and Allen Dulles.77 To 
Kennan, this was not a group of men who were amiable or who had found a long-
term solution to the leadership question. He also disagreed that destalinisation 
was planned in advance. Instead he put forward a more scandalous hypothesis: 
the current leaders had killed Stalin, or at least hastened his demise. The Soviet 
leaders knew that the truth would eventually emerge and destalinisation was part 
of a plan to reveal his crimes in order to make it seem as if they had saved Soviet 
Communism. But the shared guilt of the leaders in killing Stalin was a blessing 
and a curse. It was both a “bond of unity”, and the “source of violent suspicions 
and disagreements”.78 One argument was how fast Stalin should be “deflated”. 
Kennan thought this was behind the erratic nature of the anti-Stalin campaign 
since 1953 and the changes in the Soviet leadership: Beria was purged since he 
could not be trusted to keep quiet; Malenkov’s demotion indicated he had not 
been fully aware of the plot; and Molotov was likely not involved at all and thus 
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needed to be removed.79 This was highly conjectural. It was unlikely that 
Khrushchev and Bulganin could have killed Stalin without the Malenkov or 
Molotov knowing. 
Bohlen consistently stressed that his vision of collective leadership did not 
mean there was total agreement in the Kremlin. Rather, he argued that there 
could be disagreement between the leaders until a decision was taken, much like 
Lenin’s idea of ‘democratic centralism’. Kennan in contrast argued that there was 
far less congeniality among the leaders. Ironically, Kennan’s position was much 
more in line with DRS and the State Department in general now that he was no 
longer ‘on the inside’.80  
Chapter Conclusion 
As members of the Eisenhower administration gathered information about 
the growing campaign of official destalinisation they reacted in a number of ways. 
They often fit these new developments into existing frameworks: the notion of a 
ceaselessly hostile and aggressive Soviet Union was the most common of these. 
Indeed, even when various actors did recognise change on the part of the Soviet 
leaders, it was consistently emphasised in the same breath that any changes that 
made the Soviets outwardly less threatening could also make them more 
dangerous by increasing the attractiveness of Soviet Communism. The 
administration’s emphasis on Soviet aggression, subversion and tactical change 
remained.  
Some in the administration continued to hope for a violent power struggle 
in the Soviet leadership. Disagreements over the nature of the collective 
leadership contributed to uncertainty over the stability of the power structure in 
the Kremlin. In such a situation it was safer for the administration to hold course 
rather than entertain changed perspectives on the Soviet leaders. As the 20th Party 
Congress progressed, a consensus emerged in the administration that collective 
leadership was currently stable, though Khrushchev was the most powerful 
among the leaders. Therefore, the emphasis in the administration shifted towards 
study and exploitation of the events of the Congress and the Secret Speech. 
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Specific emphasis was placed on disseminating outcomes of the Congress abroad 
that benefitted the image of the U.S. as democratic, peaceful and egalitarian and 
concurrently exposed the Kremlin as conspiratorial, dictatorial, expansionist, and 
above all, Stalinist.  
The emphasis on the USSR remaining Stalinist was a key arrow in the U.S. 
propaganda quiver. The U.S. sought to eliminate any sympathy for the USSR by 
emphasising that the 20th Party Congress and Secret Speech exposed Stalin’s 
heinous crimes, but that the current leadership was in fact no different and would 
revert to such methods when it suited. Outwardly this line made sense from a 
psychological warfare perspective. Yet it contradicted the stated administration 
policy of encouraging peaceful evolution of the Soviet system to the benefit of the 
West by attacking prospective sources of liberalisation. The administration was in 
a transition period. Some carried on with the same image of the Soviets that they 
had fostered since the beginning of the Cold War. But others, most importantly 
Dulles, began to see the possibility of lasting change in the USSR. This was a 
change in perception was would become clearer in the coming months.  
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Chapter 6: Public Suspicions and Private Doubts 
From 1953 destalinisation proceeded in fits and starts, but the 20th Party 
Congress ushered in a new level of urgency to the campaign against Stalin. The 
American administration quickly became aware that the Soviets were destroying 
anything representative of Stalin’s legacy. But conclusions on this varied. Some 
thought the U.S. should wait to see what the Secret Speech and destalinisation 
represented; while others were more bullish and ready to dismiss it as yet another 
ploy to undermine the West.  
A “Trojan Corpse”? 
Given the timing of the 20th Party Congress one of the most instantly 
recognised symbols of the attack on Stalin was the lack of commemoration on the 
anniversary of his death on 5 March.1 Instead, portraits and statues of Stalin were 
systematically removed across the USSR and there were reports that his body 
would soon be removed from the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum. At the Museum of the 
Revolution, tour guides were specifically instructed to inform visitors viewing a 
painting of Lenin’s arrival at the Finland Station in 1917 that contrary to the 
depiction, Stalin was not present at that time.2 On 1st May, Stalin’s portrait was 
absent, replaced by yet more images of Lenin.3 Anything that bore Stalin’s name 
was rebadged: The Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute (always a mouthful) was 
now the ‘Institute of Marxism-Leninism’. The Stalin automobile plant in Moscow 
became the IA Likachev factory. These were only the most high profile re-
namings so far, with more sure to come.4  
The State Department and Moscow embassy were stunned.5 But the 
danger that destalinisation presented to the Soviets was immediately apparent. 
Francis Stevens, head Eastern European Affairs at the State Department thought 
destalinisation was an incredibly dangerous ideological problem. It presented 
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serious dilemmas for the Presidium and there were bound to be disagreements 
about how to proceed. Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov seemed to remain 
supportive of Stalinism. The act of moving Stalin’s body raised myriad questions 
about the unity of the leadership. It also questioned the unity of the Communist 
movement and Soviet Bloc.6 
Though the administration did not yet have a copy of the Secret Speech, it 
was not hard to discern that the 20th Party Congress had been the opening salvo in 
an effort to destroy the myth of Stalin’s infallibility. Stevens indicated that the 
course so far was to divide Stalin’s acts into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Industrialisation 
and the strength of the military was deemed to have been a ‘good’ part of Stalin’s 
legacy and the State Department noted that these policies have been continued by 
his successors.7 Conclusions such as these highlighted that the idea that there had 
been no practical change in Moscow either since Stalin’s death or as a result of 
destalinisation. Assertions of continued industrialisation and Soviet military 
might insulated those making them against charges of being soft on Communism, 
or were a reflection of a stubborn refusal to acknowledge the Soviet changes since 
1953. The fact that such notions are found in analyses of destalinisation shows just 
how deeply engrained they were.  
The State Department recognised the danger involved for the Soviet 
leaders and concluded that the Soviet public had been prepared for the speech 
through the decline of references to Stalin and removal of Stalinist symbols since 
his death. Yet it understood the difference between the anti-Stalin campaign since 
1953 and the concerted effort at destalinisation now. Since 1953 Stalin had been 
sidelined or simply forgotten. But since the Congress he was actively demonised. 
This carried risks not only for the stability of the Soviet system, but also for the 
leaders themselves, whom the State Department knew could be implicated in 
Stalin’s crimes.8  
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Even so, the State Department was unsure if the speech had been planned 
in advance, or if Khrushchev had made the shocking accusations without clearing 
them with the other leaders first.9 Given the personal and political implications of 
destalinisation there surely must have been compelling reasons for it. Yet the 
State Department noted that the Soviets seemed to move out of choice, rather than 
compulsion. There did not appear to be internal or foreign pressures for such a 
drastic move. Indeed, destalinisation seemed to increase pressure in both arenas. 
Therefore, denouncing Stalin must have been a gamble on the favourable 
reactions of a few key groups; intellectuals, managers and the military; all of who 
suffered under Stalin. The managerial class especially was hoped to benefit from 
the removal of Stalin’s shadow, which would allow the economy to benefit by 
increasing initiative. Abroad the attack on Stalin could have the effect of 
increasing the respectability of the Soviet Union and the model it represented.10 
The Eisenhower administration had seen such motivations since 1955 in the 
ideological and economic offensive toward the developing world. Destalinisation 
was in this respect viewed as another way to weaken the West and compete in the 
Cold War. 
Bohlen briefed the Office of Eastern European Affairs and members of the 
PPS that some groups would benefit, but also stressed the bewilderment of much 
of the Soviet population. He noted the obstacles that destalinisation put in the 
way of one-man rule and the bolstering affect it had on collective leadership. The 
philosophical and historical questions that would need to be addressed would 
help form the basis of a more stable collective leadership. Bohlen was almost 
cavalier about the dangers to the Soviet leaders, although he remarked that 
destalinisation may have opened Pandora’s box, he did not foresee serious 
problems for Party discipline.11 
While Bohlen was in Washington Counsellor Walter Walmsley watched 
the proceedings from Moscow. He described destalinisation as a broad effort to 
reinvigorate the Party and economy. It amounted to “shock treatment” that 
would allow self-criticism and “communist action”; these were key “Leninist 
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norms” that had died out under Stalin. Indeed, Walmsley saw destalinisation not 
so much as anti-Stalin, as ‘anti-Stalinism’. By attacking Stalinism the Party was 
reclaiming legality, morality and omniscience. Such actions, in combination with 
reduced police power, would help win back the support of the intelligentsia, 
scientists, managers and the military. This would encourage freedom of thought 
and debate that could be good for the economy. Of course this all presented 
difficulties for the leadership. In particular how to control debate, especially since 
by the very nature of destalinisation, Stalinist methods of control would be 
awkward rely upon.12 
Francis Stevens emphasised many of these same ideas to a Time 
correspondent. The motivation of destalinisation appeared to be primarily 
domestic. Since 1953 the Soviet leaders had been trying to convince the 
population that they were not responsible for Stalin’s crimes. Lenin presented a 
useful way to re-establish an ideological foundation for their rule after 
repudiating the man who was responsible for their rise through the Party ranks. 
But Stevens remained unapologetic in his continued rejection of change in the 
Kremlin: although violence and terror would not be used to enforce the new Party 
line, this did not amount to the end of Stalinism: communist objectives of 
expansionism and world domination remained in place.13 
Stevens’ thoughts reflected wider thinking in the State Department that 
sought to “[d]rive home the point that denouncing Stalin does not remove 
Stalinism.”14 Therefore, the response was to maintain its guard through alliances 
and encourage the cohesion of the free world. This was especially important, as 
one of the points of destalinisation was to promote the ‘decency’ of Soviet 
Communism and thusly attract neutralists and leftists. The U.S. should respond 
by trying to minimise any acceptance of this increase in Soviet ‘decency’ by 
pointing out that Khrushchev and other leaders all owed their positions to Stalin 
and that basic Stalinist policies like collectivisation and the occupation of Eastern 
Europe remained in force. Indeed, the Bureau of European Affairs argued that the 
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very methods of denunciation that the current leaders were using against Stalin 
were the same that Stalin had used to consolidate power.15 Similar ideas were 
being used in public information campaigns. One objective was to sow confusion 
within the communist movement. This could easily be claimed as a ‘success’, 
since Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders were doing this quite effectively 
themselves. Another goal was to encourage the Soviet leaders to move “down less 
dangerous paths” and “[m]inimise and acceptance abroad of Soviet 
respectability”.16 But consistently attacking Soviet reforms through propaganda 
was not an effective way to encourage this. 
This in particular exposed the shortsighted and contradictory nature of the 
U.S. response. The State Department rejected destalinisation on the basis of the 
continued occupation of the satellites and existence of basic communist 
agricultural policies such as collectivisation. Pravda asserted that these were some 
of Stalin’s ‘good’ accomplishments.17 This illustrated to the hardliners in the State 
Department that nothing had changed. But the continuation of some policies also 
illustrated the inability of many in the State Department to differentiate between 
communism and Stalinism. Furthermore, Dulles and Eisenhower consistently 
rejected changes that made the USSR less Stalinist that had occurred since 1953. 
Often the reaction towards the 20th Party Congress both inside the administration 
and in public continued along these lines and sought to trivialise destalinisation. 
Indeed, this may have helped with the goal of preventing increased respectability 
for the USSR. But the campaign to discredit the changes, indeed the very existence 
of a goal to reduce respect for the Soviet leaders was counterproductive in helping 
the Soviets evolve in directions desirable for the U.S. The State Department failed 
to grasp the gravity of the changes to the communist movement. This was not a 
failing of U.S. intelligence- any number of former Party members in the West 
could have told the administration that destalinisation practically amounted to 
deicide. Rather it pointed to a mindset that rejected Soviet changes since Stalin’s 
death as matter of course.  
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Harrison Salisbury laid out what destalinisation meant for Soviet grand 
strategy. He characterised it as an “all out attack on Stalin…[i]t [was] no longer 
possible to discuss what has happened in Moscow since the death of Stalin in 
terms of ‘tactical change’ or ‘strategic’ manoeuvre.” Such a statement was at odds 
with the interpretation of communist doctrine and Soviet motivations as 
intrinsically subversive. But after spending the better part of his life in the USSR, 
both during Stalin’s lifetime and since 1953, Salisbury was well placed to skewer 
such conclusions. Indeed, as Dulles and others in the State Department repeated, 
the “ultimate goals” of the Soviets remained unchanged. Salisbury’s felt such a 
drastic course of action was needed to remove the element of fear in Soviet 
society. This could help increase economic productivity. What was striking was 
his illustration of the manner in which destalinisation was being carried out:   
There is a concentration on extermination of every symbol of Stalin’s 
personality that bears strong emotional overtones. No political factor or 
possibility of political gain seems to explain the spirit with which the 
Soviet leaders are acting. There is more than a suggestion of deep hate. If 
they individually escaped Stalin’s purges by a hair’s breadth, this might 
explain why, figuratively, they are pointing their ideological guns at his 
dead corpse and firing until the chambers are empty.18 
Destalinisation would not be carried out in such a manner if it were merely 
tactical. 
Another report prepared for the OCB Special Working Group on Stalinism 
(SWGS) noted the profound disbelief, anger and confusion that the denunciation 
of Stalin created, especially among the fifty percent of Soviet citizens born since 
1929 when “Stalin worship” began. But these feelings were especially dangerous 
to the Party, which had seen its largest growth in the post-war period under 
Stalin. The report noted that the leaders foresaw such difficulties. Yet this was a 
huge adjustment for Party members to make- they would either have to accept 
that their previously unquestioned fealty to Stalin was no longer possible, or they 
would have to completely suppress their doubt of the changes. There were 
serious reservations among the OCB and OIR whether the ‘little Stalin’s’ in the 
Satellites could adjust quickly enough. It would be necessary to instruct Party 
members that it was acceptable to criticise Stalin, but nothing that was current 
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policy. The report asserted that the leadership must have felt confident in the 
stability of the Soviet regime to initiate such a course.19 This may have been true to 
an extent: they would not have started such a process without knowing that they 
could ultimately control events- but they still realised it was a gamble. This was 
what indicated that the leaders might have felt that the Soviet system would be 
less secure if it continued on its current heading. To be sure, the report noted that 
much of the effect of destalinisation in terms of removing his image and public 
legacy could have been achieved by continuing to ignore Stalin, as had been 
largely the case since 1953. Clearly the leaders felt that some sort of shock was 
necessary in order to safeguard the system in the medium to long term. The OCB 
also concluded that the reasoning was domestic, and intended to liberalise society 
and encourage enthusiasm and initiative in the Party and economy. But the OCB 
noted something that others had not: just as Stalin could have been ‘forgotten’, 
why not simply encourage initiative and demonstrate that it would be rewarded? 
The answer seemed to be that there was a need to cut the ground from anyone in 
a position of authority who remained wedded to Stalinist methods. By doing so, 
anyone who opposed liberalisation could be denounced as a Stalinist.20 
Yet certain policies pursued by Stalin continued to be supported by the 
present leaders. As mentioned, these were not Stalinist per se, but rather part of 
Soviet Communism that would have likely been pursed by any Soviet leader in 
the absence of Stalin, although perhaps in a different manner. The occupation and 
domination of Eastern Europe, collectivisation and emphasis on defence and 
heavy industry fell into this category. As such, the Soviet leaders sought to divide 
Stalin’s life into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Rather it was the cult of personality and self-
glorification, disregard of collective leadership, and the dominating power of the 
secret police- the consequences of which were the death of thousands of loyal 
Party members that drew the most criticism from Khrushchev and the other 
leaders. The administration was well aware of this division. The U.S. sought to 
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develop highlight this in order to facilitate the demise of Soviet Communist 
credibility.21 
The distinction drawn by the Soviet leaders was done so not only out the 
necessity for some continuity, but also out of conviction. These ‘good’ 
accomplishments of ‘Stalin’ were not only things that the new leaders were 
deeply involved in, but also truly believed. This appeared highly contradictory to 
many in the Eisenhower administration, not least Dulles. Since Soviet 
Communism was often seen as a monolith it was unthinkable that they should so 
thoroughly discredit some of the actions of Stalin while continuing to support 
others. Thus, Dulles publicly stated that the Soviets were still Stalinists, regardless 
of destalinisation. But he was also aware that he could no longer dismiss changes 
in the USSR out of hand; the 20th Party Congress offered evidence that was too 
compelling. Dulles qualified his comments by stating that the existence of such 
“liberalizing tendencies” encouraged hope for peaceful change in the USSR.22 This 
statement cannot be dismissed as rhetoric. Dulles was coming to terms with the 
fact that destalinisation represented something monumental. But both his long 
held perceptions of the Soviet leaders as cagey conspirators, buttressed by his 
innate cautiousness, bid him to continue to play the sceptic until the evidence was 
more fully developed.  
Dulles’ reaction to destalinisation at this time was understandable given 
his previous responses to changes in the USSR. Indeed, analysis from the PPS 
gave a number of reasons for the U.S. to remain on guard against the Soviets. In 
an exhaustive PPS report on the 20th Party Congress Richard Davis concluded that 
the Soviet leaders were still confident in the Soviet system and ultimate victory of 
Communism.23 The Soviets were still trying to divide the West. Peaceful co-
existence was one manner of doing this: ‘peace’ simply meant the “...maximum 
possible pressures for the exploitation of the weaknesses and contradictions in the 
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outside world in order to enhance Soviet power.” The softening of Soviet 
Communist ideology at the Congress was intended to help achieve both these 
goals by making the Soviet system more attractive to people in both the West and 
in the developing world. But Khrushchev also stated that war was still possible if 
unleashed by capitalists, thus the USSR needed to maintain a strong military.24 
Davis’ summary of Soviet objectives after the 20th Party Congress would 
have led many to conclude that there had been no changes of substance. Those in 
the administration interpreted the change towards a less aggressive manner of 
foreign policy as a threatening development. Thus, the changes of the Congress 
were brushed aside and fit into the framework that had been developed since 
1953: a lessening of hostility from the Soviets meant little if they were still 
communists, and in fact could make them more dangerous. Davis cited events 
such as the Czechoslovakian Coup, Berlin blockade, rift with Tito and the Korean 
War. These caused the West to band together. The subsequent isolation hurt the 
Soviet economy and blackened the image of the USSR abroad. The new leaders 
concluded that they need to not only abandon such policies, but that Stalinism 
was untenable without Stalin himself. As Davis put it:  
…collective rule…needed a broader base of support and greater freedom 
and flexibility in action than Stalin's orthodoxy and one-man rule could 
allow. From the fundamental fact that the Stalinist system has been 
replaced by a collective dictatorship flow most of recent Soviet 
developments.25 
The adoption of peaceful coexistence was an example of this flexibility. But it was 
also a reflection of necessity due to the nuclear reality. The realisation that war 
could not be allowed to occur made revisions in Soviet doctrine necessary. Davis 
emphasised that such revisions did not mean a change in Soviet objectives. The 
Soviets would still seek advantage over the West.26  
Though Davis’ conclusions about Soviet intentions were much the same as 
those mooted over the past three years, he encouraged a different response. 
Remaining opposed to Soviet objectives did not mean the U.S. must reject all 
aspects of change in the USSR. Davis acknowledged that the recent developments 
warranted a more flexible position. The U.S. could not reject destalinisation out of 
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hand. Davis did not think the Soviet position a short term one. Though he 
maintained Soviet objectives were the same he also asserted that the changes were 
not tactical. The revisions in Soviet foreign policy and ideology over the past three 
years made a return to Stalinism unlikely. But whereas the U.S. had been good at 
resisting Stalin’s harsh tactics, Davis now emphasised the need for the U.S. to 
develop more flexible policies in response. Davis’ suggestions seemed to have 
been written for Dulles himself. They were innovative and realistic:  
Less emphasis should be given to conjuring up the vision of a Kremlin 
bent on Communist conquest and world domination at some unspecified 
time and more to attaining an appreciation by the peoples of the world of 
the basic power factors which necessitate that the free nations maintain 
their guard at least until such a time as a workable system of 
disarmament has provided assurance against any sudden breach of the 
peace. 
Davis argued that the U.S. could not simply dismiss destalinisation “...as merely a 
cover for the same old predatory ends. It has been designed with too many built-
in attractions for us to wave it lightly aside…” Davis concluded that although 
there was no change in Soviet goals, the U.S. could not reject destalinisation 
outright. The U.S. should investigate whether Soviet positions that were based on 
Stalin’s policies were shifting.27 Davis viewed destalinisation as making peaceful 
change in the USSR more likely, and the U.S. could only encourage such a 
development. 
In public neither Dulles nor Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political 
Affairs Robert Murphy seemed to be influenced by Davis’ conclusions. Speaking 
to the American Society of Newspaper Editors Murphy dutifully repeated the 
position Dulles made on 3 April: the downgrading of Stalin did not mean the 
Soviets had made any basic change to domestic for foreign policies. The attack on 
Stalin did not alter the “committee dictatorship”, or the Soviet adherence to 
Marxism-Leninism. All that had changed were methods, and the West needed to 
remember that less reliance on violence and coercion did not mean their basic 
objectives had altered. Murphy also dismissed significant Soviet foreign policy 
moves over the past three years: the Austrian treaty, rapprochement with Tito 
and conciliatory offers toward Japan and Germany. All this was striking to say 
the least, but paled in comparison to Murphy’s argument that all of these actions 
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were only taken to gain advantage over the West.28 Ironically, the aforementioned 
Soviet foreign policy moves were some of the exact things that Eisenhower 
demanded in his Chance for Peace speech before the same audience in 1953. But 
now that the Soviets demonstrated the goodwill Eisenhower demanded, it was 
disregarded on the basis that the Soviets remained communist. This prevented the 
U.S. from taking advantage of the changes in the Soviet system to encourage the 
evolutionary change that was laid out as policy in NSC-5505. 
Different views were expressed in private. Rather than rejecting 
destalinisation outright, Bohlen told the SWGS that the 20th Party Congress and 
Secret Speech presented a new level of anger towards Stalin. He cautioned the 
SWGS to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach. The U.S. should only respond in its 
information campaigns by asking what had been done to prevent the emergence 
of another Stalin. This was one of the same lines used by Dulles. In contrast, 
Bohlen did not recommend that the U.S. actively cast doubt on destalinisation or 
question its motives, in sharp contrast to Dulles and much U.S. information 
output thus far.29 This omission was telling. Bohlen was aware that if he made a 
point of disagreeing with Dulles that his suggestions would likely be rejected. It 
was better to remain mute on Dulles’ actions and instead offer a different course 
of action towards destalinisation. In this case it was better to allow destalinisation 
to proceed, possibly to the benefit of the U.S., than to openly attack it and risk 
playing into the hands of the Soviets.  
In contrast to Dulles, who credited the changes in the USSR to Western 
policies, and to specialists in the State Department who thought destalinisation 
was motivated by domestic issues, Allen Dulles developed a different view. The 
Dulles brothers looked at the same events and drew different conclusions. In the 
Cold War so far, Foster saw the victory of Western policies and cohesion. The 
West was proactive and forced the Soviet system to change. In contrast, Allen saw 
the West reacting to Soviet aggression. Allen Dulles figured that the Soviet leaders 
knew Stalin’s manner of foreign policy had definitively failed, thus forcing such a 
fundamental change in course. 
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But this alone did not explain destalinisation. The Kremlin could have 
simply let Stalin fade away. Rather, the leaders needed to increase support from 
key parts of the population in order to solidify their power base and stimulate the 
economy. To this end, Allen Dulles saw destalinisation as mollifying the Army by 
acknowledging Stalin’s murder of thousands of officers. The Soviet economy also 
needed to increase productivity to compete with the rest of the world. This 
required more education, and specifically more emphasis on science. Stalin had 
set science back by promoting quacks like Trofim Lysenko. With the scientific 
method firmly reinstated, science could no longer be moulded in service of 
communism. This, along with more people holding advanced degrees in science, 
Dulles concluded, could result in questioning of the Soviet system. Attacking 
Stalin was in this respect a way to encourage innovation and education that could 
improve the economy, but also to direct toward Stalin frustration that would 
normally be directed towards the Party. But Allen Dulles acknowledged that even 
this was fraught with danger. Allowing open questioning and criticism of Stalin 
could easily lead to criticism of the current leaders and Party. He noted that 
Pravda made it clear that only criticism of Stalin’s deeds- and only specific ones at 
that would be tolerated. This led Dulles to conclude that:  
A dead and dishonored Stalin, therefore, is likely to be merely a device—
here possibly a Trojan corpse rather than a Trojan horse—with which the 
long suffering Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived in their 
expectation of a freer and better life. 
Allen Dulles had thought this all through carefully. But he still concluded that 
destalinisation was at root a way of maintaining the Party monopoly over all 
aspects of the state, something Dulles characterised as Stalinism rebadged as 
Leninism. Even after denouncing Stalin the Soviet leaders still maintained a police 
state with powers of life and death over anyone who dissented. The leaders could 
return to terror “like ducks to water”. Stalin had come to power through collective 
leadership, noted Dulles, and little prevented such a situation from occurring 
again.30 
It was this sort of public criticism of destalinisation that both Bohlen and 
Salisbury decried. But the best summary of the administrations perceptions of 
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destalinisation thus far came from another dissenting figure, Louis Halle. He kept 
in touch with numerous figures in the administration, the most influential of 
which was Bowie.31 Though Halle’s discord with Dulles and others of the 
‘liberation’ stripe precluded him having any influence on policymaking, he 
provided his expertise to the press. He was jointly asked for an essay on 
destalinisation by the editors of the French monthly Preuves, the British review 
Encounter, and German magazine Der Monat. His essay was suitably cerebral and 
reflected his new place in academia (it began with a Gandalf quotation from 
Tolkien’s The Two Towers). But it addressed a central question- one that the initial 
response of the Eisenhower administration to destalinisation avoided: what was 
communism? 
Communism is a word. As such it has not changed in one syllable or 
letter since the Communist Manifesto of 1847. But what is “the thing” 
itself? It was one thing in Russia in 1919. It was not quite the same thing 
in Russia in 1928. It was something else again in 1949. Is it what Lenin 
said it was, what Trotsky said it was, what Stalin said it was, or what 
Kruschev [sic] says it is? Is it the same in China as in Russia, in Russia as 
in Yugoslavia?32 
Communism had become a loaded term and was preventing policymakers from 
appreciating the changes in the Soviet Union. The insistence by Dulles and others 
that the Soviets leaders remained wedded to the goals of ‘communism’, and 
therefore their objectives were unchanged, was a useless interpretation. “Ultimate 
objectives”, Halle argued, “exist only in the imagination”. What was important 
was what a power did in pursuit of those goals. Halle thought the West should be 
to find out whether it was still Kremlin policy to impose communism by force and 
subversion as it was under Stalin, or, whether the new leaders were truly 
confining themselves to legitimate forms of competition.33  
Halle was right: it did not matter that the Soviets still desired to spread 
communism. Nothing the U.S. could do would change this. What mattered was 
whether they were pursuing their goals in a more liberal manner that would be 
conducive to Western objectives. Though there were clear indications of this the 
administration fell back on the established response to change in the Soviet 
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Union, that destalinisation could only be to the detriment of the West. This 
prevented any useful examination. Part of this failure was due not only to the 
cautious nature of figures like Dulles, but also of the tendency of bureaucracies to 
maintain course in the face of incomplete or conflicting information. Such caution 
had existed since 1953. Domestic politics in the earlier years of the administration 
made it very dangerous to risk anything on Soviet changes. But that was no 
longer the case. Sustained signals of change and a desire to improve relations 
from the Soviets, and the decline of McCarthy and rabid anti-communists in 
Congress, meant that Soviet changes could have been considered more when 
formulating U.S. policy. Instead policymakers hesitated because of outdated 
perceptions of the Soviet leaders. This was slowly changing, but only in private.   
Indeed, the public comments of State Department officials and U.S. 
information publications followed the line set out in Dulles’ 3 April speech. They 
dismissed the changes inherent in destalinisation and claimed that Stalinism 
persisted. By the middle of April officials were instructed that they might develop 
other lines of argument in their public statements. The expanded line, however, 
only added to the old one in limited ways. Officials were encouraged to 
disseminate the line that the Soviets were only embarking on destalinisation for 
their own economic and diplomatic benefit.34 Therefore, the public response of the 
administration to destalinisation remained the same since the 20th Party Congress: 
it consisted of scepticism and demands for reforms that proved destalinisation as 
more than a tactic. Continuity was drawn between Stalin and the current leaders, 
and between Stalinism and current policies. The administration was extremely 
cautious with public opinion, and it was careful to craft a response that seemed to 
satisfy those that sought better relations with the USSR while hedging against any 
accusations of softness toward communism from Cold War hawks. But by 1956 
the administration had much more leeway in its relations towards the Soviets 
than it had in 1953 or 1954. The Geneva Conference, even if it resulted in little 
progress on concrete issues, did present the Soviets as desirous of better relations 
and committed to avoiding war. If both Dulles and Eisenhower pressed for a 
positive exploration of what destalinisation meant for U.S.-Soviet relations they 
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could have accelerated the improvement of relations that finally emerged in 1958-
59. Certainly Eisenhower, as a military hero, and Dulles, as the Christian moralist 
and strident anti-communist, could not have been seriously attacked for being 
soft on communism; they had their record of the previous three years to prove it. 
Instead, their long-held perceptions of the Soviets as devious and conspiratorial 
prevented them from making any quick adjustments in policy. The resulting 
middle-of-the-road approach limited the ability of the administration to take 
advantage of destalinisation in pursuit of its goal of a more liberal Soviet system.  
A Changed Man 
Dulles had begun to publicly note the liberalising possibilities of the 20th 
Party Congress. In private he agreed that destalinisation was a serious change. 
But he remained characteristically cautious. He noted the possibilities of 
destalinisation, but rather than seizing them, he focussed on minimizing the 
dangers. It was reminiscent of the lack of response to Stalin’s death. The U.S. now 
found itself in a similar situation: serious changes in the USSR presented possible 
avenues of either improving relations, or for exploitation. But neither course was 
followed due to Dulles cautious nature, and engrained perceptions. Political and 
bureaucratic rivalries also hindered greater initiative. CD Jackson documented 
this, which was fitting since he left the administration citing a lack of action in 
prosecuting the Cold War.  He met with Dulles in mid-April; though 
unbeknownst to Dulles the meeting was in fact preparation for a possible Time 
hatchet job on the administration’s foreign policy. Confiding in Jackson, (with 
whom, despite his differences in approach, he was friends) he noted that many 
Americans wanted to see a more active U.S. foreign policy. The problem was both 
a lack of presidential follow through, and the blocking of initiatives by members 
of the administration and State Department who were close to the president: in 
this case Charlie Wilson and Herbert Hoover Jr. The latter, as Undersecretary of 
State, often used Dulles’ absences to stall or reverse instructions. According to 
Dulles, Hoover was even insubordinate in his presence.  
But this was not so much of an issue as was the lack of useful ideas. Dulles 
ranted about the failure of the bureaucracy. There was no shortage of “idea 
mechanisms”, but everything had to be reduced to a common denominator in 
NSC meetings. In addition, Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for ‘coordination’ meant 
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that various departments were able to weigh in on foreign policy matters, thus 
hindering the State Department. Excessive communication was throttling 
enthusiasm.35 There was no lack of irony in Dulles’ complaints. He had done more 
than anyone to destroy morale in the State Department through his attention to 
politics at the expense of the Foreign Service. Ambassadors were frequently left 
uninformed of new policies, yet Dulles complained about having to show key 
ambassadors copies of his speeches prior to delivering them. He lashed out at 
Eisenhower, saying that the president had the mandate to do almost anything, but 
instead wasted his first months in office.36 Dulles conveniently forgot his own 
cautious nature and his frequent role in stymieing various initiatives.  
It is unlikely that if Eisenhower or Dulles had really wanted to accomplish 
something innovative in foreign policy it would have been impossible. Jackson 
challenged Dulles on exactly this point. Dulles countered that his only ally was 
Eisenhower, who was (with no hint of irony) an indecisive ally at that. Dulles 
painted Eisenhower as a man who “likes to be liked”, and firmly resisted putting 
forth any ideas that could encounter political resistance before the election. 
Confrontation was not Eisenhower’s style anyhow; he aimed to lead through 
persuasion.37 But Dulles reserved most of his scorn for the “Humphrey-Dodge 
axis”.38 Both men were known for their strict fiscal conservatism, and locked horns 
with Dulles over foreign aid. Their obstructionism was even more ironic since 
Eisenhower appointed both based upon not only their banking and business 
experience, but also their alleged efficiency.39 
Dulles was frustrated at his colleagues for hampering his ability to wage 
the Cold War. But he was also conflicted about the changes in the USSR. He had 
come to a different view of the Cold War and Soviet methods since Stalin’s death. 
He reminisced to Jackson about building a bomb shelter for he and his wife in 
1951, but said he would not consider building one now. The struggle had shifted 
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away from a military angle and towards hearts and minds. This presented 
dangers and opportunities:  
So long as the Soviets under Stalin continued to behave so badly in public, 
it was relatively easy for our side to maintain a certain social ostracism 
toward them... Now all of a sudden the outward Soviet appearance, 
mood, behavior, has materially changed...it is becoming extremely 
difficult to maintain the ostracism — and maybe we should not even want to 
maintain it.40 
Dulles’ questioning of whether the Soviets should be kept at arms length 
was a revelation. In private he was no longer rejecting Soviet changes out of hand. 
Indeed, he was asserting the fundamental nature of the changes for the Soviet 
regime: “...this change is not superficial, is not limited to a few speeches and 
Pravda editorials. It goes quite deep.” In the face of the rehabilitation of 
communists, rapprochement with Tito and acceptance of national roads to 
socialism he recognised that it would be increasingly difficult for the U.S. to claim 
that destalinisation meant nothing. Dulles even claimed to have predicted the 
changes in the USSR in his writings:   
Ten years ago, in my article in LIFE, I said that if we could stay with this 
thing long enough and solidly enough, there would come a time when 
important internal changes would occur in the Soviet Union, and that any 
change from the rigid Stalin police state would probably be a step 
forward. Well, that has come to pass. Six years ago in my book, I wrote 
that it was conceivable that at some time the rulers of Russia might 
publicly repudiate Stalin and all his works. Well, that has come to pass 
also.41 
Dulles’ ‘prescience’ was actually the result of vague language and hindsight. If he 
had meant such claims he would have been more inquisitive about destalinisation 
immediately after Stalin’s death. Instead it took the revelations of the 20th Party 
Congress for him to truly question his own perceptions, and he came to a vastly 
different interpretation of the Soviets than he had in 1953 when he asserted the 
U.S. must destroy the USSR. 
Dulles acceptance of destalinisation was not yet firm enough to express 
fully in public. A week after his meeting with Jackson he addressed the 
Associated Press and read out a list of changes in Soviet foreign policy since 1953, 
including the latest ones due to destalinisation. He continued to convey that it 
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was the unity and pressure of the free world on the Soviets that had caused 
destalinisation. The Soviets were determined to see built communism throughout 
the world and possessed enormous military capabilities. Therefore, it would be 
foolish for the West to lower its guard.  Indeed, Dulles repeated his conviction 
that the “moment of greatest danger would be the moment when we relaxed”, 
and that the West should not “treat the prospect of success as itself a complete 
success”. Dulles could not be expected to change course quickly, but some of his 
remarks were revelatory: “[t]o say that is not to say that we should act as though 
nothing had happened. We cannot and would not set the clock back. There is no 
longer the mood of fear that gripped the free world…” Dulles thought this left the 
West in a tricky position: the West should give destalinisation a chance, but this 
also gave the Soviet leaders more chance for “mischief”. 42 At a press conference 
the following day Dulles welcomed the official sanctioning of national roads to 
socialism. For Dulles, Titoism represented a shift away from international 
communism towards national communism: the U.S. could have normal relations 
with the latter..43 Dulles was no longer suspicious of every Soviet move.  
Dulles was concerned with both the ideological and political changes in 
the USSR. The problem was that he continued to mix his messages as a result of 
his own confusion about the permanency of destalinisation. His statements about 
Soviet changes and how the U.S. should perceive and respond to them were 
frequently contradictory; often times in the same speech. In the days before his 
speech on 24 April both he and Eisenhower stressed the need to keep hatred of 
the Soviets simmering and that the basic concepts of Communism had not 
changed.44 The changes wrought by destalinisation left him deeply conflicted 
about Soviet Communism, and what it meant for the U.S. Dulles and Eisenhower 
did not know what to do. They were obfuscating the issue, deliberately or 
otherwise, in order to buy time.  
The insistence that the U.S. must maintain its vigilance while it examined 
the Soviet changes was a natural way for the administration to protect itself from 
any Soviet reversals or accusations of being soft on the Soviets. Indeed, 
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Eisenhower’s presidential rival Adlai Stevenson said the same thing. Yet in 
campaign speeches Eisenhower maintained that the Soviet change in tactics as a 
result of destalinisation did not mean there was any change in Soviet aims.45 But 
casting doubt on the Soviet changes was a strange way to pursue the stated goal 
of promoting evolutionary change in the USSR. Soviets objectives were probably 
unchanged, insofar as they remained communist. But Soviet means certainly had, 
and the administration failed to see the importance of this. In American Cold War 
discourse, statements that asserted the unchanging nature of Soviet goals only 
obscured the much more important issue of the change in means. 
The Initial Response to the 20th Party Congress and Secret Speech   
Knowledge of Khrushchev’s speech gave new urgency to ascertaining the 
direction of destalinisation, and the State Department and White House took steps 
to investigate. Over the coming months the OCB set up, and then consolidated, a 
number of groups that scrutinised destalinisation. The roots of these groups 
actually stretched back to 1953. Under the aegis of the OCB’s predecessor the PSB, 
a Working Group on Stalin was convened in the wake of Stalin’s death to find 
ways of exploiting the event.46 Following the condemnation of Stalin, the OCB 
embarked on almost exactly the same path. Many of the records of the group are 
missing and the ones that do exist either remain classified or are heavily 
redacted.47 What is known is that after the 20th Party Congress the OCB Special 
Working Group on Stalinism (SWGS), led by Jacob Beam, Robert Murphy and 
Park Armstrong met almost daily to produce reports on the anti-Stalin campaign 
and finding ways to exploit it. The OCB agreed that the group should provide 
guidance to the State Department and USIA.48 The recommendations of the group 
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were much the same as those that had been mooted in the State Department 
before. The SWGS suggested that official criticism of Stalin be redirected towards 
economic issues. In terms of politics, the OCB sought to show that one-party rule 
directly caused one-man rule. In both these themes the SWGS felt that there 
should be official and non-official policies. Officially, the U.S. should remain 
sceptical of destalinisation, but be careful not to appear jubilant lest this cause 
communists to close ranks. Unofficially, the U.S. should try and sow confusion 
among communists, and even ridicule of the Soviet leaders. Foreign sources 
should be utilised in order to appear objective. The OCB coordinated such 
campaigns with the British and French, with the latter publishing satirical posters 
to this effect.49   
The suggestions of the SWGS were much the same that the State 
Department and USIA had been following for the past months. The fact that it 
was meeting daily to discuss destalinisation suggested that it was the source of 
the line that had been followed thus far. Though Dulles was contemptuous of 
bodies like the OCB, figures he respected like Armstrong and Beam, which meant 
he was likely to take the guidance seriously. Indeed, at the end of May the SWGS 
proposed to widen its focus to consider developments in the Satellites and Soviet 
Union more generally. This was formalised by the end of June when the group 
was reformed into the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems. If the 
group had been useless or a bureaucratic graveyard, it was unlikely given Dulles’ 
feelings about ‘coordination’ that he would have allowed the creation of the new 
committee.50  
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Stalin the “Super-Judas” 
Other ways of exploiting the situation were far less cerebral. One such 
instance was ‘Orlov affair’. Formerly an NKVD General, Alexander Orlov accused 
Stalin of being an Okhrana agent from 1906-12, as well as being homosexual, and 
argued that this was the true basis of destalinisation. In April 1956 LIFE published 
Orlov’s accusations along with documents purporting to prove Stalin’s guilt. 
Orlov claimed to first learn of Stalin’s work for the Okhrana in 1937 from 
documents in the Ukrainian NKVD archive. These were shared with Politburo 
members who were subsequently killed. Zhukov learned of the file and the 
murders and shared the information with the current leaders, thus forcing the 
destalinisation campaign.51 All of this was outlandish, and any credibility was 
further eroded since émigré groups were responsible for spreading the story. The 
Tolstoy Foundation was foremost in this and received CIA funding. But some 
scholars took it seriously. Russian historian Isaac Don Levine wrote to Bulganin 
demanding the release of the complete file in order to expose the full truth of 
Stalin the “super-Judas”.52 Levine contacted Kennan to review the documents, but 
probably did not expect Kennan to reply that he had seen the documents when he 
was still in State Department. Kennan explained that he did not have the time to 
give the documents the type of research they needed in order to determine their 
authenticity, though he thought they were genuine. He recommended they not be 
released while Stalin was alive, and if they were, only by a private organisation or 
scholar and with context provided by respected historians.53 Kennan’s hypothesis 
that Khrushchev and others murdered Stalin would have meshed with Orlov’s 
accusations and would have provided the Soviet leaders with an excellent reason 
for embarking on destalinisation in order to pre-empt the revelation that they 
killed Stalin. But if anything, Kennan’s explanation seems even more far-fetched 
than the accusations themselves. It is hard to believe that Kennan could not have 
found the manpower to evaluate the documents when he was in government 
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service given the potential gravity of the accusations and the propaganda coup it 
would have handed the U.S.  
CENIS 
No one in the Eisenhower administration took these accusations seriously, 
if for no other reason than there were more important, obvious, and verifiable 
changes taking place as a result of the 20th Party Congress. Both the OCB and the 
SWGS sought outside analysis of the Congress, and turned to the Center for 
International Studies at MIT (CENIS).54 It felt that the ideological changes of the 
Congress were of primary importance. CENIS asserted that ideology did not in 
itself determine Soviet policy, or even relations between Moscow and foreign 
communist parties. Rather, the role of ideology was more subtle, but no less 
important, and played a key role in the changes underway. Ideology was both the 
vocabulary of the Soviet leaders- the way power struggles between them were 
articulated- and the means of communication between the Kremlin and the 
people. It was the manner in which Soviet intentions and desires were presented 
and provided legitimacy for the leaders.55 This interpretation was not far from 
Bohlen’s view of the USSR. It was, however, in stark contrast to Dulles who felt 
that ideology not only was the motivation for Soviet actions, but was also a useful 
way of predicting Soviet moves. 
CENIS also found reason to doubt destalinisation:  
...while the recent changes may in the long-run may be favorable to our 
interests, they do not now represent a change in Moscow’s fundamentally 
hostile objectives, but are, in fact, designed to increase the effectiveness of 
Moscow’s hostile policies…56 
According to the CENIS, the importance for U.S. policymaking lay in the 
way that the modified Soviet Communist ideology would change how the 
Kremlin behaved. The ideological modifications all came in the wake of practical 
modifications made since 1953. These changes, along with the re-emphasis on 
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Lenin brought the USSR closer to the values of the non-communist world. The 
Congress not only made these changes into doctrine, but it also:  
Clean[ed] out Stalin who had become associated in a highly personal way 
with all least attractive (sic) about Communism, they aim to facilitate the 
present policy of economic and political subversion of the Free World.57 
CENIS clearly envisioned destalinisation as a manner of opening up opportunities 
for the Soviets, but not necessarily of a change in objectives since the Soviets were 
still out to subvert the West. Indeed, CENIS noted, “Stalin's elimination is a 
tactical move without solid foundations. The present leaders are not prepared to 
abandon these ideas and practices.”58 
But by discarding Stalinism, the Soviets left an ideological void. CENIS 
argued it would be nearly impossible for the Soviets to provide an monolithic 
alternative to Stalinism in any detail without opening themselves up to attack 
from both the West and other communists. Ironically, the very dismissal of 
Stalinism made this at once a certainty: it prevented the Soviets from doing 
anything about it, except for trying to define the new ideology further, which 
again they could not do lest they invite criticism. CENIS astutely pointed out the 
dilemma the Soviets faced: destroying Stalinism increased the appeal of Soviet 
Communism abroad and promoted initiative at home. But it also exposed Soviet 
ideology to deviation, especially now that national roads to socialism were 
allowed. CENIS predicted that the Soviets would allow a certain amount of 
growth in “permissible doctrine”, but would also establish a firm line past which 
criticism and deviation could not pass. 
This presented both opportunities and dangers to the U.S. CENIS 
indicated that the U.S. could influence thinking in the USSR by introducing the 
right sort of questions about the changes. CENIS noted “[p]luralistic thinking in 
the Communist world is bound to grow. If it is properly exploited by Free World 
performance and thought, it could hasten the liquidation of Communism itself.” 
CENIS suggested that the U.S. demonstrate that destalinisation was only just 
beginning. This should create enough doubt among foreign Communist parties to 
prevent any sort of useful planning or incorporation of the ideological changes. In 
addition, the U.S. should continue to publicly identify Khrushchev and the other 
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leaders with Stalinism. But the perverse logic of destalinisation so far meant that 
each opportunity for the Soviets presented one to the West. Thus, pluralism was 
also strength to the Kremlin, since the very image of Communism as pluralist 
may have made the Soviet model more attractive to other leftists. 59  
Between the Devil and the Deep Red Sea 
Dulles was aware that destalinisation represented a Rubicon for the Soviet 
leaders. However the Kremlin played the situation, Stalin’s crimes had been 
revealed, and this had potential danger and advantages for both the USSR and the 
U.S. Just as CENIS argued, the State Department’s Executive Secretariat discussed 
the prospect that destalinisation could increase the appeal and respectability of 
the Soviet system. The U.S. could counter this by trumpeting the very tyranny 
described by Khrushchev and illustrating that this admission of Stalin’s crimes 
destroyed the claims of infallibility upon which communism relied. The 
propaganda line developed at the very beginning of the destalinisation campaign 
was continued, and the State Department again forwarded the idea that 
discrediting Stalin did not destroy Stalinism: a continued police state, 
collectivisation, and the domination of Eastern Europe all proved this. By 
disseminating this line the U.S. could promote disarray among communists, but 
also avoid the appearance of a propaganda offensive by tailoring the message to 
each region or group. Thus the revelations of destalinisation were hoped would 
promote evolutionary change in the USSR, encourage feelings of nationalism and 
Titoism in the satellites, and discourage the tendency to treat the Soviets with 
respect in the free world. Yet the Executive Secretariat claimed it did not “rigidly 
reject all possibility of change in the Soviet system”. The self-criticism that 
destalinisation represented was an important step, but only a preliminary one.60 
Indeed, the administration thought evolutionary change was the best chance for 
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reforming the USSR.61 After picking apart destalinisation in public information 
campaigns such a statement was somewhat hypocritical. But its presence showed 
that some in the administration thought that destalinisation could not be written 
off.  
Those inside the USSR realised that destalinisation was indeed a very 
serious undertaking. It appeared to be the only way, other than war or revolution, 
that the Soviet leaders could relieve some of the pressure that had built up. But it 
was extremely risky. Salisbury noted that every time there had been a move 
towards relaxation, some sort of political violence had flared up in the Soviet bloc: 
in the GDR and Pilsen in 1953, and most recently in Poznan and Tiflis. But 
Khrushchev needed to eliminate Stalinism, since it repressed innovation and 
reduced incentives. Salisbury thought the motives were economic as well as 
political. He made the distinction between Stalin and Stalinism when addressing 
the issue and credited Khrushchev with attempting to eliminate the latter.62 This 
was notable given that many in the Eisenhower administration and press insisted 
that the hallmarks of Stalinism remained. The inability of many in the 
government to draw a distinction between the Soviet system and Stalinism was a 
key issue. The destalinisation campaign was removing many aspects of Stalinism, 
not to mention symbols of the man himself. Yet most in the Eisenhower 
administration continued to note that attributes of the Soviet system such as 
collectivised agriculture, secret police, and support for communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe as proof that ‘Stalinism’ still existed. What is more, they did so 
even while tracing the existence of these things to Leninism in an attempt to 
discredit the revival of Lenin in Soviet propaganda. They failed to see the 
existence of these attributes before Stalin’s reign. Instead they took a ‘pick and 
mix’ approach to the changes in the USSR that allowed them to take note of the 
changes that conformed to or confirmed their perceptions of the Soviet leaders 
and disregarded the rest as tactical.  
Dulles knew of the strain that destalinisation was placing on relations 
between the Kremlin and foreign communist parties.63 But he made no distinction 
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between Stalinism and the Soviet system. He did not realise that if it were a case 
of merely sacrificing the image of Stalin in order to maintain the Soviet system, 
there would not have been the same level of agony within the communist 
movement about destalinisation. This is not to say that destalinisation would have 
been easy, but rather to illustrate that Dulles, and many under him, did not have a 
clear idea of what Stalinism, as opposed to the Soviet system more broadly, 
represented. Dulles failed to grasp that the most of the economic and political 
reforms that could be credited with dismantling Stalinism had been enacted 
before the 20th Party Congress in the 1953-55 period. As shown, these were mostly 
disregarded by the administration. Had they come at the same time as the 
Congress, the administration may have put more credence in them. But the irony 
again was that although numerous intelligence reports and analyses noted that 
the ideological changes of the Congress rubber stamped the changes made in the 
years since Stalin’s death, Dulles and Eisenhower failed to connect the dots and 
continued to view the practical changes of destalinisation (since 1953) as 
piecemeal rather than as a whole, and the shock of destalinisation (since the 20th 
Party Congress) as largely rhetorical since they thought the hallmarks of Stalinism 
remained in place.  
The trend toward greater liberalisation in the USSR did not escape the 
notice of the media in the U.S. and Dulles was forced to address the issue. He 
coyly acknowledged the unknown nature of the Soviet changes; time was needed 
to tell what the Soviet motives truly were. Such a statement meant served two 
purposes: it was both a hedge against any future changes by the Soviets that 
could be to the detriment of U.S. interests and a way for him to indirectly address 
the uncertainties of his own perceptions that had recently developed. He thought 
that the liberalisation that had occurred in the USSR, both since Stalin’s death and 
since the 20th Party Congress, represented a ‘barometer’ that was recording a 
latent desire for greater personal freedoms and a more representative 
government. Dulles was projecting the American experience of resistance to 
tyranny onto the Soviet people. But he saw that the Soviet leaders may simply be 
‘playing’ to these feelings by offering something that seemed to satisfy some of 
these demands, but was really the status quo. Nothing happened that promised a 
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better future for Soviet citizens. But he acknowledged that liberalising forces must 
be strong for the Soviet leaders to embark on destalinisation.64 
Dulles would not have to wait long for more signs of liberalisation. In May 
the Soviet leaders announced a massive reduction in the size of its standing 
military forces. Although Dulles and the State Department based much of their 
scepticism of destalinisation on the fact that the ideological changes and 
renouncement of Stalin were not ‘concrete’ acts, the reduction of almost 1.2 
million men was also discounted. To Dulles these were not irreversible gestures. 
The men could be easily recalled and re-equipped since there was no 
commensurate reduction in armaments. The Soviets could afford to make this 
change due to the increase in their nuclear forces. And betraying his belief in a 
communist world more united than it actually was he indicated that the Chinese 
retained huge military manpower. There were no peaceful intentions behind the 
reduction, instead Dulles pointed to a need for industrial and agricultural 
manpower. The men who were demobilised could now be at work in factories 
producing military goods.65 Opinion in the press was similar. The common line 
was that the Soviets were simply making better nuclear weapons, and thus its 
large army was obsolete.66 Much of the country seemed to be sufficiently 
convinced of Soviet nuclear weaponry to offset any other reduction in the 
military. As a result, the reduction in manpower was interpreted as a propaganda 
ploy aimed at neutralists and Western European leftists. Aware of the public 
relations value of such a move, Dulles stressed to the press that since 1945 the U.S. 
had reduced the size of its military from 12 million to 3 million, whereas the 
Soviet military after the current reductions numbered over 4 million men.67 
Nonetheless, the reduction was substantial- particularly since so much of it had 
taken place since Stalin’s death, as the unilateral reduction of over 600,000 men 
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that that preceded it in 1955 illustrated. There was clearly no longer an emphasis 
on ‘bigger is better’, as Stalin had preached.  
Chapter Conclusion 
The administration voraciously collected all manner of intelligence on the 
nascent destalinisation campaign. Conclusions were quickly reached that Stalin’s 
image was being destroyed to consolidate the rule of the collective leadership and 
the power of the Party. Disavowing Stalin’s legacy was seen as a significant threat 
to the U.S. Events in the USSR were again evaluated in light of the worst-case 
scenario they could present to the U.S. Of course, it would be irresponsible if the 
administration did not consider these scenarios. But the focus on the ‘worst case’ 
made many in the administration disregard the very real changes in the Kremlin 
that were the result of destalinisation. To be sure, destalinisation was intended in 
part as a way of burnishing the image of Soviet Communism for export abroad, 
especially in the Third World. But the focus on such uses blurred the fact that the 
USSR was beginning to liberalise and proceed in a direction that was favourable 
to improved relations. Many in the State Department, the press, and academia 
continued to insist that destalinisation was meant as yet another ruse to 
undermine the West. To an extent, many of those who resisted the apparent 
changes: the editors of Time, Walt Rostow, and the OIR, did so because the 
concept of an unalterably aggressive and subversive USSR was necessary for the 
worldview they clung to. The image of the U.S. as defending liberty, religious 
freedom, and the free market- was developed in opposition to ‘monolithic 
communism’. The USSR sat at the apex of this conception. Destalinisation was 
incompatible with this.  
But crucially, Eisenhower and Dulles had come around to accept that the 
changes in the USSR since 1953 were more than window dressing. Since 1953 both 
Eisenhower and Dulles were rigid and doctrinaire towards any changes in the 
USSR. But the 20th Party Congress represented a tipping point in U.S. perceptions 
of the Soviet leaders and Soviet Communism more generally. They expressed of 
belief in the veracity of destalinisation. Such talk would become more common 
over the next months, even if it remained for the time being, in private. 
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Chapter 7: Changing Perceptions 
By the summer of 1956 there was increasing acceptance that Soviet 
Communism was changing and that this could no longer be ignored. This chapter 
charts the course of changing perceptions of Soviet Communism by examining 
how certain policymakers in the administration reacted to the obtainment of the 
Secret Speech. A lively debate ensued over whether the denunciation of Stalin 
amounted to a change in Soviet Communism, or whether it was once again a 
tactical manoeuvre. A concurrent argument raged over how the U.S. should 
exploit the anti-Stalin campaign to its benefit. By the end of the summer 
Eisenhower and Dulles no longer adhered to an image of the Soviets as rigid, 
doctrinaire Stalinists: they recognised the changing nature of Soviet Communism 
but maintained that it posed a danger nonetheless. 
The Speech Reaches the West  
The U.S. had been attempting to get a copy of Khrushchev’s speech since 
the 20th Party Congress, but it was not until 18 May that a copy was obtained. 
Only a few knew of its existence while it was studied for authenticity.1 Hoover 
thought the U.S. should leak it to the press, since other versions were apparently 
less effective as propaganda than the one the U.S. obtained. He asked Bohlen for 
guidance.2 Bohlen was in two minds about the wisdom of releasing the speech. 
The speech offered some clarity about current Soviet policies and could be useful 
to students of Soviet affairs. However, it could convince those less informed that 
Khrushchev and others were liberals. If the U.S. was purely after the propaganda 
value, then releasing it could hurt as much as it helped. If the purpose was to 
provide insights into Soviet policy, then Bohlen advocated releasing it through a 
non-governmental body such as the Committee for a Free Europe.3 Word had 
gotten out that the State Department had a copy of the speech and the press was 
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clamouring for its release.4 This more than anything else forced the decision to 
release it. The leak was almost certainly the work of those in the State Department 
who wanted the text released.  
The source may have been the same that spoke to Time journalists 
detailing the divisions in the administration over whether to release the speech. 
One group in the administration thought that releasing the speech would 
highlight that there had been fundamental change in the Kremlin. This group 
thought that the Soviet leaders had adopted a different “communist technique”. 
They resisted making the speech public since the new, less aggressive methods of 
the Kremlin appealed to neutralists. Releasing the speech could strengthen the 
belief of those like Nehru and Tito who believed that a fundamental change had 
taken place. It was a risk for the U.S. to promote any sort of “superficial 
interpretation” of this sort.  
A second group in the administration advocated releasing the speech on 
the grounds that it painted such a horrid picture of communism that it could only 
help the West’s cause by highlighting Stalin’s crimes and demoralising 
communists- especially in the satellites. It was particularly damaging since it 
presented communists as either “knaves” if they were part of Stalin’s crimes; or 
“fools” if they claimed not to have known of them.5 The CIA was the scene of a 
similar argument.  Jim Angleton, head of the CIA Special Operations Division, 
and who along with Frank Wisner was involved in obtaining the copy, opposed 
releasing the speech.6  
Allen Dulles overruled Angleton. He then called his brother early on 4 
June to press for its release. Furthering the sense of urgency were reports that the 
French also had a copy of the speech. It was thought better to release it in full and 
have control over how it was done, than risk the speech being released in a 
manner the U.S. could not control. Ultimately the decision came down to 
Eisenhower, who was advised to do so by both Allen and Foster Dulles. 
                                                       
4 Circular Telegram From Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, June 2, 1956, ibid., 
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Eisenhower agreed, and with footnotes prepared by the CIA, it was published in 
the New York Times that day.7  
 
Exploiting the Speech 
The U.S. quickly embarked on a campaign of saturating the Soviet Bloc 
and neutral nations with the speech: VOA broadcast it in 43 languages.8 The 
broadcasts were limited in their scope, as was USIA output, which was restricted 
to repeating press reports of the speech due to a State Department Office of Public 
Affairs ban on commentary. USIA Director Theodore Streibert knew of Dulles’ 
repeated public statements over the past months that Stalin was a product of the 
Soviet system that remained in place. Streibert wanted permission to produce 
USIA commentary along these lines.9 The limitations on content were partially an 
indication of Dulles’ cautious nature. An overenthusiastic American response 
could cause communists to unite in the face of propaganda attacks. Bohlen, 
Salisbury and even USIA deputy Director Washburn argued this to varying 
degrees. But Dulles’ reticence to allow more cutting U.S. propaganda also 
reflected his own personal conflict over the nature of destalinisation.  
The CIA was also keen on developing propaganda from the speech. All of 
it, however, focussed on highlighting the continuity between Stalin and the 
current leadership, and why there was nothing preventing another dictator.10 In 
addition, Ray Cline, who was in charge of Sino-Soviet affairs at the CIA sent 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Livingston Merchant copies of 
several critiques of the Soviet system in order to prepare methods of exploiting 
the speech. Among these were essays on “Dictatorship Versus Democracy” and 
the “Return to Leninism”. These sought to illustrate that dictatorship was 
inherent to Leninism, that Stalin was heir to Lenin’s ideas, and reasserted the 
Soviet goal of destroying capitalism. Another essay, “Khrushchev vs. 
                                                       
7 Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, June 2, 1956, 
FRUS: 1955-1957, Vol. 24, 109–110; “DeptState PR (unnumbered),” June 4, 1956, JFDP, Box 109, 
Soviet Union and Communist Party 1956, ML; “‘Khrushchev’, Beal to Williamson.” 
8 Taubman, Khrushchev, 284; “‘Khrushchev’, Beal to Williamson.” 
9 “Memcon: USIA Re Khrushchev Speech,” June 7, 1956, RG59, CDF, 761.00, Box 3506, 761.00/3-
2155, NARA; “Memo: Beam to UnderSecState,” June 27, 1956, G59, BEA, Office files of AsstSecState 
For Euro Affairs 1943-57, Box 29, OCB Committee on Soviet Problems III, NARA. 
10 “Topics for Research on Problems Resulting from the 20th CPSU,” March 1956, CREST, CIA- 
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Khrushchev”, dug up various contradictory Khrushchev quotations.11 Yet despite 
this focus on propaganda, the CIA did ask what destalinisation meant for Soviet 
domestic and foreign policies and how effective liberalisation measures had been, 
both in the USSR and in the satellites.12 This indicated an appreciation of 
destalinisation as more than a tactical manoeuvre to be discredited. Propaganda 
was only one response while the CIA determined how destalinisation would pan 
out. 
Despite the enthusiasm of those under him in the State Department and in 
the CIA, by the end of June Foster Dulles remained hesitant to allow the 
propagandists in the administration free reign. He recognised that the Secret 
Speech gave the U.S. a once in a lifetime propaganda opportunity that could 
“...fragmentize the wall of granite of the International Communist Party”. His 
ideas for doing were based on letting the speech speak for itself: distribution of 
the speech was the primary vehicle for exploitation. Indeed, though Dulles’ staff 
and undersecretaries all agreed that the speech offered excellent material for the 
USIA, they could only agree that the State Department, CIA and USIA should 
coordinate on the matter, while SWGS researched lines of exploitation.13 The State 
Department was responsible for tying its own hands due to the blanket ban on 
original comment on the speech. The reasoning was that the “speech affair” was 
unfolding in a direction beneficial to the U.S. without any interference, and 
further comment only risked derailing this. Yet some like Beam came to agree 
with Streibert that the time had come to go beyond a passive strategy and draw 
attention to certain aspects of the speech that the press had not addressed. Among 
these were the conditions that could be further improved in the Soviet system and 
Stalin’s misdeeds not specifically mentioned in Khrushchev’s speech.14 
Thus, almost a month after the U.S. obtained a copy of the speech the only 
agreement in the administration was for further study to be done. This 
corroborated Dulles’ diatribe against ‘over-coordination’ inside the State 
Department. But it also highlighted the lack of forward planning. The 
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administration knew that it would get a copy of the speech eventually, but failed 
to make any plans on what to do when they did. Thus for all Eisenhower’s 
claimed infatuation with organisation that he garnered through his career as a 
staff officer, he failed to direct the organisation he created at a time of incredible 
opportunity for the administration, both in terms of improving relations with the 
Soviets, or, alternatively, for exploiting destalinisation. Yet there is another, 
complementary, possibility: Dulles recognised that destalinisation was 
progressing in a direction favourable to the U.S. It could lead the Soviets towards 
the liberalisation he predicted, and thus he restrained efforts to exploit the speech 
for propaganda effect. 
The Analysis of the Speech 
After the speech was released, Dulles’ public statements reflected his 
divided thoughts over destalinisation. He repeatedly stressed that Stalinism was 
the result of the Soviet system, and the system remained in tact. The West must, 
therefore, be on guard against the emergence of another Stalin figure.15 Yet even 
these public statements were now two-sided. He expressed that destalinisation 
could result in liberalisation. This reflected the variations in his thinking. To be 
sure, in previous years Dulles admitted the possibility of change in the Soviet 
system, but in reality he was only leaving the rhetorical door open - he saw no 
chance of it and consistently acted to block any policies that could weaken, or 
even be seen to weaken, the U.S. cold war position. But after the 20th Party 
Congress Dulles persisted in mentioning the possibility of liberalisation in the 
USSR. Of course he was hardly sanguine about it. He repeated the State 
Department line that violence was inherent in Leninism, that the current leaders 
were Stalin’s accomplices, and that the Soviets could quickly revert to Stalinist 
tactics. As for Soviet objectives, he pointed out the obvious fact that the Soviets 
remained communists. The speech was only a way of improving their image.16 For 
these reasons the U.S. could ill afford to let up on its defence. Yet in almost every 
statement or speech he gave in June 1956 he presented the dichotomy of 
liberalisation in the USSR, and the need for the West to be cautious, but open to it, 
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along with the need for the West to maintain vigilance lest destalinisation fail to 
pan out.17 For example: 
[The] fact that the Soviet rulers now denounce much of the past gives 
cause for hope, because it demonstrates that the liberalizing influences 
from within and without can bring about peaceful change…[The] 
yearnings of the subject peoples are not to be satisfied merely by a 
rewriting of past history. Thus we can hope for ultimate changes more 
fundamental than any that have so far been revealed.18 
The allowance for Soviet liberalisation did not remove the need for the 
Western alliance and he worried constantly about Western unity. He remained 
concerned that the Soviet ‘new look’ was concocted to divide the West. His 
emphasis on European unity did little to help the opinions of him in Western 
Europe, especially among the Belgians and French. After years of Dulles’ refrains 
that nothing was changing in the USSR and that the West needed to maintain its 
defence many viewed Dulles as a impractical moralist who regarded the Soviets 
as “devils with whom any traffic is the acme of unholiness”.19  The irony of Dulles’ 
doubt of Soviet changes was to increase divisions between the U.S. and many 
Europeans, the very thing he was trying to prevent.  
However, Dulles knew that it was Adenauer’s opinion that mattered more 
than those of the French and Belgians. This explained, from a foreign policy 
standpoint, his hedging over the promise of destalinisation. The FRG was a key 
ally, and Dulles was keen not to alarm Adenauer. Adenauer was adamant that 
destalinisation was simply a tactic and the objectives of the Soviets remained 
“world communism”. Peaceful coexistence was a “passing interim stage”. 
According to Adenauer, the Russians had been expansionist for centuries, and 
destalinisation was not about to change that. Destalinisation was part of a larger 
Soviet soft line that was successful in appealing to neutralists across the globe. It 
was also dividing Europe and the U.S. This was especially dangerous for 
Germany, and Adenauer claimed destalinisation was also part of a larger plan to 
prevent reunification.  
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Time correspondents echoed Adenauer. They were critical of those who 
interpreted the speech to mean there were changes afoot in the USSR. But the 
editorial line had shifted: the mistake now was not insisting that there was 
change, but it was in assuming it was good. Time admitted to a change in strategy, 
but the overall objectives of the Kremlin remained the same as under Stalin. The 
Soviets were still intent to “swallow more and more of the world by one means or 
another.”20 
Naturally the interpretation among Time correspondents was among the 
most conservative of Kremlin watchers. It was Bohlen, on the ground in Moscow, 
who offered a more grounded take on the 20th Party Congress and destalinisation. 
Whereas Dulles struggled to reconcile his long held perceptions of the Soviets 
with the developments of the Secret Speech and destalinisation, Bohlen had no 
such hindrances. He had insisted since 1953 that there was serious change afoot in 
the Kremlin, and therefore the Secret Speech was not the shock to him it was to 
many other U.S. policymakers.21 His perspective in Moscow and vast Soviet 
experience made him reach different conclusions to those in Washington. The 
idea that destalinisation was a last minute decision was commonly heard among 
the State Department and White House. Indeed, Sovietologists provided a litany 
of reasons for the Secret Speech. These varied from repetitions of the idea that the 
current leaders killed Stalin in order to prevent a Third World War, to suggestions 
that Mikoyan’s earlier speech to the Congress- which was very critical of Stalin- 
that pushed Khrushchev into giving a harsher speech than he originally planned.22 
Bohlen vehemently disagreed with these hypotheses. It was unlikely that 
the Soviet leadership would embark on such a dangerous course without greater 
planning. Indeed, Bohlen noted a meeting of Soviet historians in January that had 
agreed on the same revisions as the 20th Party Congress, though without naming 
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Stalin directly. The meeting involved over 600 historians from across the USSR, 
making it unlikely that it could have been arranged on short notice, especially for 
such a sensitive topic. Both of the main speakers at the conference also referred to 
prior Party instructions as the reasons for the revisions announced.23  
In Bohlen’s mind the Secret Speech, and destalinisation more generally, 
were the logical consequences of developments since Stalin’s death. The new 
policies introduced since 1953 required at least implied criticism of Stalin. The 
new leaders could hardly embark on different polices without at some point 
addressing the underlying ideology that had formed the basis of Soviet politics 
for over 20 years. To Bohlen, it was necessary to challenge Stalin since the policies 
that had developed under him were based on dictatorial rule. If collective 
leadership were to work, then such a “frontal attack” was practically a necessity. 
This was not to say that there were not differences of opinion inside the 
Presidium on how to proceed. Nevertheless, Bohlen totally rejected the idea that 
destalinisation was somehow a last minute decision prior to the 20th Party 
Congress.24 
Bohlen’s depth of knowledge about the USSR allowed him to provide 
perspective on the events of the 20th Party Congress. He ordered the embassy to 
compile a series of despatches covering the extent of destalinisation thus far in 
science, philosophy and law. But most crucially the embassy found that Stalin’s 
figure in Soviet history would heavily revised, but not eliminated entirely since a 
number of key policies developed under him remained in force. It was likely that 
Stalin would be reduced to the level of a pupil of Lenin. But the embassy also 
predicted that Soviet history more generally would be re-written. Stalin’s ‘Short 
Course’ on the history of the CPSU, his biography, and his history of the Great 
Patriotic War would all need to be withdrawn or heavily revised. This would lead 
to a rise in the importance of Lenin for Soviet history.25 This was part of the re-
emphasis on Lenin that Bohlen had noted in domestic Soviet life, and Rostow 
feared as part of a larger global campaign to burnish the Soviet ‘brand’.  
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Within a month of his statements about communism being a “wall of 
granite”26, Dulles told the press that as a result of the Secret Speech international 
communism was “in a state of perplexity and internal odds.” For Dulles, the 
Secret Speech did not correctly address the source of communism’s ills. He 
reiterated that Stalin was merely a symptom of the greater problem: communism 
itself. Nevertheless, the Secret Speech led Dulles to acknowledge that the Soviets 
inadvertently distanced themselves from international communism. He did not 
think that the dissolution of the Comintern or recent end of the Cominform was 
what led to the practical difference between Moscow and abroad. Rather, the 
Secret Speech had shaken their ability to control foreign communist parties. 
Destalinisation meant that the Kremlin was no longer reliant on “terrorism” to 
influence parties abroad.27 What was once thought a monolithic communist 
menace was now a fragmented movement. This brought his thinking more in line 
with his brother, who had made similar comments in March28, and underscored 
how far his own thoughts had come since April. He was now publicly admitting 
that his previous perceptions of the Soviets were misplaced. 
But the apparent disunity of international communism did not preclude 
suspicions of a greater Soviet plan.  Speaking to the NSC Allen Dulles ruminated 
“[W]hat are the Soviets actually driving at?” Both Nixon and Harold Stassen 
believed that the ‘confusion’ of the Soviets was merely a Kremlin plot. Allen 
Dulles would not go this far- he thought there was genuine confusion- but that 
there was a greater meaning to it than was presently apparent. Further illustrating 
how far his thinking had evolved, Foster Dulles now seemed to be the least 
conspiratorially inclined toward the Soviets of the NSC members. He sharply 
criticised the tendency of many in the U.S. to see the Soviets as “infallible” and the 
assumption that all of their actions were part of a larger conspiracy. He felt the 
Soviets were merely trying to make the best of a bad situation, though he did note 
that the Soviets could still snatch a “victory” from destalinisation.29 The contrast 
with Foster Dulles’ comments about the Soviets in previous years was striking. 
Foster Dulles was no longer presenting the Soviets as cloak and dagger 
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communists with every move planned out in advance. To a degree, he was giving 
their actions the benefit of the doubt.  
Dulles certainly felt that the Soviets were still a threat. But this did not 
mean that the U.S. should dismiss the changes that resulted from destalinisation. 
Instead, the administration should resist the tendency to view the USSR as 
perpetually unchanging. This was a monumental statement from Dulles. He 
thought the pressing question was whether the U.S. should continue to ostracise 
the men in the Kremlin, or, help them along the path towards liberalisation. 
Dulles was inclined towards the latter. Pressing his point, he told the NSC that the 
changes in the USSR were both genuine and meaningful. At any rate, the allies 
were taking the changes seriously, which necessitated the U.S. do so as well for 
the sake of unity.30 
The events since the 20th Party Congress added up to enough to change 
Dulles’ mind about the possibly of change in the USSR. A threshold was reached: 
whereas previously any number of Soviet gestures and policy changes since 
Stalin’s death were dismissed as ‘tactical’ or ‘Soviet ploys’, Dulles was now 
convinced that destalinisation was the real deal. Khrushchev and the other 
leaders were serious about eliminating Stalinism. This did not remove the Soviet 
threat but it did alter it in a direction that could be beneficial to U.S. policy.  
Dulles’ statements differed depending on the audience. In private, such as 
with the NSC, he was openly optimistic about destalinisation. But in public, his 
comments remained hedged; though he acknowledged the possibility of change, 
he always encouraged western unity towards the Soviets or emphasised that 
western policies were the source of the current Soviet spasms.31 
A Quickening Pace of Change 
While Dulles’ acknowledgement of change in the USSR proceeded the 
Kremlin pressed ahead with destalinisation. In late June it published a number of 
documents written by Lenin. Among these were notes of his written shortly 
before his death, and a letter to the Party Congress of December 1922. Stalin had 
kept these secret, but in the context of destalinisation the Soviet leadership found 
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them very useful. Lenin’s criticism of Stalin lent enormous credibility to the anti-
Stalin campaign. The documents illustrated Lenin’s treatment of his opponents- 
Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev- as “humane”. This was interpreted by the State 
Department as a method of gathering historical precedent for the current leaders’ 
code of conduct.32 
Yet this openness and criticism of Stalin created problem for the Kremlin. 
Party discipline needed to be upheld. In order to clearly draw the line between 
accepted anti-Stalin criticism and excessive anti-Party attacks the Central 
Committee published “On Overcoming the Personality Cult and its 
Consequences” in Pravda on 30 June. Bohlen thought it meant to answer questions 
generated by the Secret Speech, for instance: how was the Stalin cult possible in 
the Soviet system? Why did the other leaders not remove Stalin? The decree 
explained that the historical necessities of capitalist encirclement, class enemies 
and rapid industrialisation required extreme discipline. This, in combination with 
Stalin’s personality, allowed him to become dictator. Furthermore, the decree 
argued that Stalin’s crimes did not come to light until after his death.33 
The Soviet leaders were careful to emphasise that the cult of personality 
was not implicit to the Soviet system- obviously since they sought reform it rather 
than abolish it. But they also took Dulles’ comments into consideration. Bohlen 
noted that the decree also listed the support of the Chinese, French and British 
Communist Parties in the anti-Stalin campaign. This was key: if destalinisation 
was only short term or tactical, there would not have any reason to go to such 
lengths to offer justification and gain support.34 Bohlen felt the Soviets were more 
apt to tell the truth in publications, and this appeared to be the case with their 
assertion that destalinisation was not a hasty decision, but rather was a process 
that began with Stalin’s death. The decree was aimed not only for domestic Soviet 
consumption, but also at foreign communist parties. The varied and confused 
response of a number of communist leaders abroad was not a surprise to the 
Soviet leaders. The decree was meant to clarify destalinisation, but the fact that 
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the Soviets went ahead with destalinisation apparently without consulting or 
informing foreign communist parties highlighted the reduced influence of the 
Kremlin abroad. As Bohlen viewed it, this was part of a larger shift by the 
Kremlin that was underpinned by the ideological changes codified at the 20th 
Party Congress: the emphasis on national roads to socialism and the equal 
treatment of communist parties meant more independence for the satellites, but 
also less control for the Kremlin. The Soviets hoped to improve their image by 
liberalising. Only time would tell if this plan would bear fruit.35 
Compared with the analysis of the Decree in Washington, Bohlen was 
optimistic. An intelligence memorandum prepared for Dulles reiterated much of 
what Bohlen said, but added that the resolution was “superficial, transparent and 
hackneyed”. Dulles’ intelligence staff informed him that it illustrated how hard 
the Soviet leaders would find it to explain Stalinism so long as they prevented 
discussion of the Soviet system as a whole.36 Deputy head of DRS, Boris Klosson, 
leaked to Time that the Soviet attempt to stem the criticism of destalinisation 
would fail so long as the Soviets refused to admit that there were no checks on 
power inherent in the Soviet system.37 Those under Dulles continued to push a 
more rigid view of the Soviet system, but Dulles had since adopted, contrary to 
his intelligence staff and the head of the Russian section, a much more pliable 
stance towards destalinisation- at least in private. This was no small change. 
Ironically, while Dulles was opening up this thinking about destalinisation 
and the prospect of change in the USSR, Kennan was in many ways doing the 
opposite. His reports to the CIA stressed the Stalinist nature of the Central 
Committee decree, citing the explanation of Stalin’s ability to consolidate power 
as due to “capitalist encirclement” as a thoroughly Stalinist excuse. Kennan felt 
that the apparent differences in foreign policy between the current leadership and 
Stalin were tactical.38  
Yet the differences in action in terms of Soviet relationships with foreign 
communist parties were significant. If anything they were one of the most 
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concrete examples of the break the current Soviet leaders were making with 
Stalinism. The CIA noted the tension that the Secret Speech had produced, 
especially between Moscow and European communist parties. The Chinese 
Communist Party was also dismayed- publishing a half-hearted endorsement of 
destalinisation. Moscow was criticised for its failure to inform foreign communist 
parties of destalinisation the lack of direction given after the Secret Speech. More 
damningly, there was a chorus demanding more to be done to prevent future 
abuses of power. To guarantee  ‘socialist legality’ it was not simply enough to 
simply acknowledge Stalin’s crimes. In this vein, Western communist parties 
noted that the Soviet leaders could not be absolved of all crimes- at the very least 
they did nothing to stop Stalin. 
The CIA thought that Western communist parties were generating 
centrifugal forces on their own. The Soviet model was widely acknowledged as a 
blueprint. However, it could no longer be so rigidly followed due to varying 
conditions abroad. The CIA thought the Soviets acknowledged as much in 
allowing national roads to socialism, but still felt they could maintain control by 
allowing national adjustments to the Soviet model that would prevent the rise of 
genuine splits. In the satellites, loyalty would be guaranteed through economic 
dependency. Although the Soviet plan itself was extremely risky, the CIA found 
the situation very dangerous for the West. The danger from communist expansion 
could increase due the new Soviet relationship with the communist movement 
generally. The CIA insisted a more flexible approach was less threatening and 
thereby more difficult to counter. The CIA thought destalinisation was created a 
“post-Stalin concept of victory”: socialism would be achieved in individual 
nations according to national conditions, and these nations would then be 
gradually merged together until they lost all national identity. This polycentric 
strategy was well suited to this relaxed atmosphere in Europe that the Soviets 
were fostering. 39 
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The CIA recognised that the CPSU was moving away from Stalinist style 
relationships with foreign communist parties. This was an implicit 
acknowledgement of destalinisation. Yet it drew alarming conclusions. It insisted 
that the Soviets had not lost control of the communist movement. The satellites 
were so tightly bound together that Soviet leaders would not countenance major 
deviation. Thus the ‘national roads’ line was aimed at the developing world (but 
would have its greatest impacts in Eastern Europe). Allen Dulles noted that the 
Soviets found themselves in a bind: they needed to continue destalinisation, but 
also needed to put a brake on the debates surrounding it that could inadvertently 
hurt them.40 Asserting that the Soviets had control over the communist movement 
abroad, but highlighting the fact that the Soviets were unable to frame the debate 
around destalinisation meant that the CIA itself was unsure of how events were 
proceeding. Credible intelligence was severely lacking, but destalinisation was of 
such monumental importance that the CIA was compelled to analyse the 
situation, even if that meant coming to conclusions that were often muddled, or 
worse, based in part on out-of-date perceptions. Yet the CIA was no longer asking 
if there was change, but rather how the change would hurt the USSR.  
The lack of certainty in CIA opinions was even more apparent when 
different views were considered. Bohlen reported in August that destalinisation 
was proceeding smoothly; he specifically denied that there was any atmosphere 
of crisis. The London embassy cabled that there was no instability in the Kremlin: 
destalinisation was a “hot potato”, but Khrushchev was firmly in charge.41 In a 
series of reports that specifically evaluated the effects of destalinisation on the 
organisation of the CPSU, the embassy concluded that contrary to CIA reports of 
‘runaway’ destalinisation or leadership instability, destalinisation was increasing 
the power of the Party. Though destalinisation began in 1953, the Secret Speech 
had initiated a new level of openness and directness in the Party. This was 
deliberate. The secret police were firmly placed in a subordinate position and the 
discipline enforced by Stalin was relaxed. As a result, the leadership realised that 
the Party itself needed to be transformed into a more powerful instrument of 
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persuasion and discipline. But in order to do this the Soviet leaders needed to 
introduce a limited amount of democracy in the lower levels of the Party. This 
would eliminate some of the harmful practices of the Stalin era such as 
whitewashing reports and hiding shortcomings. This would encourage initiative 
and Party. But the embassy saw that this new openness was limited to lower 
levels of the Party.42 
Despite their rocky history of disagreement, DRS echoed much of what the 
Moscow embassy said, specifically noting that destalinisation must be viewed 
against the reality of Stalin’s absence, and the need for the new leaders to rule 
collectively while avoiding the practices of the Stalin era. The decision to change 
from passive destalinisation to the assertive form that came after the Secret 
Speech could have been for several reasons, perhaps something unforeseen 
happened during the opening days of the 20th Party Congress. DRS acknowledged 
that Bohlen and the Moscow embassy disagreed with this idea. But they also 
admitted that the departure could have been due to a need to clarify what was 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Stalinism. It could also have been born of a need to remove 
Stalinism among second-level party leaders, which remained rife, and thus avoid 
future accusations of deviation if present destalinisation policies failed.43  
Such conclusions illustrated a level of convergence between those in 
Moscow and Washington. But the reality was that differing views on the 
progression of destalinisation caused policy to languish. Eisenhower and Dulles 
faced the challenge of reconciling their changed perceptions in the face of 
disagreement from their advisors and other experts. In this situation maintaining 
the course of caution was the best way forward.  
Press Reactions to the Secret Speech 
The release of the Secret Speech caused a revival of the scepticism in the 
media that characterised the initial response to the 20th Party Congress. The State 
Department kept a thorough recording of this. Commentators claimed that the 
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Secret Speech itself was proof that although Stalin was gone, terror was still used 
in the USSR. A common refrain was that the Secret Speech was designed to 
exculpate the Soviet leaders from Stalin’s crimes, but it failed to condemn political 
terror in general. Indeed, the New York Herald Tribune paraphrased Dulles that “a 
change of tune does not indicate a change of heart” and that the speech did not 
change the general attitude of the Soviets towards repression and violence.44 To be 
sure, doubt was a common theme among journalists and public figures, which 
stressed that the U.S. must remain vigilant until there was a “…genuine lessening 
of the dictatorial powers wielded by [the] Soviet leaders.” Others emphasised that 
the new Soviet line was only window dressing. Senator Bridges agreed, noting 
that nothing indicated a change in the goal of world communism. The Wall Street 
Journal was among the most outspoken, stating that “[n]either a hint of mutiny, 
nor dropping the pilot is proof enough that Russia’s destination is still not world 
domination” and that the current liberalisation was easily reversed. Walter 
Lippmann wrote that the present relaxation would only last so long as there were 
no internal or external crises for the Soviets. The Scripps-Howard papers were 
naturally critical, arguing, “it takes more than an anti-Stalin speech to convert 
barbarians.” To an extent these feelings were a reflection of public scepticism of 
destalinisation. 63 percent of those asked felt that there was no chance that the 
Soviets would change their policies and make peace with the West in the coming 
years- the highest number since Stalin’s death.45 Yet there were positive 
sentiments: many voiced their agreement in the decision to release the speech.  
But the knowledge of Khrushchev’s actual words, combined with the 
persistence of destalinisation since 1953 caused a number of observers to conclude 
that the U.S. needed to pay more heed to change afoot in the USSR. 
Destalinisation resulted in a “vastly differently Russia to deal with”. Even 
commentators that were critical of destalinisation admitted that even if the Soviets 
had not abandoned their objectives of creating chaos, this did not preclude 
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changes taking place in the Kremlin. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch emphasised that 
the Soviet Union was far from democratic, but that the new line represented a 
serious change from Stalinism. The reaction of the administration was criticised as 
well. Christian Science Monitor editorials argued that the “State Department 
reaction that nothing has change about the USSR is an oversimplification” and 
that an attachment to “fixed ideas” was preventing the administration from 
recognising the changes in the USSR. The Boston Herald warned that the U.S. 
should be weary of its own propaganda- lest the Soviets “turn over a new leaf” 
and the U.S. fail to see it.46 
The consensus had changed. No longer was everything the Soviets did 
suspect. A number of outlets, such as the Boston Herald and Christian Science 
Monitor noted the importance of not maintaining old perceptions out of mere 
habit. This represented an important change in the history of the Cold War thus 
far: a point at which it was popularly recognised that old perceptions of the 
Soviets as expansionist and devious was not necessarily the most beneficial way 
of viewing the situation for U.S. policy. In fact the change in media opinion was 
reflective of Dulles’ own changed opinion of destalinisation. Though he still 
harboured a great deal of hesitation towards Soviet gestures and public doubt 
towards destalinisation, he no longer discounted it wholesale.  
‘No Basic Change’ No More? 
Dulles’ own divisions over the change in the USSR reflected a greater 
cleavage within both the government and the U.S. in general about the nature of 
destalinisation. The Secret Speech caused a debate over whether the events in the 
USSR were indicative of serious changes that could impact policy. These broadly 
fell into two groups. The first acknowledged the scope of the changes wrought by 
destalinisation and encouraged the Eisenhower administration to take advantage 
of them to improve relations, or at least to exploit it for propaganda purposes. The 
second group remained wedded to the idea that nothing had changed in the 
USSR, and that destalinisation was a red herring. They relied on the interpretation 
that since Soviet objectives had not changed there had been no fundamental 
change in the position of the Soviets. This ‘fundamentalist’ group repeated ad 
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nauseaum that there was ‘no basic change’ in Soviet objectives, and as such, there 
should be no change in U.S. policy towards the USSR.  
By the middle of 1956 the Eisenhower administration acknowledged that 
destalinisation necessitated a rethink of existing national security policies, 
particularly those dealing with the Satellites.47 But this in itself did not mean there 
was a fundamental shift in how U.S. viewed destalinisation. Rather, it was the 
modified views of Dulles and others that illustrated this change. Yet given the 
anxiety and tension of the Cold War, it could hardly be expected that anyone 
would adopt radically altered perceptions of the Soviet threat in such a relatively 
small period of time: Dulles’ hedged statements bore witness to this. Rather, the 
devil was in the details. Statements by some members of the administration, and 
some outside it, highlighted the movement toward accepting the post-Stalin 
reality in the Kremlin.  
Harrison Salisbury noted “[t]oward the outside world Russia has 
substituted the Big Smile for the Big Frown.”48 He contended that the new Soviet 
manner evident since 1953: a lighter touch domestically and a more “pleasant 
flexible manner” in foreign policy, amounted to a Soviet “New Look”. But he was 
quick to question whether something fundamental had changed since Stalin’s 
death; was Moscow “...no longer working for the world-wide victory of 
communism?” In doing so he highlighted what many in the U.S. considered the 
only thing that a fundamental change could be: the complete abandonment of 
communism. Salisbury himself thought that the Soviet leaders had postponed 
their goals of communist conquest, and even altered their basic theories behind it. 
Yet they still believed that communism would triumph. Salisbury rhetorically 
queried whether this amounted to a ‘fundamental’ change. He pointed to the end 
of hostilities in Korea, the lessening of tension of Europe and Soviet development 
of nuclear weapons, and the persistent development of light industry (even after 
Malenkov’s departure) as harbingers of “big change” in the USSR. Salisbury 
painted the picture of a drastically changed landscape since 1953. He conceded 
that long-term Soviet goals were likely unchanged. But in the short term the new 
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Soviet posture vastly improved the situation- and the destruction of the Stalin 
myth was most important in this regard. Salisbury emphasised that nothing was 
more important than the fact that one-man rule was eliminated.49 
In a similar vein Louis Halle told Adlai Stevenson that there were two 
groups of thought about destalinisation. One was the “all-or-nothing boys” who 
would only accept total surrender from the Soviets as any sort of meaningful 
change. Halle posited Dulles as the leader of this group, which served to highlight 
the nature of Dulles’ public statements regarding the Soviet Union since the 20th 
Party Congress, in contrast to his private ruminations in which he considered the 
changes real. Halle had no way of knowing that he was wrong, and that Dulles’ 
views were actually converging with his own. Consequently, he blamed the 
resistance to acknowledge (openly) that there was real change in the USSR on 
Dulles, and disparaged Eisenhower for simply following Dulles’ lead.  
The second group was the “half a cake is better than none boys”, who 
considered the changes to be positive, even if they did not alter ultimate Soviet 
objectives. Halle included himself in this group as he told Stevenson:  
Of course Moscow hasn’t changed its objective of a Communist world. 
We can’t expect that it will- at least until it decides to commit suicide at 
our behest. What counts, however, is not so much a regime’s ultimate 
objective as what it does for its realization- i.e., its “tactics.” 
Halle likened the change in Soviet tactics to the spread and objectives of Islam. It 
too had tried violence to spread its message, but this did not prevent the U.S. 
from cooperating with Muslim states. The USSR was not about to abandon its 
objectives, no matter the strength of the free world. But the Soviets could settle for 
certain limits and this seemed to be happening. Halle stressed that the answer 
now was not to press for a total abandonment of communism. This would only 
backfire. The Soviets would only give up communism through defeat via nuclear 
war. In this case, Halle judged it better to take the path of Islam and let the Soviets 
keep their objectives.50 He thought that the administration made a hash of the 
opportunities that destalinisation presented. The hard-line utterances of Dulles 
since 1953 were especially counterproductive since they only provided fodder for 
                                                       
49 Harrison Salisbury, “‘Russia Since Stalin,’” June 1956, HSP Box 173, Folder 5, CUL. 
50 Of course Halle had no way of knowing that Dulles’ views were beginning to converge with his. 
Consequently, he blamed the resistance to acknowledge (openly) that there was real change in the 
USSR on Dulles, and disparaged Eisenhower for simply following Dulles’ lead. “Letter: Halle to 
Stevenson,” July 9, 1956. 
Chapter 7: Changing Perceptions 
 
 
213 
those in the Kremlin who wanted to continue along Stalinist lines. Instead, Halle 
recommended that Stevenson say he would invite Khrushchev to the U.S. to meet 
’normal’ Americans. But he also advised that Stevenson be firm with Khrushchev 
at the same time, and explain that the U.S. was easy to get along with, so long as 
the USSR abandoned Stalinism.51 Though he was in contact with Robert Bowie, his 
impact was hard to gauge. But he may have helped change Bowie’s mind, and 
through this conduit, Dulles’. Either way, Halle’s thoughts highlighted that 
recognition of the scope of destalinisation was occurring outside the 
administration in other elite political circles.  
Even the most reticent to accept any change in the Kremlin were coming 
around. In examining the Soviet visit to the UK in April, the OIR highlighted that 
the Soviet leaders were utilising personal contacts with foreign governments to 
promote a respectable image of the Soviet regime and promote their peaceful 
intentions. Of course the OIR discounted the possibility that the Soviets were 
engaged in the sort of respectable diplomacy that was practiced in the West, 
instead suspecting ulterior motives. Nevertheless, implicit in the OIR’s conclusion 
was recognition of change on the part of the Soviet leaders and their methods.52 
Gone were the days of Molotov and nyet.  
It was this sort of begrudging acknowledgement that was recognisable in 
the State Department over the latter half of 1956. Reports still commonly cited the 
danger the USSR posed, but now freely highlighted the changes underway in the 
USSR. A statement written for Robert Murphy in his appearance before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee was typical. It emphasised a number of changes in the 
Soviet system: improvements in living conditions, more political flexibility, and a 
reduction in police power. In foreign policy, it argued that Stalin’s policies had 
been negative for the USSR. Thus, the current line of coexistence was a step away 
from that- as the rapprochement with Tito illustrated.  
These changes were identified as remnants of Stalinism that hurt the 
Soviet system in general. As such, they were not made out of any humanitarian 
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motives. The State Department noticed the liberalising nature of the changes. 
However, it concluded that:  
...the evident purpose is to bolster rather than change fundamentals of the 
system…generally, Stalinist methods have been put aside in favor of a 
more flexible and imaginative, but no less vigorous, drive to oust U.S. 
influence from the world between us and the USSR...53 
Thus the State Department, whilst recognising the reforms that the Kremlin had 
embarked upon, was limited in how far it would admit they changed the Soviet 
threat. Since the fundamental objectives of the USSR were unchanged, then the 
U.S. must remain weary. This was precisely the interpretation that Halle railed 
against: minimising the changes that were taking place due to the fact that the 
Soviets remained communist meant that the U.S. could not adjust its posture to 
take into account these very changes. Nevertheless, Murphy’s statement reflected 
a new level of candour on the part of the State Department. As a statement 
written for Congress it is questionable whether it was an accurate depiction of 
high-level thinking. It is entirely possible that Murphy overstated the unchanged 
nature of Soviet objectives in order to prevent sounding too favourable towards 
destalinisation. Other than Dulles, Murphy’s statement is the highest-ranking 
documentation from the State Department that a questioning acceptance of the 
changes in the USSR was spreading. To be sure, this part of a longer term change 
in mindset toward the Soviet Union that would prove to have profound 
repercussions.  
Yet there was still a great deal of embedded scepticism of any action the 
Soviets took. Dulles himself was unconvinced with the recent Soviet reduction in 
forces. Deborah Welch Larson cites this as an instance to prove her larger point 
that concessions made by adversaries are discarded if they are easily reversible. 
Dulles identified the troop reductions in just this way.54 Yet there is an important 
distinction between the reduction in the size of the Soviet army and the 
ideological changes wrought by destalinisation. Unlike the troop reductions, 
destalinisation could not be easily reversed. There was no doubt that the Soviets 
were adept at modifying their doctrine to fit circumstances, but destalinisation 
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was a vastly larger undertaking than Lenin’s New Economic Policy, the embrace 
of Popular Fronts, or even Malenkov’s abortive emphasis on consumer goods. 
Destalinisation combined structural reforms to both the state and economy with 
its most powerful effect: the destruction of Stalin as a symbol. Such distinctions 
had been brought to Dulles’ attention since July 1953. He consistently rejected 
Soviet changes as tactical until the 20th Party Congress, which was a milestone for 
doctrinal changes and destalinisation, not for more tangible changes like military 
reductions. Consequently Dulles reassessed his stance toward the USSR.  
Others were not so sure. Adenauer felt that destalinisation made the 
Soviets more dangerous than ever, and that it was merely a plot to lull western 
vigilance. Publicly Dulles continued his line that the U.S. must remain on guard, 
but he was torn between allies like Adenauer, who thought that the Soviets were 
more dangerous than ever, and others like French Foreign Minister Pineau, who 
declared he was ready to accept the Soviet ‘new look’ at “face value”. In the 
American press, comments like Pineau’s were thrashed for their naïveté. As a 
result, Dulles found himself in the position of having to placate not only various 
allies, but also a powerful faction of the U.S. media, which remained hostile to the 
idea that the Soviets were becoming less of a threat. The harsh reaction of much of 
the press to the Soviet military reductions also contributed to his reticence to 
publicly acknowledge its veracity, even if, as previously mentioned, he did feel it 
was genuine. 55  
As such, the position Dulles of in public continued to be one of scepticism. 
His speeches cautiously welcomed the changes in the USSR, but stressed that they 
did not prevent the return of Stalinism. Dulles publicly concluded that only 
democracy could prevent the rise of another Stalin. He continued to refrain that 
the Soviets were only changing their positions because previous ones had failed. 
He cited Yugoslavia as the paramount example of Stalinist foreign policy failure, 
followed by a volte-face under the current leaders. Playing to his domestic 
audience, Dulles emphasised his desire for the Soviets to unify Germany and 
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leave the Satellites.56 But despite these statements, Dulles introduced a startling 
degree of optimism, as the following exchange at a press conference illustrated:  
Q: Mr. Secretary...can we derive from that you feel this transformation in 
the Soviet Union may well alter Soviet aggression that has been so 
troublesome over the years? 
A: ...I believe the forces that are now working are going to prove to be 
irresistible. That does not mean that will happen today or tomorrow...but 
I believe this second post-war decade in which we are will see these new 
forces take charge of the situation and that we can really hopefully look 
forward to a transformation of the international scene.57 
Traditional historiography paints Dulles as a dour figure, and certainly 
not one given to sunny outlooks. This makes it important to note the instances 
such as these when Dulles was optimistic. He further acknowledged the new 
Soviet line in the wake of the Poznan riots. Conferring with Eisenhower at his 
Gettysburg farm he noted the dilemma the Soviets were in: their ‘new course’ 
relied on liberalisation to win over the satellites. But after Poznan, the Soviets 
were stuck between allowing liberalisation to go further, which was a slippery 
slope, and reverting to “Stalinist style” repression. If they chose the latter, Dulles 
said, they would forfeit any gains that they had made with the West as a result of 
destalinisation.58 This statement was revelatory: Dulles noted that Stalinism would 
have to be “reverted” to, and admitted the gains as a result of the changes of 
destalinisation. In private Dulles had come to accept the reality of change in the 
USSR. 
The State Department continued to reject the Soviet changes and avoid 
any expression of optimism in public. Instead, both internal documents and 
public statements reflected the same level of doubt in the Soviet changes as they 
had since the 20th Party Congress, and indeed since 1953. The onus remained on 
the fact that worldwide communism remained the Soviet objective, that the 
current leaders were “Stalin’s progeny”. Indeed, the State Department still clung 
to the idea that foreign communist parties were beholden completely to Moscow.59 
Even if there was a wider trend in the State Department to explore destalinisation 
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from a U.S. perspective, to do so was dangerous. Given Dulles’ sensitivity to 
Congressional opinion, the State Department had little to gain and much to lose 
by altering their public stance towards destalinisation. The Bureau of Public 
Affairs (BPA) knew as much. Polls found a great deal of scepticism toward the 
Soviet “new look” among the public. The BPA noted that some newspapers 
encouraged the State Department to be more proactive in fostering freedom in the 
Soviet bloc, though the Christian Science Monitor presciently discouraged any 
moves that could encourage resistance behind the Iron Curtain that the U.S. could 
not actively support. Indeed, Dulles’ public scepticism of destalinisation, and of 
other Soviet actions such as the reduction in forces, drew praise among much of 
the press.60 Such public opinion would have militated any inclination to publicly 
acknowledge the reality of destalinisation. Indeed, in October Murphy 
maintained the line that there was little change of relevance for the U.S. He 
admitted that the USSR had changed since Stalin’s death, but then fell back on the 
cliché that the Soviets were committed to communist ideology, and by 
implication, sought world domination.61 
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Chapter Conclusion  
In the wake of the 20th Party Congress there were important changes to the 
perceptions held by many in the administration. The more nuanced outlook 
towards the changes in the USSR since 1953 advocated in various guises by 
Bohlen, Fuller, Armstrong, and Bowie, as well as Kennan and Halle outside the 
administration, proved to be prescient. Indeed, the inclination of Dulles in the 
closing months of 1955 to think that the Soviet Union was indeed changing to the 
benefit of the U.S. seemed to be coming true.  
The Secret Speech provided further impetus for this change in perception. 
Acceptance of destalinisation as something real that would have profound effects 
only U.S.-Soviet relations was proceeding apace. Yet perceptions of the USSR and 
its leaders intentions had only begun to change- perceptions that had been honed 
through years of interaction with the USSR and communism. The last few months 
of 1956 would make it clear to all concerned how far reaching destalinisation 
would be, and the impact it could have on U.S. policy. It was ironic then, that the 
events in Poland and Hungary illustrated to U.S. policymakers how important 
destalinisation was, and yet the outcome of the unrest would delay a wider 
acceptance of liberalisation in the USSR. But the opinion of Eisenhower and 
Dulles that destalinisation now needed to be taken seriously was not shaken as 
much as may have been expected, and this, perhaps more than anything, showed 
how far their perceptions had come since 1953.  
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Chapter 8: The Effects of Destalinisation before Poland and Hungary 
Many of the changes wrought by destalinisation were intended to remedy 
domestic Soviet shortcomings, but arguably the most pronounced results for both 
the USSR and U.S. were abroad. Significant events would occur in the satellites, 
and at a hectic time for the Eisenhower administration. The 1956 election would 
be decided in November and the campaign was well underway. Foreign policy 
concerns such as Indochina presented an increasingly difficult situation for the 
U.S.1 
A number of studies have covered the history of U.S. involvement in the 
satellites during 1956.2 However, these have not evaluated the effect that the 
Poznan riots, Polish October and the Hungarian Uprising had on the perceptions 
of destalinisation and of the Soviet leaders held by the Eisenhower 
administration. This gap is curious since a number of historians have noted that 
the U.S. response- insofar as there was a coherent response- served to solidify the 
division of Eastern Europe and highlight U.S. acceptance of Soviet domination.3 
This chapter is intended to highlight what the effects of these events were on how 
the administration perceived of the changes in the Soviet bloc since Stalin’s death, 
and specifically since the 20th Party Congress.  
In the saga of changing perceptions of Soviet leaders and the Soviet 
system over the 1953-56 period, the Soviet responses first in Poland, and then the 
crushing of the Hungarian Uprising, actually did not greatly affect already 
changing perceptions. One would have expected Eisenhower and Dulles to 
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conclude that Russian tanks in Budapest meant a return to Stalinism. However, 
this reversion never happened. Of course, public rhetoric remained hostile and 
spoke of freedom and the violence of Soviet communism. In private however, no 
one in the administration who had come to accept the reality of destalinisation 
prior to October changed their opinion of it as a result of Poland or Hungary. 
Those who had been opposed to the idea of destalinisation representing genuine 
change also remained opposed to any conciliation with the USSR. Both groups 
found reasons to maintain their convictions. This is not surprising since they both 
had found reasons not to change their positions in the progression of 
destalinisation in the satellites since February 1956.  
U.S. Evaluation of Destalinisation in the Soviet Bloc since the 20th Party 
Congress 
It did not take long for the U.S. to realise the implications of destalinisation 
for the satellites, if for no other reason than many in the administration saw a 
similar rationale behind destalinisation in both the USSR and the Soviet bloc. 
Dulles mused that the denunciation of Stalin could simply be a way of getting the 
population of the satellite nations to like the Soviets more.4 This was much the 
same rationale used in evaluating destalinisation and its domestic effects in the 
USSR. 
But less cerebral musings such as this should not be taken as indicative of 
all U.S. assessments of destalinisation in the satellites. The administration 
recognised the significant implications of destalinisation prior to the 20th Party 
Congress. In January NIE 12-56 forecast that over the next five years nationalism 
and deviationism would continue to spread in the Soviet Bloc. It also noted that 
Moscow would be willing to alter its method of control to take into account local 
conditions.5 This was actually less prescient than it sounded since the changes 
announced at the Congress were acknowledgements of policy alternations made 
since 1953. What it did show, however, was that the intelligence establishment in 
the U.S. noted the acceptance of both national roads to socialism by Moscow and 
the increased decentralisation of control.  
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The release of NSC-5602 in March highlighted the knowledge of 
destalinisation in the satellites and its possible implications. The NSC asserted 
that no upsurge in nationalism in the satellites would make the Soviets release 
them from their grip. This, in combination with improved relations with the West, 
would kill off any remaining hope of liberation in the bloc. The NSC highlighted 
the opportunities and dangers resulting from destalinisation in the satellites: 
An extended period of reduced international tensions and wider East-
West contacts would present problems for the Bloc as well as the West. 
The relaxation of harsh police controls may be difficult to reverse, and the 
promise of higher standards of living may be difficult to abandon. If a 
change in Soviet foreign policy required reversion to a policy of sacrifices 
enforced by drastic controls, internal discontent would result, although it 
could almost certainly be kept in check. A relaxation of domestic controls 
and of the atmosphere of hostility in East-West relations could, if 
continued over the much longer run, combine with other factors 
ultimately to create pressures for change within the Bloc...6 
 In the spring of 1956 it was clear to many in Washington that 
destalinisation threatened to destabilise the system the Soviets built. Jacob Beam 
noted that many of the leaders in the satellite nations were committed Stalinists- 
many appointed by Stalin himself. Destalinisation was a particular danger to 
them.7 The position of such ‘little Stalins’ meant that Dulles could publicly 
maintain scepticism of destalinisation in the satellites. He said the changes in 
Soviet control over the satellites were involuntary, and meant to shore up Soviet 
control, which appeared to be weakening. The appeal of Titoism inside the bloc 
was spreading.8 But it was an election year, and Dulles’ public stance was 
certainly influenced by the votes of Americans of Eastern European descent. The 
fact that the liberation rhetoric of 1952 proved to be hollow made this voting bloc 
even more vulnerable to be lost to the Democrats.9 Dulles would not say anything 
to give those with a special interest in the satellites reason to doubt the 
administration’s anti-communist credentials and the commitment to liberation. 
Yet his comments were also a public acknowledgement of change in the Soviet 
bloc. He raised the issue of Titoism: this was critical. It was seen as the antithesis 
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of Stalinism; after all, Tito was the only communist leader to have successfully 
resisted Stalin. Raising this topic in public indicated that Dulles was not only 
aware of the changes afoot, but also the gravity of destalinisation for the satellites. 
Poland and Hungary 
Although Poland and Hungary quickly proceeded with destalinisation, 
Dulles insisted that the Soviets were still firmly in control. The recent events 
indicated a ’thaw’ in Poland, but he did not think they were necessarily indicative 
of independent policy. Typically, he insisted that the changes in Poland were a 
result of outside pressures on Moscow and rebuffed the comments of the British 
ambassador in Poland who raised the possibility of a fundamental change in the 
Soviet bloc. Instead he directed the embassy in Warsaw to maintain established 
policy: the promotion of evolutionary change in the Soviet bloc- and to do this 
through a firm stance towards the Soviets, rather than appeasement or 
cooperation.10 Once again the 1956 election played a role: Weary of appearing soft 
on communism, especially to voters with links to Eastern Europe, Dulles did not 
want to be liable of charges of appeasement, even if such a line was to the 
detriment of the goal of promoting evolutionary change. The irony was striking. 
Dulles insisted on maintaining a firm stance towards the Soviets since he publicly 
doubted that the changes resulting from destalinisation were significant enough 
to alter Soviet objectives. Even though U.S. policy was to promote evolutionary 
change, it was rejecting indications of such change on the basis of the changes not 
being large enough.  
The Warsaw embassy responded to Dulles’ comments almost verbatim. It 
insisted that there was no real reform going on in Poland, and the Western media 
was getting ahead of itself. The changes were the result of communist ‘zig-zag’ 
and any debate over destalinisation was farcical.11 In contrast the PPS recognised 
the role of destalinisation, concluding that satellite nations were being allowed a 
much freer hand in implementing reforms. But it also noted that there was no loss 
of Soviet control.12 The OIR agreed with this assessment, adding that the satellites 
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were at the vanguard of destalinisation as far as correcting the abuses of one-man 
Stalinist style rule.13 Francis Stevens told a Time correspondent that Poland was in 
the lead in condemning Stalin due to its historic anti-Russian sentiment. The 
public was more at ease expressing discontent with the Soviets. This illustrated 
that Stevens at least grasped the importance of nationalism within destalinisation. 
But he underlined that far from expressing weakness, the fact that the Poles were 
allowed to embark so enthusiastically on destalinisation was an expression of 
how firmly the Soviets were in control.14 
By the end of April the OCB knew the situation was becoming volatile. In 
Poland representatives in the Sejm openly criticised the current Polish leadership 
for past cooperation with Stalin. Polish radio attacked trade unions for not 
protecting workers from Stalinist excesses. In Hungary Party members questioned 
whether there ever was a ‘right deviation’ under Nagy in 1953-54. In response, 
Moscow denounced those who used the mantle of destalinisation to attack the 
Party.15 Both the OCB and OIR were aware of openly expressed hatred towards 
Stalin and as was becoming apparent, the CPSU. The OCB and OIR analysis 
illustrated an increasing acceptance of the changes resulting from destalinisation.  
Although there was acceptance of the importance of destalinisation, even 
in Dulles’ public comments, the consensus was that Soviet control over the 
satellites was unchanged. The OCB noted that after a decade of Sovietisation, 
Moscow could loosen its grip without fear of losing control. The presence of 
Soviet troops, pliant political leaders, and Soviet advisors in the security 
apparatus of Poland and other satellites meant that instability was not a threat. 
Instead, the OCB asserted that the relaxation of Soviet control was a sign of 
toughness. The Soviets were maintaining control while eliminating policies that 
could be a liability. They could make these changes due to the strength of their 
position.16 This was one way to interpret the changes, but it missed the pivotal 
question of why the Soviets would make changes if their position was so strong? 
Why run the risk? No one in the OCB asked why such a gamble was being taken.  
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Destalinisation and the Poznan Riots 
When riots against communist rule broke out in Poznan on 28 June the 
immediate reaction of John Foster Dulles was to tell his brother that “[w]hen they 
begin to crack they can crack fast. We have to keep the pressure on.”17 The 
following day Poznan was the predominant topic at Dulles’ staff meeting. He 
thought that the Soviet economy was over-extended and the U.S. should maintain 
pressure. Later that day he told Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson that he 
found the developments in Poland encouraging. If the U.S. simply held its line, 
other satellites would “crack”.18 However, in these initial statements there was no 
mention of destalinisation. Rather, the emphasis was on how U.S. pressure led to 
the riots in the first place- rather than any intra-bloc events. This type of self-
congratulatory conclusion was not surprising. It was quite similar to the 
justification Dulles had applied for rejecting Soviet changes in 1953. Under 
pressure, Dulles in this instance seems to have reverted to the type of response he 
would have had towards the Soviets prior to 1956. In a way this was odd: At this 
point the Soviet response was not yet clear, so it cannot be said that the resultant 
Soviet-led repression of the riots led Dulles to believe that destalinisation was 
false after all.  
The OCB met to discuss how best the U.S. could take advantage of the 
situation in Poland. Addressing the meeting as the head of SWGS, Beam stressed 
that the Soviets would blame the West for the riots. In preparation, as well as to 
damage the Soviet position, he informed the OCB that the SWGS was 
disseminating to the media a U.S. offer of food to the Polish Red Cross, as well as 
maintaining the line that the riots were caused by dissatisfied workers. It was 
specifically decided that no encouragement should be given to any of the satellites 
to revolt or riot. In the coming weeks special emphasis would be given to 
investigating how Moscow dealt with the riots. The OCB suggested to Beam that 
the U.S. compile eyewitness reports; stimulate UN action in defence of peaceful 
protest; and invite a statement from the International Federation of Free Trade 
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Unions in support of the Polish workers.19 Beam’s office also compiled a number 
of similar suggestions for evaluation at the upcoming NATO meeting held to 
discuss destalinisation. The common theme was how Khrushchev was little 
different from Stalin.20 This theme fit with the general U.S propaganda line against 
destalinisation, and illustrated that publicly the State Department continued to 
doubt the veracity of destalinisation.  
With Soviet assistance the riots were quelled in a few days. It became 
clear, however, that although violence was used against the rioters, the aftermath 
was different. No mass purges or further violent repression followed. This caught 
the Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ attention, who discussed the apparent dilemma of 
the Kremlin: If it allowed further liberalisation, there could be more instances of 
revolt. If reverted to, as Dulles put it, a “Stalinist type of repression” then it would 
forfeit the gains it had made with the non-communist world in trying to appear 
civilised and reformed.21 Indeed, Eisenhower and Dulles hit upon the clearest 
manifestation of destalinisation for U.S. policy. They recognised the danger the 
Soviet Union faced in either direction. To be sure, Dulles distinguished between 
the use of force to put down the riots, and ‘Stalinist’ repression that could follow. 
But in discussing this eventuality they acknowledged that the Soviet leaders 
themselves were not operating as Stalinists. 
The CIA at times doubted the link between destalinisation and Poznan.22 
Yet it is hard to imagine the riots happening without the emphasis the 20th Party 
Congress gave to the doctrine of national roads to socialism. Furthermore, the 
protesters were certainly aware of the liberal image that Khrushchev and 
Bulganin were attempting to cultivate, as well as the recent release from prison 
and reinstatement of Wladyslav Gomulka, a reformist, to the Polish Workers 
Party. Indeed, the NSC noted the common developments in each satellite since 
Stalin’s death: reduced role of secret police, attacks on the cult of personality, and 
an emphasis on socialist legality. Along with different roads to socialism and the 
denigration of Stalin, the NSC thought these were the motivations behind the 
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developments in the satellites. The attack on Stalin introduced a significant degree 
of fallibility to the Soviet leaders, which in combination with the reduced power 
of the police and nationalism, led to greater demands for reform in the satellites.23 
Bohlen agreed with the NSC, but not with the CIA. He thought Poznan 
was a product of the post-Stalin relaxation. Bohlen found it easy to understand 
the outpourings of dissent in the satellites, where police power was curbed but no 
real redress for grievances given. Bohlen thought the best thing for the U.S. would 
be to stimulate continued relaxation.24 In this scenario, continued U.S. pressure 
could easily be counterproductive.  
Sentiments such as Bohlen’s would prove difficult for high-level 
policymakers, such Eisenhower, Dulles and others on the NSC, to reconcile with 
other considerations. Allies took various views on Poznan and the concurrent 
changes in the Soviet bloc, varying from Adenauer’s dismissal to Pineau’s 
optimism. The British meanwhile remained guarded, but more open to a Soviet 
thaw than the U.S. While in the U.S., a study of public opinion on the Soviet ‘new 
line’ found that Poznan caused many to reject the apparent Soviet changes as 
false.25 Time correspondents were quick to characterise the Soviet response to 
Poznan as Stalinist and to insist, contrary to even the administration’s 
acknowledgement, that there was no reduction in police power prior to the riots. 
The claim that Stalinist secret police methods were still in force was all the more 
extraordinary since Time also claimed that due to existing grievances, further 
outbreaks of violence were likely.26 It is hard to see how more unrest would have 
been forthcoming in the face of Stalinist-style repression. Harrison Salisbury 
provided an answer to the question of why the Soviet leaders would embark on 
such a risky course in the satellites: it was much the same as his reasoning for 
destalinisation inside the USSR. Salisbury thought destalinisation was meant to 
relieve pressure economic and political pressure on the Soviet system. The only 
other means of release, he argued, were war or revolution. But trying to let out a 
small amount of pressure could be more dangerous than trying to “keep the lid 
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on”. Indeed, brief periods of relaxation in the post-Stalin years previously led to 
unrest in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Tiflis.27 Such varying opinion among 
allies and the press provided no clear indication of how to interpret the unrest in 
the satellites within the larger context of destalinisation.  
Destalinisation and Changing U.S. Objectives towards the Soviet Bloc 
The fate of Eastern Europe concerned the administration even before it 
took office. But the Solarium exercise made it abundantly clear that little could be 
done to change the Soviet position in the satellites without risking war.28 As such, 
the objectives changed to reflect this. In December 1953, NSC-174 outlined the 
dangers involved in trying to detach a satellite. It argued that nationalism could 
be a powerful tool in reducing how effective the satellites could be as allies of the 
USSR, but not something that could effectively break down the bloc. NSC-174 also 
assumed Titoism to be an important element in a strategy to reduce satellite-
Soviet solidarity. But the overall objectives stated in NSC-174 remained both far 
reaching: “…the rights of the people in the Soviet satellites to enjoy governments 
of their own choosing”, and more immediate and practical: “[t]o disrupt the 
Soviet-satellite relationship, minimize satellite contributions to Soviet 
power…[and] to undermine satellite regimes.”29  
NSC-5501 looked at the Soviet threat more generally but also addressed 
the satellites insofar as the U.S. should exploit the differences between the 
Kremlin and satellite regimes in order to promote actions on the part of the Soviet 
bloc that would, at the very least, not conflict with U.S. interests.30 In order words, 
the administration sought to promote evolutionary change to the benefit of the 
U.S.  
The Soviet Vulnerabilities Project led by Max Millikan and Walt Rostow at 
CENIS prompted NSC-5505, the drafting of which overlapped with NSC-5501. 
The project’s report concluded that the U.S. should strive to “…promote 
evolutionary changes internally in the Soviet Bloc” as well as: 
…changes in Russian society [that] will tend, if only in the long run, to 
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reduce or remove the latent threat posed by that society to our way of life. 
These changes might occur by violent crisis and revolution or by gradual 
evolution.31  
NSC-5505 stated that the U.S. should:  
Seek to create and increase popular and bureaucratic pressures on the 
Soviet regime through the exploitation of discontents and other problems 
to promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and conduct… 
Therefore, the U.S. should seek:  
…to cause the regime to occupy itself increasingly with internal problems, 
…[and] [c]ontinue basic [U.S.] opposition to the Soviet system and 
continue to state its evils; but stress evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
change.32 
A progress report on NSC-5505 in January 1956 repeated these passages 
practically verbatim: 
…the promotion of revolutionary changes appears to be beyond our 
national capabilities, the promotion of evolutionary changes appears to 
offer the most acceptable course for the U.S….33 
Both the NSC and the White House were aware that change in the Soviet 
system could be so slow that it might be difficult to detect. This raises the question 
that if the administration expected change to be gradual, why were so many small 
changes in the Soviet system and behaviour after Stalin’s death so easily 
discounted? Why were they not studied further to see if they were indeed the 
types of changes that the report warned of? Even more interesting was the NSC’s 
conclusion that in pursuing this goal the U.S. should convince the USSR that their 
national security was not threatened.34 After the Geneva Summit and the failure of 
disarmament talks it is hard to see what the U.S. did to convince the Soviets of 
this. Indeed, the rhetoric of the administration in an election year would have 
militated against such reassurance if even it were to be given. Furthermore, not 
until some weeks after the 20th Party Congress did anyone in Washington 
seriously contemplate the veracity of the changes wrought by destalinisation. 
Such changes were certainly not subtle, and they would have fit with the idea of 
the promotion of evolutionary change as outlined so far. 
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Superseding NSC-174 in July 1956, NSC-5608 emphasised that Soviet 
control in the satellites was secure. But it acknowledged that the current events in 
the satellites were a reflection of destalinisation, Titoism was once again noted as 
an important source of friction in the bloc. The NSC recognised these 
developments meant the ability of the U.S. to sow disunity were improved.35 But 
NSC-5608 recommended little in terms of how to harness destalinisation to 
benefit the U.S.  
Destalinisation’s Bitter Fruit: October-November 1956 
Gomulka’s re-emergence as leader of the PWP was representative of both 
nationalism and anti-Soviet sentiment. Evidence from the period indicates that 
the administration understood the effects of destalinisation in Hungary in the 
same manner. Policymakers saw differences between the satellites insofar as 
nationalism was a factor, but Soviet Communism provided a paradigm with 
which to interpret and compartmentalise the twin crises of Poland and Hungary 
in October-November 1956. The crises were always spoken of in a manner that 
illustrated that the high-level members of the administration grasped that they 
were not separate. Indeed, Poland and Hungary were almost always spoken of in 
the same breath. Therefore, they are discussed in the same manner.  
There were, however, differing interpretations of destalinisation’s 
repercussions. From the outset the PPS and OIR were aware that destalinisation 
formed the basis of the crisis not only in Poland, but also underpinned the current 
tension with Moscow. Indeed, the OIR’s analysis emphasised that Gomulka was 
taking actions that were specifically anti-Stalinist in character, such as de-
emphasising collectivisation. He publicly denounced the effects of the cult of 
personality, saying it created a “hierarchical ladder” that extended from Moscow 
through the satellites. OIR saw specific importance in the last point, since the 
Kremlin never viewed Soviet control of Eastern Europe as one of Stalin’s 
mistakes.36  
Allen Dulles understood the close relationship between Poland and 
Hungary. He told the NSC that the worsening crisis in Hungary threatened the 
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newly stabilised situation in Poland. The Soviets could well go back on their word 
if they felt that Gomulka could not be trusted, or if the deal reached with the Poles 
was likely to instigate demands elsewhere. Dulles noted Gomulka’s speech about 
the Soviet economic system, which he deemed -overstatement unintended- as 
“the most violent denunciation of the entire Soviet economic system which had 
ever been issued anywhere from any source.” He realised, however, that there 
were important differences between the two situations. Gomulka presented clear 
but not drastic aims, while the situation in Hungary lacked leadership. Dulles 
noted that it was quickly coming to represent a stark choice for both Hungarians 
and Moscow. Either the Soviets would need to resort to “Stalinist control”, or 
permit reforms toward democracy that could lead to a total loss of authority. 
Harold Stassen seconded Dulles. Stassen claimed that the Soviets would have to 
“revert to the old harsh policy of Stalin toward the satellites, or else they would 
have to let things go on as they were going”, which would lead to a loss of 
Hungary. Eisenhower agreed, noting that if the Soviets reverted to “the Stalin 
policies, then they would stand bankrupt before the whole world.”37 
The administration knew that Hungarian Socialist Workers Party leader 
Mátyás Rakosi was an increasing target of attack as a result of destalinisation. The 
U.S. legation in Budapest suggested that the U.S. should launch a propaganda 
effort to make Rakosi’s position even more difficult for Moscow to support.38 
Allen Dulles highlighted to the NSC the danger that destalinisation was posing 
for the Soviet position in Hungary: there was considerable unrest, but the U.S. 
was distracted by Poznan. The Central Committee Degree of 30 June was clearly 
meant to put an end to any discussion and restore order among communist cadres 
before further unrest could erupt. Of course, Dulles thought the U.S. should see to 
it that the debate about Stalin continued. He recommended publishing all 
information the U.S. had about Khrushchev’s speech and its implications for 
Hungary.39 The administration was aware of the effect that destalinisation was 
having, and sought to capitalise on Soviet troubles. It indicated an understanding 
of the overt changes resulting from Stalin’s denouncement.   
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As summer progressed the administration became increasingly concerned 
with the effects of destalinisation. Soon after the crisis in Poland and the unrest in 
Hungary began in earnest, U.S. policy toward the satellites officially changed. 
Now the objective would be the emergence of national communist movements in 
each satellite.40 The NSC grasped, if belatedly, the importance of the ideological 
revisions that were made after Stalin’s death and codified at the 20th Party 
Congress. Indeed, if the NSC were swifter perhaps more could have been done to 
stoke the flames of nationalism in the bloc. As it was, it took until 26 October, and 
the crises in Hungary and Poland, to prompt changes to the national security 
strategy. Such changes were not approved until 31 October. Destalinisation was 
the cause that prompted the change in objective. The administration could hardly 
claim to have had any influence on events in Poland or Hungary. Yet the NSC 
framed it thusly: 
Developments in Poland appear favorable to the early attainment of this 
objective. The Gomulka government has proclaimed its “national 
independence and equality” and has asserted its right to pursue its own 
internal road to “socialism”…In Hungary, a nationalist movement, 
similar to that in Poland, was triggered into national revolt by the 
intervention of Soviet troops called in by the Hungarian government in 
the first hours of its difficulty. The demands of the people on the 
government have since gone far beyond those originally sought and are 
now anti-communist as well as anti-Soviet.41 
Indeed, if not for the secrecy of the NSC debates over destalinisation one could 
have concluded that the changed objective was a way for the administration to 
claim a foreign policy success. It was a clear case of moving the goal posts, 
especially as the NSC made clear in its conclusions that there was little the U.S. 
could actually do to influence events.42  
The stated objective of promoting evolutionary change in the Soviet bloc 
was progressing, albeit not through any efforts of the U.S. The NSC 
acknowledged destalinisation as the driving force. Poland had claimed “mutual 
independence and equality” while maintaining its loyalty to Moscow. In this 
instance, rather than seeing continued fealty to Moscow as something that made 
                                                       
40 Richard Davis, “Developments in Poland and Hungary: U.S.Policy and Courses of Action in the 
Light Thereof,” October 28, 1956, RG59, PPS Subject Files 1954-62, Box 113,  S/P Working Papers, 
Oct 1956, NARA This paper would become NSC 5616. 
41 NSC-5616, FRUS: 1955-1957, Vol. 25, 354–358; Richard Davis, “Developments in Poland and 
Hungary...” 
42 NSC-5616, FRUS: 1955-1957, Vol. 25, 354–358. 
Chapter 8: Destalinisation and the Satellites 
 
 
 
232 
Poland’s changed line inconsequential, the NSC recognised the importance. The 
U.S. should maintain the course set by NSC-5608/1 by emphasising its 
willingness to discuss all issues with the Kremlin. It should also be careful not to 
appear too willing to offer assistance to Gomulka, lest this taint him by 
association. But the situation in Hungary was more difficult. The frequent 
changes in leadership and open defiance of communist authority prevented 
stabilisation. U.S. intervention was out of the question. Rather, the U.S. needed to 
encourage cautious liberalisation that would discourage Soviet intervention.43  
But as the reality of Soviet intervention in Hungary became clear, the path 
Poland took towards national communism was in doubt. Whereas the Poles made 
it clear that they would remain allied with Moscow, the Hungarian uprising took 
on an explicitly anti-Soviet tone. Allen Dulles thought that Gomulka could be 
removed by the Soviets due to the bloodshed in Hungary.44 All the U.S. could do 
was reassure the Soviets that the U.S. had no designs on Hungary. Foster Dulles 
did so, but to no effect.45  
The crushing of the uprising had a predictable effect in the media. Those 
commentators who never gave credence to destalinisation pointed to the Soviet 
use of violence as proof of the continued reality of Stalinism and the fact that 
Soviet reforms were purely for show. Some contended that Hungary could 
actually be a turning point in Soviet policy abroad, and others thought Hungary 
could be a harbinger of the collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. For 
those that thought of Hungary as such a pivotal moment the wisest move would 
be for the U.S. to ‘nourish’ independence movements behind the Iron Curtain. Of 
course, commentators provided little detail on what this entailed. More realist 
commentators supported Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ refusal to involve the U.S.46 
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Walter Lippmann thought the tragedy of Hungary was that it tried to bypass 
Titoism.47  
The Aftermath of the Hungarian Uprising 
The impact of the Hungarian Uprising on the satellites in general was 
closely scrutinised. The OIR provided the PPS with a detailed report in the 
drafting of NIE 12-57. The report concluded that destalinisation significantly 
increased the strain on the satellite system. But outside Poland there was little 
progress in altering the relationship with Moscow. Soviet troops were up to the 
task of keeping order and the only change was that the commitment to violence of 
local forces might have been lessened by destalinisation. This small change 
notwithstanding, OIR’s conclusion was not very optimistic:  
The Soviet European satellite system has been subjected during the past 
year to greater stresses than at any previous time, largely due to the 
repercussions of Soviet de-Stalinization at the 20th CPSU Congress…A 
prime result has been the highlighting of Moscow's determination and 
capability to hold fast to the Eastern European area, by military force if 
need be, and to maintain Communist governments in alliance with the 
USSR throughout the regions.48 
To be sure, the OIR did note the perverse result of destalinisation in the satellites: 
It opened up new avenues to national interpretations of communism- for a 
period- but the Soviets subsequently made clear that no satellite would leave the 
communist fold.  
The tendencies encouraged by destalinisation were present throughout the 
Soviet bloc. Only in Poland and Hungary did they burst into the open. The 
crushing of the Hungarian revolt quashed any enthusiasm for independence from 
Moscow in the rest of the satellites. Yet the OIR saw Poland as the bright spot in 
the situation. If Gomulka could hold on to his gains, then this could over time 
encourage further independence from Moscow in other satellites.49 Russia experts 
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outside the administration, such as Kennan, supported the OIR’s conclusions.50 Of 
course, such independence from Moscow was a result not only of the 
decentralising tendencies of destalinisation unleashed at the 20th Party Congress. 
It was also a consequence of the broader destalinisation campaign since Stalin’s 
death. Allen Dulles stressed that the current debates about the nature of 
communism in Moscow, Belgrade, Beijing and Warsaw were all a direct result of 
the lack of a “clear communist gospel”51 that had developed since 1953.  
But destalinisation’s effects did not only flow outward from Moscow. The 
situation in the satellites also impacted the progression of destalinisation in the 
USSR itself. Since 1953 the Kremlin had embarked on differing forms of 
liberalisation. The progression was not always smooth, and at times regressive. 
This led the administration to often conclude that Stalinism would yet return, and 
through the Geneva Summit there remained a nagging inclination to dismiss 
destalinisation. Not everyone took this view, especially not Bohlen. He noted at 
various points the ongoing changes and repeatedly suggested alterations to U.S. 
perceptions of destalinisation in order to better assess the U.S. position light of 
these changes. He did so again after the Hungarian uprising in an effort to shed 
light on how the satellites might have changed the situation in the USSR. He 
concluded that there had been little effect. At first he was concerned about 
student unrest, which led to public questioning of the regime.52 These outbursts 
soon subsided and Bohlen concluded that the regime was secure. The military 
remained committed to the supremacy of the Party. But critically there was no 
reversal to any of the policies announced at the 20th Party Congress despite the 
unrest in the satellites and in the USSR. Bohlen realised destalinisation was still in 
force. To be sure, there was a crackdown on excessive criticism of the Party, but 
there was still room for discussion, and this was worlds away from life under 
Stalin. Purges were now a thing of the past. Indeed, Bohlen thought the discontent 
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of the intelligentsia could even lead to further concessions to some segments of 
society.53 
Chapter Conclusion 
In the months after the 20th Party Congress the U.S. paid close heed to the 
developments of destalinisation in the satellites. The initial conclusion was that 
they did little to change the reality of Soviet control. This understanding persisted 
through the riots in Poznan. Even after Polish October many clung to the belief 
that the Soviets were merely allowing the Poles the semblance of independence, 
and that the reality of Soviet domination would soon enough reappear. Behind all 
of this was the persistent perception of the Soviets as cunning and conspiratorial. 
The State Department and CIA tended to give the Kremlin too much credit; they 
often concluded that if things did not appear to be going well for the Soviets, this 
must be part of the plan. But it was Dulles with his reformed view of the Soviet 
leaders who thought that the Soviet leaders were not out to hoodwink the West 
by letting the satellites have a degree of independence, or at least some reforms.  
But the Hungarian uprising made the reality of destalinisation abundantly 
clear. It was undeniable that it even if it were part of a Soviet tactic to undermine 
the West, as the more paranoid doubters persisted in believing, it nonetheless was 
an important issue that the administration needed to address. Yet there is no 
evidence that the events in the satellites changed perceptions of the Soviets from 
what they were just prior to the events in Poland and Hungary. It would have 
been understandable if Dulles and Eisenhower had changed their minds and 
rejected the Soviet changes since the Secret Speech, and more broadly since 1953, 
as hollow due to the crushing of Hungarian resistance. But this did not happen. It 
was, to paraphrase from Arthur Conan Doyle, a situation where the dog did not 
bark. At the same time, those who never changed their perceptions of Soviet 
Communism as a result of destalinisation found their reticence vindicated.  
There is a lack of evidence in this period on this issue. Between the 
uprising and the end of 1956 there is no evidence of any re-evaluation of this 
changed perception of the Soviets that Eisenhower, Dulles and others held. Some 
of this is due to the fact that at this time Dulles underwent an operation for the 
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stomach cancer that would later kill him. The absence of evidence does not tell us 
one way or the other, but it is reasonable to conclude that there were numerous 
conversations of how the uprising affected U.S. perceptions of the Soviets. These 
conversations were either informal or were not recorded. However, the 
progression of U.S.-Soviet relations proceeded in the years following the uprising 
suggests that Eisenhower and Dulles did not revert to an understanding of the 
Kremlin as beholden to Stalinist thought. They certainly were not viewing the 
Soviets in the same manner as they had in 1953. Both domestic and alliance 
politics had changed, and therefore this was an easier position to defend. But 
crucially, Soviet actions both inside the USSR, and in the satellites helped confirm 
to the Eisenhower administration that the Soviets, despite the crushing of the 
Hungarian revolt, were acting out of self-preservation rather than reverting ‘to 
type’. Indeed, the very fact that the Soviets were undertaking destalinisation at all 
finally sank in. Eisenhower and Dulles realised that the Soviet hand was forced in 
Hungary. To them the hesitancy of the Soviet intervention was proof of the Soviet 
reticence to use force. For Eisenhower and Dulles this confirmed their belief that 
the Soviet leaders were distancing themselves from Stalinist methods. The Stalin 
they conceived of, or his lackeys, would not have hesitated to crush the uprising 
in Hungary, nor would he have tolerated Polish intransigence. Indeed, they knew 
that under Stalin the situation would not have occurred at all. They had fully 
come to accept the reality of destalinisation.  
 Just as the Soviet leaders were hesitant, Eisenhower was extremely 
cautious, almost to the point of giving the Soviet intervention the benefit of the 
doubt.54 There was little need to do this. He could have issued stronger messages 
of support but chose not to. U.S. rhetoric was measured. This was partially due to 
the ongoing crisis in Suez. Eisenhower realised the limitations on action, but 
could had made Hungary a much larger issue. This belied a different 
understanding of Soviet intentions than during the 1953 riots in East Germany 
and other satellites, when U.S. rhetoric was stridently anti-Soviet and sought to 
capitalise on the events for the sake of U.S. propaganda. This time U.S. action was 
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limited to an attempt at a UN resolution, which it expected the Soviets would 
veto, and accepting Hungarian refugees.55 
It was clear to Eisenhower and Dulles that the Soviets were forced to act in 
order to preserve the Warsaw Pact. They separated this need for action from 
destalinisation and the changes in the USSR since 1953. For Eisenhower and 
Dulles, the fact that destalinisation was proceeding despite the uprising was proof 
of destalinisation as something much more than a tactic. The reforms in Poland 
remained and the anti-Stalin campaign in the USSR continued. This led 
Eisenhower and Dulles to conclude that the Soviets acted out of simple self-
preservation rather than any sort of ideological reversion to Stalinism. Indeed, 
Hungary and Poland led to a solidification of the status quo in Eastern Europe 
that was useful to both the U.S. and the USSR. This acceptance of Soviet 
domination has not been highlighted before, at least not in this time frame. It is 
credited as one of the items that the U.S. needed to recognise in order for détente 
to take hold in the 1960s, and would later be formalised in the Helsinki Accords. 
But the roots of the U.S. acceptance of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe was in 
reality closely bound up with American acceptance of destalinisation and the 
effects of the 20th Party Congress. 
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Conclusion 
The immediate period after Stalin’s death witnessed the genesis of 
destalinisation. Scholars have not ignored this era. But the conspicuous feature of 
this literature is its exclusive focus on 1953. The most prominent studies of how 
Stalin’s death affected the West, such as Larres and Osgood’s excellent volume, do 
not look past the initial period of transition of power in the Kremlin.1 At most, the 
contributors examine the period up to the Geneva Conference.  
As my thesis has shown, it is vitally important to trace how Washington 
perceived the origins of destalinisation, and its radical expansion at the 20th Party 
Congress. As early as 1953 many officials understood the link between Stalin’s 
death and what would develop into destalinisation. Yet historians have failed to 
examine Stalin’s death in combination with destalinisation. This is a serious gap 
in the existing scholarship.2 Other works reconsider the period after Stalin’s death 
as a chance to end the Cold War, but do not assess the period after 1955.3  
This thesis addresses such shortcomings.  It shows that when examined 
with a longer view, the role of destalinisation in changing U.S. perceptions of the 
USSR becomes much clearer. Such an examination matters since so much Cold 
War history has been based on an assumption of unrelenting U.S. hostility 
towards the Soviets from the onset of the Cold War until the beginnings of 
détente in the 1960s. While there was certainly a baseline level of hostility and 
mistrust throughout the Cold War, this varied according to time and 
circumstance. The period under examination is of critical importance since it 
shows the genesis of the transition from total mistrust and rejection of anything 
Soviet towards a more moderate perception of the Soviet system that was 
ultimately compatible with détente. Some in Washington began to express a more 
accepting view of destalinisation in late 1955, but this only became the view of 
Eisenhower and Dulles after the 20th Party Congress. Without the challenge to the 
American mindset that destalinisation presented, culminating with the shock of 
the Secret Speech, U.S. leaders undoubtedly would have taken years longer to 
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accept that Stalinism was no longer the Kremlin’s ruling idea. Because of the 
Secret Speech, Washington was able to develop a more nuanced view of Soviet 
actions and intentions, which in turn allowed the second Eisenhower 
administration to improve relations with the USSR. This set the foundations for 
the détente that followed in the 1960s. 
Domestic and Foreign Factors 
Although the Cold War would continue for almost another 40 years, the 
changes that began in 1953 would have profound implications for the tenor of 
Soviet-American relations. Stalin’s death not only allowed the Soviet leaders to 
pursue different avenues towards their objectives, but it also led to farther 
reaching changes that would have serious implications in Washington.  
The Eisenhower administration started to reassess its perceptions of Soviet 
Communism in this period. This reassessment led to its changed view of the 
tactics and behaviour of the Soviet leaders. But improved relations relied on 
viewing Soviet Communism in a different light. The well-known détente of the 
1960s and 1970s necessitated a new understanding of the Soviets and their 
intentions. If the Soviet leaders had still been regarded as Stalinists, little 
improvement in relations would have been forthcoming. It is hard to imagine an 
ushanka-clad Gerald Ford bear-hugging Brezhnev in Vladivostok, or even Nixon 
debating with Khrushchev at the Moscow World’s Fair if the Soviet leadership 
had still been regarded as unceasingly hostile. 
 Because relations with the USSR were so tense in the 1950s, historians 
have largely overlooked this period when exploring whether Washington could 
have developed a new understanding. As this thesis has shown, however, this is 
exactly when such a re-evaluation began. The first Eisenhower administration 
was pivotal in this regard. Many of the officials involved were extremely resistant 
to the idea that the Soviet leaders could change, or that Soviet Communism 
would ever be anything but aggressive and expansionist at the expense of the U.S. 
Yet some of these same officials, including most crucially Dulles, would also come 
to accept a different view of the Soviets by the end of 1956.  
Dulles was perhaps the most resistant to the idea of change in the Kremlin 
up to the end of 1955, and it was not just his rigid mindset that was responsible. 
Domestic political opinion and alliance politics were important, to an extent. In 
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1953-54 the power of the Republican right made it extremely dangerous for 
officials to challenge the accepted image of the Soviets as expansionist Bolsheviks. 
One only need to look to Dulles’ demands for “positive loyalty” or Eisenhower’s 
refusal to stand up for General Marshall during the 1952 presidential campaign to 
see the Republican right’s power.4 But by the middle of 1954, this danger had 
significantly, though not completely, receded. Eisenhower and Dulles were men 
who had proven their anti-communism, and in Eisenhower at least, their 
leadership abilities. If anyone could have challenged the accepted view of the 
Soviets and their methods it was them. Yet the views expressed in the 
administration about the Soviets and the changes in the USSR remained the same: 
They were either rejected, or were accepted only with the caveat that they made 
the Soviets more dangerous. Either way, the Soviets remained communist, so the 
administration regarded the changes undertaken by the Kremlin as 
inconsequential.  
Until 1955, Washington had another reason to maintain an element of fear 
in its perception of the Soviets: alliance diplomacy. The Kremlin’s own actions 
were taken in part to make the Soviet Union seem less threatening. Washington 
regarded this as dangerous to the Western alliance. Prior to the integration of the 
FRG into NATO in 1955, the State Department was apprehensive about Western 
European security. This helped prevent a reassessment of the Soviet changes. As 
one would expect, few in Washington changed their view of the Soviets in this 
period. 
Significantly, though, there is no evidence that either domestic politics or 
alliance diplomacy proved crucial. Eisenhower and Dulles certainly did not revise 
their perceptions of the Soviets in the months after McCarthy’s implosion in the 
Army hearings. Nor did they change their views after the FRG was integrated 
into NATO.  To the contrary, heading into the Geneva Summit, Dulles thought no 
differently of the Soviets than he had in 1953. Clearly their perceptions were 
deeply engrained—so much so that the easing of domestic anti-communism and 
the solidifying of NATO did not allay their fears. It was the monumental events of 
the 20th Party Congress that finally unlocked a new perception of the Soviets.  
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Years of sustained signals of change from the Kremlin after Stalin’s death 
failed to influence the administration. Instead it made most sense to policymakers 
to fit these new signals into existing perceptions of the Soviets. Washington had 
heard talk of peace and amicability from the Kremlin in the past, so there was 
little initially to indicate that something was different now. Work on perceptions 
has shown that people are more apt to fit new information within existing 
frameworks of thought if at all possible. Furthermore, from a tactical standpoint, 
far more can be gained in the short run through deception than honesty.5 The U.S. 
suspected the Soviet leaders of this sort of duplicity.  
Thus, in the years after Stalin’s death, rather than confront the changes 
that were occurring in the USSR, the administration continued to rely upon an 
explanation of the changes as merely tactical and unrepresentative of any wider 
alteration in Soviet strategy. The U.S. did not know of the internal division the 
Soviet reversals were causing. The administration, relying on the perception of 
the Soviets they had cultivated since 1917, concluded that any changes would be 
readily reversed when it suited the Soviet leaders most. Eisenhower publicly 
explained this in the closing days of the 1952 election.6  Indeed, American officials 
did not doubt that the Kremlin would soon revert to its violent and deceptive 
foreign policy—that, after all, had always been the case in the past. Soviet history 
and ideology had a powerful effect on Dulles’ and Eisenhower’s conception of 
how the Soviets operated. They ascribed far too much explanatory power to 
communist ideology in determining Soviet foreign policy. Yet ironically, when 
serious alterations to this ideology began to appear, they also dismissed them as 
irrelevant as long as the Soviets remained communists. The inconsistency was all 
the more boggling because from 1955 onward encouraging evolutionary change 
was stated U.S. policy.  
 
U.S. Perceptions of Stalinism and the Soviet System 
Key officials had good reasons for the image of the Soviets that they held 
in the first years after Stalin’s death. From the American perspective Soviet 
Communism had long been an enemy of the liberal capitalist society. The 
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antipathy began with the October Revolution and the subsequent Russian 
separate peace with Germany. Thus from the start the relationship between the 
West and the new Soviet state was, from the Western perspective, based on 
betrayal. Indeed, this was part of a larger image of the Bolsheviks as cunning, 
conspiratorial, and violent. The Cold War did not begin in 1917, but its 
foundations can most certainly be found there, as the memoirs of Kennan, Bohlen 
and others attest.7 The experiences of these men had a great impact on how they 
viewed the Soviet Union. Indeed, this was the heyday of the study of 
totalitarianism, and such thinking meshed well with the mindset that Eisenhower, 
Dulles and others held as the Cold War began. At the same time, a small industry 
was created around the study of the Soviet Union.8 
In the post-war period the fundamental disagreement of the U.S. and 
USSR was laid bare. Soviet actions in Eastern Europe after the German defeat 
were understood through the perceptions of the Soviets as Bolsheviks who sought 
to conquer the world. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe meant that the menace 
of Bolshevism that existed in the 1920s-30s was now a very real threat. The Soviet 
state was thought to espouse everything antithetical to an American way of life: 
elimination of private property, the destruction of individual freedoms, atheism, 
and even slavery. Many in the Truman administration cultivated this Manichean 
image to justify various actions.9 But the prevalence and depth of this perception 
cannot be attributed merely to such cynicism. The image of the Soviets was one of 
ideologically driven zealots who were now frighteningly powerful. Of course the 
men who made the decisions in the Truman and later the Eisenhower 
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administrations were no less ideological themselves.10 It was merely their 
perspective that differed. To them, liberal capitalism was the norm, and 
communism was the ideological aberration. Thus many looked to the study of 
Soviet ideology in order to understand the actions of those in the Kremlin. There 
was, as is often the case in rivalries, a severe lack of introspection. Until the rise of 
the New Left in the 1960s few questioned what the U.S. role was in the hostilities. 
Thus, history was vitally important in moulding the view of the Soviets held at 
the beginning of the Eisenhower administration.11 In this situation the historical 
perception that numerous policymakers formed of the Soviets played a role in 
how they responded to developments in the USSR. In the absence of good 
intelligence about the intentions of the new Soviet leaders the inclination of those 
in the Eisenhower administration was to fit changes into the perception they had 
formed not only in the post-war period, but since 1917. This represented a 
significant barrier to the formation of a new understanding of the Soviets. 
 
Initial Challenges to Perceptions, 1953-54 
The Soviet leaders changed both their policies and their manner of 
interaction with the West after Stalin’s death. Yet due to how U.S.-Soviet relations 
had progressed since the Second World War, policymakers in Washington 
dismissed these changes out of hand. They viewed efforts to improve relations as 
false: mere ways to trick the West into a false sense of security. Indeed, the USSR 
did have a dual purpose in initiating change in the opening phases of 
destalinisation. Its peace offensive was a case in point. The Soviets truly desired 
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peace. A war with the West would be devastating for the USSR. Yet Kremlin 
leaders also saw the peace offensive as a wedge to divide Western allies. Because 
the U.S. interpreted the latter objective as perfidious, the overall Soviet desire for 
peace was assumed to be as well. As a result, the administration remained 
convinced of Soviet hostility. This was the beginning of a tendency in the 
administration to dismiss any change in the Kremlin because they viewed a select 
few Soviet actions though the established lens of the Soviets as conspiratorial and 
dishonest. Indeed, the overwhelming position was that the change in Soviet 
attitude was simply tactical. Bohlen was the only exception to this when he 
stressed that a much more fundamental shift in the Kremlin was beginning. 
Although he expressed this in numerous cables to Dulles and others, he was not 
taken seriously. At this point it still made sense to the majority, not to mention the 
most influential, in the administration to explain the Soviet shifts in terms of 
tactical moves. There was not yet a long-term history of sustained change on the 
part of the Soviets that could sway doubters.   
Popular opinion was an important consideration in this period. There was 
little to gain and much to lose by appearing conciliatory towards the Soviets. 
Numerous voices in Congress, not least of which was McCarthy, waited to jump 
on any indication of softness towards communism. Thus any motivation within 
the administration to challenge perceptions or policy towards the Soviets was 
seriously undermined, and the freedom of action of Eisenhower and Dulles 
constrained. 
Furthermore, the lack of intelligence about the Soviet leadership meant 
that it was dangerous to for the administration to plan for anything but the worst-
case scenario. Even if there had been the political will to investigate the Soviet 
changes more closely the administration was constantly grasping at straws when 
assessing who was in charge. This mattered since the Soviet leadership was the 
best indication of the direction Soviet policy would take.  
After Beria’s execution and throughout 1954 the administration spent a 
great deal of time and effort trying to discern whether there was a power struggle 
in the Kremlin in order to try and ascertain what direction Soviet policy would 
take. Therefore, Malenkov’s effort to expand light industry was particularly 
scrutinised. However, perceptions of Soviet intentions remained such that even 
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serious changes in economic policy were disregarded as indications of lasting 
change. The shifts in economic priorities were thought to be temporary and could 
be reversed when it suited the Soviets or were the result of an expanding Soviet 
economy that could provide both guns and butter. In this regard, the best-case 
scenario was that the Soviets were duplicitous, and in the worst case they were 
aggressive. By the end of 1954 the consensus was that the Soviet leaders were 
fundamentally unreformed and in fact remained Stalinists.  
 
Indications of Change, but Doubt Remains in Force, 1955 
 Malenkov’s downfall led to a great deal of discussion whether there 
would be a return to Stalinism. Khrushchev’s bombastic nature and support for 
heavy industry seemed to indicate that he would be a hardliner. However, when 
he persisted with a number of reforms that could not so easily be categorised as 
‘Stalinist’ the administration nevertheless dismissed the possibility that he was 
taking the USSR in a new direction. Once again, the U.S. understood any changes 
as actually increasing the danger to the West.  Policymakers dismissed reductions 
in the size of the Soviet military and changes to the planned economy in this way. 
The administration did not see Soviet actions as an improvement since they were 
thought to increase the danger posed by Soviet Communism. 
Indeed, 1955 was a period when the Soviet leadership stabilised around 
Khrushchev, and thus the U.S. could be sure whom it was dealing with. Yet the 
debate over the stability of the collective leadership remained and this had 
implications for U.S. policy. If the leadership was indeed stable, then the U.S. 
could proceed with either talking to Khrushchev or countering Soviet moves. If 
the leadership was unstable, then caution dictated that the U.S. should hold 
course and continue to express doubt about changed Soviet tactics. The latter 
interpretation won out.  
All this ran parallel to the divisions between different factions in the 
administration over the fundamental nature of the Soviet leaders. Those like 
Bohlen, who thought that the collective leadership was firmly in place, believed 
that ideology was being twisted in the service of policy. He, and others, did not 
see the Soviet leaders as ideologues, but rather as reasonable men that could be 
bargained with. Others such as Dulles and the DRS felt that the leaders remained 
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zealots, and therefore Soviet ideology was a good predictor of future actions. For 
Dulles and the DRS, it did not matter if the immediate tactics were more peaceful, 
since they were still being used in service of Soviet Communism. The result of this 
interpretation was that Dulles and the DRS discarded as false any actions that 
were ostensibly meant to improve relations since the Soviets remained 
communist.  
Popular opinion, never decisive, now played an even smaller role in these 
changing perceptions. By 1955 McCarthy was a spent force. Although visceral 
domestic anti-communism could not be discounted, it was nowhere near as 
powerful as it had been in the first two years of the administration. Furthermore, 
the Democratic majorities delivered in the 1954 mid-term elections meant that the 
power of the isolationist wing of the Republican Party was blunted. Therefore, if 
Eisenhower and Dulles had sincerely wanted to probe Soviet intentions in 1955 
they could have. They had the anti-communist credentials to rebuff any charges 
of being soft on the Soviets. No one could seriously accuse Eisenhower of being 
unpatriotic.  
At the same time Western European allies were pushing for a meeting 
with the Soviet leaders. These allied governments faced a popular desire to lessen 
Cold War tensions. Concurrently, the FRG was integrated into NATO, 
strengthening Western defences. Despite the popular desire for a meeting and 
improved Western defence Dulles and the State Department pursued the Geneva 
summit with half-heartedness. They gave more thought to rebuffing Soviet 
disarmament proposals and preventing Eisenhower from making agreements that 
could be ‘detrimental’ to the U.S. than to achieving lasting agreements.12 The 
Soviets were still seen as dishonest and conspiratorial and this prevented 
meaningful negotiations. 
                                                       
12 The best overall treatment of the summit is: Bischof and Dockrill, Cold War Respite; See also 
relevant chapters in Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace; Klaus Larres, “The Road to Geneva 1955: 
Churchill’s Summit Diplomacy and Anglo-American Tension After Stalin’s Death,” in The Cold War 
after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Richard 
Immerman, John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990); Rosenberg, Soviet-American Relations, chap. 5–6; On how the administration attempted 
to prevent Soviet disarmament proposals from gaining traction see: Osgood, Total Cold War, 183–
216; The Quantico panel thought reduced tensions would be to the detriment of the U.S. “Report of 
Quantico Vul. Panel.”  
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The 20th Party Congress Changes Perceptions 
Prior to the convening of the 20th Party Congress the consensus in the 
administration was that little would change as a result of it. But it soon became 
clear that a major shift was underway. Though most often remembered for 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, this was only one of the reasons that the 20th 
Party Congress was a major concern for the administration. The U.S. and allied 
governments paid a great deal of attention to any indications of leadership 
changes. It soon became clear, however, that although Khrushchev was the most 
powerful man in the Kremlin, collective leadership was alive and well. The other 
major event of the Congress was the enshrining into doctrine of several 
ideological shifts that had taken place since Stalin’s death.  
From the beginning of the 20th Party Congress Stalin and his legacy were 
under attack. Both the Moscow embassy and those in the State Department and 
CIA in Washington watched as the Soviet leaders severely criticised Stalin’s cult 
of personality. Collective leadership was praised at all times. When Khrushchev 
and the other leaders were not criticising Stalin’s policies, they omitted him 
entirely. The leaders resurrected Lenin to substantiate any points of doctrine. In 
all of these developments, Washington suspected that Soviet intentions were 
deceptive. American eyes saw only the dangers. Even when the U.S. learned of 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin this position did not change much in the 
short term. Various intelligence sources confirmed that the Secret Speech 
irreversibly destroyed Stalin’s memory. But U.S. perceptions of the Soviet 
leadership and its ideology meant that the reasons for attacking Stalin were 
doubted. For the Eisenhower administration, destalinisation was inconsequential 
because the Soviets remained communist. Herein lay the contradiction: those in 
the administration who thought that ideology was a good indication of the Soviet 
leaders’ intentions also rejected that an alteration of ideology could be the 
harbinger of change. Foster Dulles was most prominent among these doubters. 
Others, such as his brother Allen, were not as beholden to the idea of the Soviets 
as ideologues. He initially rejected destalinisation on the basis that it was merely a 
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“Trojan corpse”, meant to promise to the Soviet people a better life and to leftists 
abroad a more attractive form of Soviet Communism.13  
Khrushchev’s attempt to reform the image and ideology of Soviet 
Communism threatened the administration. The 20th Party Congress stressed 
peaceful coexistence, national roads to socialism, the end of the inevitability of 
war thesis, and announced a ‘third camp’ of neutral nations. These were all things 
that, on the face of it, the administration could welcome. But the peaceful nature 
of these revisions was precisely why Washington initially found them so 
dangerous; the Soviets were altering their ideology to appeal to the neutralists 
and leftists abroad. The administration thought that convictions mattered little to 
the Soviets: it was all about increasing the appeal of Soviet Communism. This 
conformed to the idea of the Soviets as both ideologically driven and 
opportunistic. Policymakers thought the Soviets remained avowed communist 
that were willing to temporarily forego ideological purity in order to advance a 
communist victory. Thus, in a perverse way, the Soviets remained conspiratorial, 
expansionist, and even Stalinist to the administration.  
But in the months following the 20th Party Congress an extremely 
important change occurred. This gathering provided the shock Eisenhower and 
Dulles needed to realise that destalinisation was in fact not something being done 
to undermine the West. They accepted that the changes in the USSR since Stalin’s 
death were not all meant to undermine the West, nor done as tactical manoeuvres. 
In so doing, their perception of the Soviet leaders changed substantially. 
Eisenhower and Dulles no longer regarded them as completely distrustful and 
out for the destruction of the West. To be sure, Dulles still found communism 
repugnant, and held considerable reservations about Khrushchev and the others 
in the leadership. However, he came to accept that the Soviet leaders could be 
dealt with in the same manner that one would with other, non-communist, 
adversaries. This was the beginning of a serious change of heart, one that would 
lead to a more open-minded understanding of the Soviets that would be 
compatible with détente. 
                                                       
13 “Speech to Los Angeles World Affairs Council: ‘Purge of Stalinism,’” April 13, 1956, AWDP, Box 
105, Folder 1, ML. 
Conclusion 
 
 
249 
 Perhaps the most counterintuitive finding of the thesis is that despite the 
violence of the crushing of the Hungarian Uprising, there is no evidence of 
Eisenhower or Dulles reversing the modified view of Soviet Communism that 
they adopted after the 20th Party Congress. It would be logical to conclude that 
tanks in Budapest would have led to a reversion to the perception of Khrushchev 
and others as Stalinists. Yet this did not happen. Rather, the hesitant and limited 
response of the Soviets in Hungary, in combination with the maintenance of the 
reforms in Poland, led Eisenhower and Dulles to conclude that the Soviets acted 
out of self-preservation and did not indicate a reversion to Stalinism. Indeed, 
Hungary and Poland resulted in a solidification of the status quo in Eastern 
Europe that was useful to both the U.S. and USSR. This brought the U.S. closer to 
a mindset suitable for détente that had implications for U.S. policy after 1956 in 
the form of increased diplomatic and cultural exchange and the improvement in 
relations that continued until the U-2 fiasco scuttled the Paris summit.14 
Dulles realised the importance of the changes in the USSR before many 
others in the administration. He was certainly ahead of many of his underlings in 
the State Department. From a hierarchical standpoint, his opinion was the only 
one other than Eisenhower’s that truly mattered in foreign policy making. 
Nevertheless, it took until the Secret Speech for him to change his perception of 
the Soviets. Dulles held firm convictions. His universalism meant that any 
challenge to the ideals of liberal democracy would be fit into an ‘us versus them’ 
framework. The Soviet menace could easily be accommodated into such an 
understanding. In the face of persistent evidence that the Soviet leaders were 
quite different from Stalin, he steadfastly refused to allow for the possibility of 
change in the Kremlin until 1956. Yet this does not make Dulles unique- few 
noticed or believed that the change in the Kremlin was real until after the 20th 
Party Congress. It was those who did that were the outliers. Therefore, it would 
be incorrect to assume Dulles rejected the change in the Kremlin due to innate 
rigidity, as the orthodox view of him would suggest. He was no more rigid in his 
views than Eisenhower or most of his subordinates. He cannot be singled out for 
failing to alter his perception of the Soviets sooner. Rather, he can be criticised for 
failing to be aware of his perceptions or to question his own views. This is most 
                                                       
14 See, for example: Rosenberg, Soviet-American Relations, chap. 8–12. 
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evident in his conviction that Soviet actions were influenced by Soviet ideology. 
When intelligence reported that Soviet ideology was actively changing, as soon as 
1953, rather than anticipating a Soviet change in course, he rejected the changes as 
phony and meant to trick the West. Dulles’ flaw was not that he was doctrinaire, 
it was that he was inconsistently so. 
Dulles was also a cautious man, and certainly not prone to quick decisions. 
His caution was based not only on his mistrust of the Soviets, but also his concern 
over allies and domestic politics. However, he was not overly wary in his 
thoughts about destalinisation and Soviet leadership change; he came to accept 
these changes before most of the administration. He can be accused of being 
politically cautious, often to the point of callousness.15 But from the historical 
perspective that he relied on in his understanding of the Soviets this caution was 
entirely necessary.  
Dulles had questioned his perception of Soviet motives since the Geneva 
Conference. The 20th Party Congress provided the shock he needed to come to a 
new conclusion about the Soviet leaders. The Soviets were certainly still the 
enemy, but he came to realise that the threat had substantially changed, and 
indeed had lessened. To his credit, rather than fit the new information provided 
by the 20th Party Congress into his exiting perception, he fashioned a new one. 
This is not meant to imply that Dulles was progressive in his thinking. 
That label would be better applied to others whose views of the Soviets preceded 
Dulles’ and provided the foundation for his own change in perception. Bohlen 
was the most prominent among these. He challenged the Washington consensus 
of the Soviets as early as 1953. His relationship with Dulles, however, prevented 
his ideas from gaining traction. This was much the same with others who 
recognised the importance of destalinisation earlier. Dulles’ perception of the 
Soviets was too engrained and required much greater evidence to be altered.  
Bohlen’s realisation that destalinisation was a serious change in the USSR 
that needed to be considered in policymaking contrasts with Dulles’ reticence. But 
it also reflects a wider pattern among those who came to advocate a more 
nuanced view of the changes in the USSR versus those who continued to reject 
them. As mentioned, Dulles and DRS, believed that Soviet ideology offered not 
                                                       
15 His treatment of Bohlen, Charles Thayer and Kennan are the most prominent examples of this. 
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only an explanation of Soviet actions, but also an indication of where Soviet 
policy was heading. Bohlen, however, felt that ideology was usually moulded in 
the service of Soviet political aims.  
The amount of experience with Soviet affairs, and proximity to Moscow, 
had a deep effect on how those in the administration interpreted Soviet actions. 
There was an inverse relationship between the amount of time spent in Moscow 
and the belief that the Soviets were slaves to their own doctrines. Dulles had 
limited direct exposure to the Soviets prior to becoming Secretary of State, 
attending only foreign ministers meetings with his counterparts dealing with the 
post-war settlement and the founding of the UN. Between 1953-1956 he only met 
the Soviet foreign minister four times.16 
With the exception of a very brief tenure on a Russian affairs committee in 
1918, Dulles was no more interested in communism than he was in many other 
foreign policy issues until the end of the Second World War.17 His involvement in 
forging a post-war settlement thrust him into dealing extensively with the Soviets. 
He studied Marxist-Leninist doctrine to help understand the Soviet mentality. In 
particular, Stalin’s Problems of Leninism caused him to form a perception of the 
Soviets as unflinchingly bound to communist ideology and wedded to 
conspiratorial methods. He blamed the Soviets personally for preventing the 
world he wanted to create via ecumenicalism and the UN. His involvement in 
numerous post-war foreign ministers meetings also gave him the impression that 
the Soviets were obstructionist of Western intentions, and expansionist in their 
own schemes.18  
 In contrast, Bohlen (and the other members of his staff in Moscow such as 
Jacob Beam and Robert Tucker) had spent significant time either in Moscow or in 
other capitals with active communist parties. In particular, Bohlen was one of the 
first men trained by the State Department in the 1920s when the need for Russian 
specialists was recognised. He was on the staff of the first U.S. embassy in the 
                                                       
16 Dulles’ foreign travels are listed here: 
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/secretary/dulles-john-foster 
17 Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy, 
Biographies in American Foreign Policy, no. 2 (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 7; 
Preston, Sword of the Spirit, 452–453. 
18 Section on Dulles in the introduction, as well as: Hoopes, Devil and Dulles, chap. 5; Preston, Sword 
of the Spirit, 451–457. 
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USSR after relations were normalised.19 These Foreign Service officers studied the 
Soviet Union in great detail for many years and gained a first-hand appreciation 
of Soviet society. This enabled them to see that ideology was often changed in the 
service of Soviet policy, and not the other way around. Bohlen was the first to 
seriously urge a rethink of how the Soviets were understood. His presence in 
Moscow played a key role in this. Better able to appreciate the nuances of the 
political and social atmosphere in the USSR, he could see that destalinisation 
mattered a great deal for the U.S. as soon as it began in 1953. Perversely, his 
position there as Ambassador meant that he could not create policy, and could do 
little to influence it, and could only ‘observe and report’. This was part of the 
reason why Dulles was keen on him being there. 
Location also mattered in that it had a deep impact on the ability of 
policymakers and analysts to express their views of the Soviets. Some of the most 
perceptive analysis of destalinisation came from people who at some point were 
stationed in Moscow, either as diplomats or journalists. The further one was 
removed from Washington, the less the analysis was affected by political 
considerations. The danger posed by McCarthyism in the 1953-54 period meant 
that it was dangerous for anyone in Washington to write a report that was not 
stridently anti-Soviet.  
Dulles and Bohlen had vastly different experiences with the Soviets. The 
result was that when Soviet policy and ideology changed, Dulles saw this process 
as transient or tactical. Dulles maintained this position until 1956, when the 
monumental changes that were part of the 20th Party Congress forced him to 
reconsider his conceptions of the Soviets. Bohlen, in contrast, was able to place 
destalinisation into his broader experiences with the Soviets. This enabled him to 
sooner realise the magnitude of the changes in the USSR. The closer one was ‘to 
the action’, the sooner the gravity of events would prompt a change in perception.  
The importance of perception in foreign relations cannot be understated. 
In the Cold War of the 1950s it was perhaps at its most influential. Destalinisation 
offered myriad opportunities for changing the relationship between the USSR and 
the U.S. This thesis has filled that gap. It has offered an examination of the longer-
                                                       
19 T Michael Ruddy, The Cautious Diplomat: Charles E. Bohlen and the Soviet Union, 1929-1969 (Kent, 
Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1986), chap. 1; Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969, chap. 1. 
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term effects that destalinisation and the leadership changes associated with it had 
on U.S. perceptions. Of course none of this happened in a vacuum. Domestic 
politics and the relations with allies played important roles in when and how 
perceptions changed. Ultimately, however, it was perception that influenced 
decisions most. The 20th Party Congress had the greatest effect on changing such 
perceptions. This thesis highlights how decision-makers need to be completely 
aware of their predispositions towards adversaries, just as they need be aware of 
other influences in their decisions. It serves no one to judge whether Eisenhower 
and Dulles could have ended the Cold War during their tenures. But if there is 
one lesson to be learned from the period under study in this thesis, it is that future 
policymakers should take heed of the role that perception played in the decision 
making of the Eisenhower administration, and scrutinise their own prejudices in 
order they may take the most beneficial decisions possible without needlessly 
abiding outmoded mindsets.  
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